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During the 1990s it was my student experience of the absolute boredom of Dutch 
politics that triggered a desire to deepen my understanding of political philosophy. 
The spectacle of politics as a prestigious playground of experimentation for 
increasingly younger politicians with a candid aversion to political ideology but 
an undying appetite for institutional change—it was a challenging sight. Today it is 
still embarrassing to observe politicians who are incapable of distancing themselves 
from daily politics. Apparently, they need to retire first, start to hang out with pop 
stars, and visit charity events before they can begin solemnly contemplating wisdom 
and reflecting on that “crazy short-term circus of politics” they were once part of. 
I wish for politicians with the talent to transcend journalistic observations, while 
showing a cautious attitude in the execution of their mandated power; people capable 
of providing a stable legal mainframe, while not being seduced and swayed by the 
grotesque and sometimes sad media events in our daily life. Political questions are 
complex and need plenty of experience and thought. It is not enough to master the 
manipulative art of media communication, believing that to show strong will power 
is the practical quintessence of democratic accountability.
 This work took me considerable time to finish, yet I find solace in the words 
of Aristotle that “a young man is not equipped to be a student of politics.” With a 
project like this, many people are involved—despite the fact that writing is a solitary 
business. I am grateful to Samira Benlaloua (for use of laptop), Coert Noordermeer 
(for use of laptop), Koos Levy-van Halm (for study accomodation), Ineke Sijtsma 
(for editing), Paul and Pia Coenjaarts (for study accommodation—and the finest 
baked potatoes), Felix Janssens (for use of printer), Ailsa Montagu (for editing), 
Gerrie and Hein Meijers (for study accommodation), and Contemporary Political 
Theory (for kind permission for reprinting parts of Chapter 3).
 I especially thank Shulamit Kleinerman for master editing the complete 
manuscript; I am glad we met at the last moment as the result is so thoughtful and 
perceptive. 
 Thank you to Joyce and Erik for being dear to me, Charly for our special 
friendship, and thanks to all my other friends for putting up with an academic. 
Thanks to Hein, who designed the book and who I consider my great moral 
motivator. I am proud to have him on my side. 
 I thank Jeroen van den Hoven, for inspiration and for the trust with which 
he invited me to start writing this book—although the result is not as initially 
intended. Many thanks to Wibren van der Burg for carefully and critically reading 
the manuscript and, most of all, for being the best of help in difficult times. He has 
shown patience and conviction throughout the latter part of this research. Extra 
thanks to Jerry Gaus, for whose generous willingness to comment on my writings 
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experiencing Liesbeth’s gripping lectures on law and philosophy in that summer 
of 1995—while smoking Belgas in the classroom with co-tutor Niels—I certainly 
would not have come so far as finishing a doctoral dissertation. It’s crazy.
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Since the 1990s, many political scholars have argued that the opposition between 
liberalism and republicanism has been successfully challenged by deliberative 
democracy.1 Scholars of deliberative democracy take the political system to be an 
association governed by the deliberation of its members.2 They aim to rejuvenate the 
idea of democracy as popular self-government, maintaining that political decisions 
should be (as much as possible) the result of public deliberation and discussion. As 
John Rawls puts it: “The definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of 
deliberation itself.”3
 The “deliberative turn”4 in political theory is seen as a landmark attempt to 
break through a familiar dilemma in political theory: whether to give priority to the 
rule of law, as emphasized by liberalism, or to popular sovereignty, as emphasized 
by republicanism. Jürgen Habermas, who has provided deliberative democracy 
with much of its philosophical foundation, explains the model’s popularity: It 
“invests the democratic process with normative connotations which are stronger 
than those found in the liberal model but weaker than those found in the republican 
model.”5 Deliberativists thus reject a purely legalist conception of politics, but 
hold on to the liberal priority of the right over the good. Likewise, although they 
oppose republicanism’s perfectionism and paternalism, they maintain its emphasis 
on citizenship.6 Liberalism and republicanism should be seen as friends, then, not 
foes. Political justice is the ultimate political goal, but one which can be fairly 
established only through public and reasonable deliberation: “the struggle to make 
something public is a struggle for justice,” Seyla Benhabib writes.7
 Deliberative democrats are critical, however, about the current state of public 
discussion. They fear that private interests are dominating the political debate and 
that people increasingly act as consumers. Benjamin Barber remarks: “Public 
citizens must be restored to their proper place as masters of their private choices.”8 
Political decisions differ from market decisions because they are made after 
public deliberation. Market decisions, in contrast, are made merely with a view to 
optimally aggregate certain particular interests.9 Barber’s fear is a weak democracy, 
his challenge to empower democracy through participation and discussion. We need 
what he calls a strong democracy: “a political community capable of transforming 
dependent private individuals into free citizens and partial and private interests into 
public goods.” 10 Cass Sunstein agrees resoundingly with Barber: “To work well, 
a deliberative democracy had better have many such people. It cannot function 
without them. And if many people are able to benefit from wider exposure, it is 
worthwhile to think about ways to improve the communications market to their, and 
our, advantage.”11













n consumerism but to other social issues as well.12 With the growing influences of 
non-Western and popular cultures, scholars of deliberative democracy stress the 
importance of publicly discussing moral conflicts and differences of cultural 
meaning. As Dutch writer Paul Scheffer puts it: “Without a ‘we’ society will not 
hold, without critical concern society will be fragmented.”13 The point is this: 
we have chosen an open society and we cherish a pluralism of values, yet such a 
political system will hold together only by means of a critical and collective process 
of self-examination. The challenge of cultural pluralism should be met, according 
to Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, by securing “a central place for moral 
discussion in political life.”14 Public deliberation makes politics more inclusive, 
more democratic; it gives people a chance to discuss and decide on issues that 
affect them all. This implies, though, that before preferences can be accepted as 
democratically legitimate, they need to be exposed to public scrutiny.
 On the face of it, I might be inclined to subscribe to the deliberative intuition; 
after all, what could possibly be wrong with discussion in a democracy? How can 
anyone committed to the common good seriously disagree with it? Why oppose 
the notion that politics rests on the participation of citizens, and that moral dissent 
should emerge in civic discussion? Indeed, it could be argued that to live in a 
democracy implies that I may expect that my fellow citizens will put the general 
interest before their own and that they will provide well-thought-out explanations 
and justifications for their preferences. To act selfishly, in political terms, would 
amount to downright oppression.
 On further reflection, however, I find doubts cropping up. Politics as public 
deliberation: is that truly the essence of living in a democracy? Does closing 
the alleged gap between citizen and politician with more debate really increase 
democratic legitimacy? Should politics be measured by the quality of civic 
discussion? If I consider more carefully, what do I personally value most about living 
in a democracy—having public discussions about political matters, or experiencing 
private happiness that is safeguarded by a trustworthy government? What do I think 
is important in politics—exerting as much influence in political decision-making as 
possible, or putting trust in officials who adequately represent my sovereignty? 
 Although portraying the choice like this seems rather black and white, if not 
academic, ultimately it makes sense, I think. It points at a persistent double issue 
in our times: the politicization of public debates and the popularization of politics. 
Daily politics often looks like a media event, a pitch of popular ideas, while many 
public discussions tend to gain immediate political importance, evoking state action. 
Both these phenomena are the effect of the deliberative approach to deal with what is 
sometimes called the “democratic deficit”: the growing political influence of private 
preferences, on the one hand, and the growing gap between public discussion and 
political decision-making, on the other. Deliberative democrats see the democratic 
deficit as detrimental to political legitimacy, arguing that if individual citizens are 
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increasingly unqualified (or unwilling) to assess their thoughts, and if politicians are 
increasingly unwilling (or unqualified) to sympathize with needs of the public, the 
democratic system will not survive. These thinkers suggest that public discussion 
will remedy the democratic deficit—that individuals will improve their preferences 
and become better citizens by using their public reason, while state officials will 
learn to be more democratically accountable by getting in touch with their citizenry. 
The idea of public discussion has become the all-around fix for the democratic 
deficit, a proxy for democratic legitimacy.
 The time has come to question whether publicly scrutinizing private 
preferences is really a means to raise the democratic legitimacy of politics. Instead 
of further integrating public discussions and politics, perhaps it makes more sense 
to distinguish between them again. On the one hand, we need to put more trust in 
the way people operate in their surroundings, how they use those experiences as a 
way to preserve a democratic way of life. On the other hand, we need to rethink 
the other aspect of democracy, how public authority should govern civil society. 
Surely, the idea of democracy is that the public decides on how things should be 
done politically, but in practice the public’s efforts to raise the quality of life take 
place in local settings and usually have an effect on only small groups of people. 
As banal as this might sound—or perhaps, to some, dangerous—it is this civil 
environment that politics ought most urgently to preserve and protect. In addition, 
it is important to bear in mind that what you and I might generally think to be 
important and precious is very hard to translate into political terms. Just as I cherish 
my health and expect to have a say about how to care for my body, I want to 
trust—and be able to expect—the physician to do what is right, in the end. I simply 
do not have the bigger picture in front of me. I am happy, often eager, to publicly 
discuss things I deem important with my fellow citizens, but I know at the same 
time that the political perspective about these things is complex, not something that 
can be easily dealt with, let alone justified, by a framework of public deliberation. 
To think politically about these things is to reflect on how to legally organize and 
govern the institutional interrelationship of these subjects about which we think and 
deliberate. The inverse applies to politicians: although—like any citizen—they will 
have ideas about the moral value and quality of things, putting those ideas directly 
into a prescriptive policy is not appropriate. In sum, political discussions are not 
simply public discussions about what is morally valuable, and conversely, moral 
discussions are not simply political discussions about how things should be done 
and managed.
 This book takes up the deliberative intuition and critically examines its 
origins. The legitimate question is whether the justification of the political system 
should be so closely connected with the public discussion and validation of 
preferences and values. I will argue that the plea for public discussion in politics is 













n in political theory. It is the effect of a political paradigm that I call politics as will 
formation. According to this paradigm, politics evolves around the issue of how to 
deal in a democratic way with people’s opinions, interests and preferences.15 The 
conception of politics as will formation centers on the communicative dynamics, 
which originated in the Enlightenment, between private (or strategic) and public (or 
reasonable) preferences. In that era, the idea of political governance based on the 
idea of subjective autonomy arose. The “we question” was introduced in politics—
that is, how society was to be managed by the public. The answer was thought to 
rest in the preparedness and capability of each citizen to rationally relate his or her 
motives of self-interest to the bigger picture of the polity. The expectation was that 
out of the public use of the citizens’ reason, a political collectivity would develop.16 
The central question, according to politics as will formation, is how the will of the 
citizen can be transformed into a politically legitimate will.
 I propose an alternative conception to politics as will formation, which I 
call politics as jurisdiction. This conception is based not on the public/private 
distinction between selfish and selfless preferences, but between state authority and 
civil autonomy. Politics as jurisdiction does not connect political authority with 
processes of will formation—it strictly distinguishes between them. It is concerned 
with achieving the right balance between, on the one hand, the desirability of 
an autonomous realm of civil practices and, on the other, the inevitability of the 
interventional authority of the state. Politics is not the result but the condition of 
processes of will formation; its legitimacy lies not in the quality of will formation 
but in the representative framework of public authority through which civil practices 
of will formation are put into a political whole. Politics as jurisdiction is about 
finding the right relationship between the representative power of public authority 
and the relative self-sufficiency of civil society—an intricate and tactful task which 
no one has described more eloquently than Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “How to find a 
form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with 
the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself 
with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.”17
 To some, politics as jurisdiction might be reminiscent of the familiar—
Rawlsian—distinction between private good and public justice, but, in fact, it is 
quite different from it. The distinction between civil society and political authority 
is not preferentially defined, it does not run parallel to the distinction between the 
pluralism of private values and the unity of a public conception of justice. Politics 
as jurisdiction is not geared towards a system of public reason that is shared by all 
citizens, denoting the polity’s constitution, as it were. As I will explain, sharing 
reason politically is something much more complex and harder to put in words.
 The political jurisdiction of civil society requires an understanding of 
society’s workings, its processes of meaning-giving and will formation. The 
political question, therefore, is not how to distinguish between public and private 
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values but how to balance the execution of political power in relation to the task 
of understanding and organizing processes of will formation. Politics in the end is 
based on the awareness of how people produce meaning and knowledge and how 
to legally organize the institutions in which people try to make the best out of their 
lives by forming their beliefs, preferences and desires.
The structure of the book is as follows. In Part One, I explain the insufficiencies 
of politics as will formation and argue for the importance of politics as jurisdiction 
from different perspectives: historical, analytical, and epistemological. In Part Two, 
I continue to develop and illustrate the argument of Part One by way, unavoidably, of 
a distinctive political-theoretical history of the “public” and “private.” My intention 
is first to demonstrate the different roots of both politics as jurisdiction and politics 
as will formation and then to present a collection of ideas that form the building 
blocks of politics as jurisdiction. For this political-historical approach, I have 
explicitly chosen to show a broader historical foundation of politics as jurisdiction. 
Inevitably, as a doctoral thesis, my study leaves much for future research. Two 
ambitions in particular will need to be developed in a more detailed way: first, 
politics as jurisdiction could more finely be compared against different strands 
of contemporary political theory, and second, current (global) politics should be 
analyzed more closely in relation of politics as jurisdiction.
 In Chapter 1, I explore the moral idea behind politics as will formation, called 
the “publicity imperative.” Under this theoretical imperative, the expectation is that 
people will improve their private preferences by publicly discussing them. I argue 
that the publicity imperative hampers an adequate perspective on political issues, and 
I introduce three topics to exemplify this: the debate about the democratic potential 
of the Internet, Richard Rorty’s ironist critique on liberalism, and the question on 
the relation between freedom of religion and freedom of speech. I argue that in all 
these debates the political problem at hand is viewed as an issue of political will 
formation. My conclusion is that a moral perspective is too narrow for an adequate 
political theory. A more complex conception of politics is called for; and this means 
a fresh investigation into the conceptual merit of the public/private distinction.
 In Chapter 2, I argue for the importance of the public/private distinction in 
political theory. The distinction may clarify some basic ideas that inform political 
theory, such as the publicity imperative. It could be said that political theory is 
affected by metaphysical impressions of the world, which should be made explicit 
during analysis. The public/private distinction is worthwhile in this respect, because 
it is a conceptual bridge between intuition and theory. I further examine the link 
between metaphysics and the conceptual constructiveness of the public/private 
distinction by reviewing Raymond Geuss’s Public Goods, Private Goods (2001). 
Contrary to his own rejection of metaphysics, I believe Geuss’s book nicely shows 













n view of a political philosopher’s position in the world and explains how a theoretical 
stance proceeds from a personal intuition about the world.
 In Chapter 3, I provide a critique of politics as will formation and introduce my 
alternative conception of politics as jurisdiction. At the basis of politics as jurisdiction 
lies the public/private distinction between “society” and “state.” To bring this claim 
into perspective, I analyze Jon Elster’s classic defense of deliberative democracy. 
Elster understands political theories in light of two sets of characteristics: he asks 
first whether the political process is private or public and then whether the political 
purpose is instrumental or intrinsic. The combined results of these two questions 
result in three views of political theory (liberal, deliberative, and republican), of 
which only the latter two make sense to Elster. Both entertain a “forum approach” 
to politics, claiming the essence of the politics to be public deliberation of private 
preferences. In my discussion, I ask why Elster did not analyze the fourth model, 
in which the political process is private and the political purpose intrinsic. I explain 
his omission by referring to his underlying paradigm of politics as will formation. 
An alternative approach, politics as jurisdiction, strongly improves the plausibility 
of the missing fourth model of will formation (which I call “civil democracy”), 
as it strictly distinguishes between the political and civil aspect of democracy. 
Politics understood as “jurisdiction” is concerned with acquiring and holding the 
balance between the implementation of public authority and the preservation of the 
institutional autonomy of civil practices of will formation. Political jurisdiction is 
the practical effect of the idea of popular sovereignty: in order to be free, people 
hand over their sovereignty to a public authority that ought to take care of their 
civil liberty. This surrender breeds, to a certain extent, public alienation, and in 
this regard, the legitimacy of public authority (the state) cannot be directly tied to 
democratic will formation, because it would undermine the political contract. The 
public discussion about political legitimacy should be concerned with the way the 
state legally preserves and intervenes in the institutional freedom of civil practices 
of will formation.
 Chapter 4, the final chapter in the first section of the book, is an epistemological 
analysis of political theory. I scrutinize three postulates of political theory, that are 
heavily influenced by pragmatist epistemology and often recur in contemporary 
literature. The first postulate is that political theory is practical, not metaphysical, 
because it needs to bring solutions to social problems. The second is that political 
theory is social-constructivist, because, like all theory, it constructs reality. The last 
is that political theory is intersubjective, because its conclusions need to be justified 
to those whom it concerns, i.e., the people. I critically analyze the three postulates in 
the light of what I consider to be a key epistemological issue: the essential difference 
between experiencing and describing the world. This “epistemic problem” leads to 
a classification of three orders of social construction of knowledge: non-rational 
(zero order), tacit (first order) and rational (second order). Pragmatist epistemology 
does not strictly distinguish between these orders of construction, a lack that has 
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influenced contemporary political theory a great deal. Pragmatic communication 
evolves around tacit knowledge, from which perpective rational knowledge only 
gives technical guidance to communication, while non-rational knowledge has no 
meaning in communication until put in words. In Chapter 3, I argued that deliberative 
democracy is flawed precisely because politics is studied as a public process of 
rational will formation. In Chapter 4, I explain the pragmatist epistemology behind 
deliberative democracy: it understands political theory as a normative theory 
which deals with people’s beliefs. These beliefs are understood as first order 
social constructions—provisional and continuously under public construction. 
The other aspects of communication, non-rational and rational, however, are, in 
their own right, imperative for any political theory, as well. Revisiting the three 
postulates, I first argue for political theory as a third-order construction. Political 
theory reconstructs second-order rationalizations (institutions, rules, protocols, 
regulations) of first-order and zero-order knowledge in the light of the need to put 
them into a legal whole. Second, I argue that political theory is not just “practical” 
but also “metaphysical,” because it needs to incorporate the non-rational aspect 
of knowledge as well. I conclude by claiming that, although political theory can 
be said to be intersubjective, it is not intersubjective in a rational sense but in a 
symbolical sense.
 In Chapters 5 and 6, I develop the model of “civil democracy” by examining 
the public and private in Greek political theory. My complementary intention is 
to present an account of the Greek—meaning especially the Athenian—political 
tradition that is more balanced than a modernist account, which is heavily 
influenced by liberalism. Greek political theory is depicted as precisely the opposite 
of the modern liberal tradition. I argued previously that in the light of the great 
influence of the publicity imperative, a liberal picture of modern democracy is 
quite misleading. On the other side of the modern idea of freedom lies a critical 
awareness of private preferences. Greek political theory, in this respect, could be 
characterized as more liberal than the modern tradition, because, as I will argue, the 
distinction between will formation and jurisdiction is more strictly drawn. It is a 
modernist misunderstanding to depict Greek political theory so republically, while 
emphasizing the liberal strands in modern political theory.
 In Chapter 6, I concentrate on Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of “public” 
and “private.” Plato generally interprets the public/private distinction as a distinction 
between politics and knowledge, and he elaborates it twofold: as a relation between 
individual and political ethics, on the one hand, and as the private pursuit of justice 
and truth within a public framework of law, on the other. Aristotle expands the 
double Platonic private/public distinction by asking what knowledge we can actually 
share, and how we can manage that knowledge. Aristotle considers both questions 
essential political issues, because a political regime can be constituted only if it is 













n of sharing and managing knowledge is based on distinguishing between three types 
of rational knowledge (technical, practical and theoretical) and two values of civil 
self sufficiency (institutional plurality and human pluriformity). Aristotle argues 
that the object of politics is to find a mean according to which citizens can develop 
themselves in the best way—which implies respecting the inherent limit of political 
unification: sharing knowledge itself is inherently limited, but so is politically 
managing society. With Aristotle’s development of Plato’s position, we arrive at 
an important argument concerning the dual task of politics as jurisdiction, which 
is to understand both the epistemological status of processes of will formation 
and the task of political management. Political theory, in Aristotle’s words, is of 
a “controlling kind.” In our words, it is a third-order construction: it studies the 
authoritative organization of democratically institutionalized knowledge.
 In Chapter 7, I set out three modern conceptions of the public/private 
distinction. The idea of democracy can be explained as comprising three subjective 
senses of “publicness”: depicted, first, by the existential public/private distinction, 
which concerns the relation between the subject and existence (the world); second, 
by the moral distinction, which concerns the subject’s relation with other men 
(society); and thirdly, by the political distinction, which concerns the relation 
between the subject and authority (the state). A comparison between Rousseau and 
Kant will bring into perspective the two philosophers’ different approaches to these 
distinctions. Rousseau explains very well the differences between the three aspects 
of modern publicness, while Kant is focused on moral publicness, which he sees as 
the core of modern politics. Kant’s theory is the classic apology of politics as will 
formation. By means of the public use of reason, he explains, man is in contact with 
his fellow beings, able to think about what it takes to politically constitute society. 
Rousseau’s political philosophy seems similar but is in fact very different, because 
he fears that the moral dynamics of reason will undermine the political commitment 
by making the legitimacy of public authority dependent on will formation. Next 
to moderating moral publicness, Rousseau is concerned with safeguarding the 
subject’s existential sentimentality, which leads him to advocate the importance of 
politics as jurisdiction.
 In Chapter 8, I explain, by introducing the political writings of Marx, Mill, 
and Dewey, how Rousseau’s fears have become real; that is, how the domination 
of the moral public/private distinction has led to a political discourse in which both 
existential and political publicness have disappeared. Put differently, the political 
subject is being characterized by his moral publicness: his ability to publicly 
transform his private inclinations is the source of state legitimacy. This has led to 
what I call the double bind of the public sphere: the public sphere is seen as a place 
where both moral preferences are constructed and political legitimacy is created. 
The erroneous effect is a political understanding of public discussions and a moral 
understanding of political discussions.
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 In the Conclusion, I return to the main theoretical aspects of the study, and 
put them into perspective by sketching the relation between politics as jurisdiction 
and a particular civil practice, using a religious school as an example.
(Notes)
 1 A few passages of this introduction follow G. Drosterij (2007) “Mind the Gap: Three 
Models of Democracy, One Missing; Two Political Paradigms, One Dwindling.”
 2 E.g. J.L. Cohen (1988) “Discourse Ethics and Civil Society,” pp. 12-24. J. Cohen 
(1997) “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” p. 67; A. Gutmann and D. Thompson 
(1996) Democracy and Disagreement, p. 12.
 3 J. Rawls ([1997], 2001) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” p. 138. Henceforth: 
“Idea of Public Reason Revisited.”
 4 J. Dryzek (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
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The Publicity Imperative: The Moralization of Politics
1.1 Introduction
Below I sketch my approach to political theory. More specifically, I explain what 
I consider to be the main idea in political theory today: the publicity imperative 
(section 1.2). I will illustrate some problematic implications of the publicity 
imperative by elucidating the high expectations that some political/legal scholars 
ascribe to the democratic potential of the Internet (section 1.3). The next section 
(1.4) introduces the main analytical viewpoint of this book: the distinction between 
public and private. That section shows how a certain interpretation of the public/
private distinction clarifies the dominance of the publicity imperative in political 
theory, and how this dominance obstructs a view of politics that is more layered.
1.2 What is the problem? The publicity imperative
My fascination with political philosophy took shape after reading Jürgen Habermas’s 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Max Weber’s The Protestant 
Ethic, and Immanuel Kant’s “What is Orientation in Thinking?”18 All these works, 
although written in different times and from different perspectives, have as their 
subject a very typical characteristic of modernity. They deal with what I will call the 
publicity imperative—that is, the expectation that people improve their opinions and 
preferences by publicly discussing them, with the purpose of raising the democratic 
legitimacy of politics. The publicity imperative originated during the Enlightenment: 
it is an invitation to free oneself from subjection and to start thinking for oneself. 
The publicity imperative, however, is not just an appeal to emancipation, but to 
critical emancipation: it expects the subject to try his inclinations, and thoughts 
about them, in front of others to become a better person. The publicity impertive is 
a model for growing up in public. The moral claim it makes on the subject is also 
a social claim: since the carrier of private enlightenment is reason, it needs to be 
applied in public.
 The conceptual development of the publicity imperative can be sketched by 
the different approaches of the three starring authors. Weber situates the spiritual 
origins of the publicity imperative in the Reformation. He describes how people 
increasingly became aware of a deep sense of metaphysical uncertainty caused 
by the proclamation of God’s transcendence. People were confronted with a 
process of spiritual privatization, which evoked a drive to work and speak from 
their faith in God.19 “The only way of living acceptly to God was not to surpass 
worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the 
obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world. That was his 













n calling.”20 The Protestant relation between private conscience and public works was 
all but harmonious, to be sure. God’s Will was thought to be absolute, man’s fate 
predestined, against which no action could have any influence.21 As it was rather 
crudely put by the Westminster Synod of 1647: “By the decree of God, for the 
manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting 
life, and others foreordained to everlasting death....”22 
 This irreconcilable conflict between the subject’s grace and his worldly 
actions changed during the Enlightenment, when the publicity imperative became 
harmonized through the universal idea of public reason. Bringing reason into play 
implied that the moral value of a belief was defined by the very condition of its 
being made public. Instead of relying on individual faith, the moral status of a belief 
depended on public reasoning. The subject was expected to master the practical 
virtue of moral truth-finding by discussing his beliefs. Alasdair McIntyre’s remark, 
in this regard, is worth recalling: “We are so accustomed to classifying judgments, 
arguments and deeds in terms of morality that we forget how relatively new the 
notion was in the culture of the Enlightenment.”23 
 According to Kant, the public use of reason emerges from individual 
immaturity. The implication of the imperative is to have the courage to use one’s 
reason as a necessary compensation for one’s metaphysical uncertainty.24 Since 
destiny will never be known to us, we have a responsibility to think about the spring 
of our life existence through the idea of reason, which God has given to us. “The 
concept of God and even the conviction of his existence is to be found only in reason 
as its exclusive source….”25 Pure faith lives in reason, Kant says, which means to 
think beyond empirical sensations and “objective grounds of knowledge.”26 Even 
all efficacy and beauty of nature will not satisfy us as humans, and this rational 
dissatisfaction drives us to orient ourselves in thinking itself.27 Reason is where 
our morality, and hence our humanity, resides, according to Kant: in the subjective 
use of public reason. The publicity imperative is directed towards the subject and 
carries an inherent democratic anticipation: humans are essentially moral beings, 
and morality consists in considering oneself as freely subjected to public reason. 
With Kant, the early Protestant metaphysics of uncertainty results in a morality of 
publicity.
 Habermas has described the political implications of the concept of the 
publicity imperative. During the eighteenth century, a public sphere emerged in 
which a critical-rational debate took shape between people using their faculty of 
reason. The public sphere became a discursive challenge to state authority. The 
public sphere in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century was however still 
dominated by what Habermas calls a “representative publicness.” The ruler’s 
authority was based on a ritualistic display of status attributes; it was made visible 
to the public yet exempt from democratic scrutiny.28 The modern public sphere, 
on the other hand, was based on the notion of public discussion as “the abstract 
29
counterpart of public authority;”29 it became the place where private opinions were 
expected to become an object of public reason, so that they could become part of 
the political discussion. The idea of publicity became the very touchstone of state 
legitimacy: the validity of a political opinion depended on its confrontation with the 
public.
 When comparing the analyses of Weber, Kant, and Habermas from a historical 
perspective, we see that the effect of the publicity imperative expands. We first can 
trace a gradual shift, from the step into publicity made by individuals as the effect of 
spiritual loneliness, to a step into publicity caused by the universal appeal of reason. 
Habermas’s historic conception of the publicity imperative, finally, is political. It 
integrates both the protestant and moral notions, becoming an individual imperative 
to discuss political matters publicly.
The idea that preferences need to be confronted in public is still seen as fundamentally 
important in contemporary political philosophy. Many authors have revitalized the 
publicity imperative in the last decades, stressing the Enlightenment’s cultural legacy.30 
The public use of reason is often deemed the moral nucleus of politics and appears, 
for instance, in the metaphorical opposition between “the market and the forum.”31 
The political ideal is the forum, which holds that preferences are to be discussed 
by the public, while its antonym is the notion of the market, which symbolizes the 
domination of preferences by commercial interests and private needs.
 I have reservations concerning a moralistic conceptualization of politics, 
however. An understanding of politics as a search for publicity—a process in which 
only arguments in line with public reason are to be part of the political debate—is 
deeply problematic. Today, such issues as the status of interculturality, the dire state 
of the environment, or the influence of global capitalism are often portrayed as 
problems in the individual’s formation of a political will; whether he is willing 
to put the general interest before his own interest. The dark side of politics is the 
democratic deficit, the lack of public will in politics.32 Underneath lies the fear that, 
if no common ground can be found, democracy is weakened. Public particularism 
is seen as a moral problem: the issue is whether citizens will be capable of thinking 
beyond their short-term interest.
 The suggested solution for the democratic deficit is to close the gap between 
private and public preferences through greater efforts at public deliberation. An 
illustration of this escape route can be found in recent literature about the Internet 
and democracy. Although many commentators see the Internet’s great potential for 
renovating democracy, they are also worried by actual developments that hamper this 
ideal. They seek to tackle this dilemma by pleading for a more democratic culture 
among Internet users themselves, thus preparing people online for democracy in 
real life.













n 1.3 Sketching the problem: Democracy and the Internet
The last decade has shown a great revival of democratic theory, not in the least 
due to the promising claims made on behalf of the Internet.33 Because many feel 
the Internet to be the answer to the democratic deficit, there have been numerous 
inquiries into what kind of public sphere the Internet is—or, rather, should be.34 
These scholars believe that the ideal of citizenship can be enhanced if citizens are 
furnished with the tools—both digital and critical—to check and call into question 
governmental imperatives, commercialized market relations, and cultural claims. As 
Lincoln Dahlberg puts it: “The public sphere will not be extended merely through 
the diffusion of new technological artefacts. People must be drawn into rational-
critical discourse before new technologies can be successfully employed….”35 
 The theory of deliberative democracy is a popular conceptualization of this 
expectation. Assuming the political system to be an association governed by public 
deliberations, the Internet might improve the communicative conditions of politics 
and, therefore, raise its democratic legitimacy. The Internet is the electronic messiah 
of deliberative democracy. It embodies the promise of rational communication: by 
embedding the procedural principles of deliberation within its very technology, the 
quality of democracy may increase.36
 In order to realize this deliberative ideal, parts of the Internet need to 
be a public sphere—that is, a “noncommercial space where the interests of the 
public are articulated and vocalized in a sustained and deliberative matter.”37 The 
political object is to safeguard areas of the Internet from intrusion by commercial 
and strategic interests. Parts of the Internet need to be made safe havens. Located 
between the Scylla of money and the Charybdis of power, these protected spaces 
should provide for optimal communicative conditions. Habermas’s concept of 
communicative rationality is the perfect conceptual tool to delineate the exact 
conditions of safe havens on the Internet; it provides accommodating criteria to 
critically evaluate everyday computer-mediated communicative practices.38 The 
specification of the ideal of public deliberation generates communicative standards 
for the interpretation, and eventually transformation, of will-formation processes 
on the Internet. The very quality of digital preference formation is judged according 
to the democratic criteria of deliberation.39 
 The publicity imperative has received much momentum with the rise of 
the Internet. The Internet’s deliberative potential demonstrates the way politics 
should be: a public web of multiple discursive and communicative designs. Larry 
Lessig explains the idea of the publicity imperative as follows: “The point is not 
the substance of the choice. The point is about politics as process. Politics is the 
process by which we reason about how things ought to be.”40 And the Internet is 
just the thing in this respect, thinks Lessig: “Cyberspace might make this process 
where reasons count more possible; it certainly makes it even more necessary. It 
is possible to imagine using the architecture of the space to design deliberative 
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forums….”41
 Like Lessig, Anthony Wilhelm42 and Cass Sunstein43 also emphasize the 
need for democratic renovation, and the regenerative potential of the Internet in 
this respect.44 Yet, at the same time, they point out the existing dangers of online 
alienation and fragmentation. In fact, although they believe the Internet to offer a 
great democratic promise, they are disappointed with the way people are actually 
behaving on it. Sunstein gives an account of the “Daily Me,” a Cyclopic consumer 
who chooses a path on the Internet that is completely in line with his or her preferred 
lifestyle and values, missing (or avoiding) other ways of living that might challenge 
the views this consumer already holds. The Internet serves more as a playground 
for consuming goods than as an open forum in which people strive to develop their 
intersubjective reasoning. According to Wilhelm, people “are interested mainly 
in vocalizing their individual or private interests and care little for adapting the 
position of another through persuasion, negotiation, and compromise.”45 Lessig’s, 
Sunstein’s and Wilhelm’s moral teaching is what John Dewey calls the problem of 
the public: “the essential need [to improve] the methods and constitution of debate, 
discussion and persuasion.”46 This is why the Internet is so important, Lessig, 
Sunstein and Wilhelm think, for it can clarify public thought by stimulating debate 
and communication online. Both critics argue for public safe havens on the Internet. 
Leaving the Internet to the market will only increase the problem of the public, 
because people are naturally inclined to follow their private wants.47 In the absence 
of a public intent of consciously deliberating and organizinge interests, commercial 
profit seeking and private interest satisfaction will start to dominate the Net.
 
I think that the suggestion to let the Internet play an important role in increasing 
the democratic legitimacy of politics only comes down to a digital displacement 
of the democratic deficit. Notwithstanding the initial appraisal by Lessig et al of 
its democratic benefits, the Internet appears to cope with deliberative problems 
similar to such problems off-line. It is indeed telling that Lessig et al portray 
actual communicative processes on the Internet rather disapprovingly too. Again, 
to them the problem is weighed against the publicity imperative: since the center 
of democracy is located in public discussion and civic activism, they judge the 
democratic potential of the Internet from this perspective. But although it seems 
attractive to support Sunstein’s claim that “[d]eliberative domains should provide a 
wave of the future [so that] the Internet might become a great ally of democracy,”48 
the irony is that by applying the ideal of the publicity imperative on the Internet, 
many communicative processes on the Internet become automatically part of 
the problem. Through the very logic of the publicity imperative, the Internet is 
transformed into a political instrument to work on its own democratic future. 
Although public deliberation online was considered to be something of an answer 
to the sick state of democracy, the Internet’s own poor democratic record actually 













n represents an obstacle. And since this conclusion only evokes another appeal to 
the publicity imperative, we can conclude that the deliberative argument about the 
relationship between democracy and the Internet runs into a vicious regress.49
 It seems wise to let the therapy depend on the diagnosis, rather than vice 
versa.50 It is necessary first to understand what exactly the normative presuppositions 
of the publicity imperative are before we jump to an acclamation of its remedial 
merits for politics. I believe that focusing on the political value of the publicity 
imperative can only lead to a moral deflation of the publicity imperative for politics. 
Public deliberation is not the backbone of politics—which, of course, does not 
imply that such deliberation has no political value whatsoever. Looking at politics 
through the lens of the publicity imperative is problematic though. We should be 
suspicious of trying to understand the democratic deficit in a Deweyan way. The 
example of the Internet shows how preference formation on the Net is judged 
according to communicative standards that probably do not have much to do with 
how people active in that forum actually experience their communication. The 
deliberative paradigm creates a moral perspective and assesses whether individuals 
act accordingly. Yet, such an ideal-typical theory about digital processes of will 
formation says nothing about the specific character of these processes.
 By politically deflating the publicity imperative, we can better focus on its 
non-political, or civil value. This understanding will bring us to a different judgment 
of phenomena on the Internet. We will find ourselves more in line with David Post’s 
observations, for instance, when he writes:
When I gaze about the Net, even at those portions of the Net that have 
been invaded by the forces of ‘commerce,’ I see something that looks more 
like the chaos of unchecked growth and diversity than it does uniformity 
and regularity; its [sic] not just that new websites, and new architectures 
with them, seem to be sprouting like mushrooms after a spring rain, they 
actually are sprouting like mushrooms after a spring rain.51
Post’s description of the Internet does not just have a different tone than Wilhelm’s, 
Sunstein’s or Lessig’s; it is the result of a different point of view. Post locates the 
intrinsic democratic element in the vast disarray of private initiatives—commercial, 
science-fictional, biographical, psychological, sexual, artistic. He tells the story of a 
world of commercial giants and dominant governments, in which the Internet is very 
much the technology of freedom.52 Phenomena like the Open Source Movement, 
private weblogs, wireless network communities, P2P communication, podcasting, 
Second Life, Facebook, and the revolution of email traffic in general, last but not 
least, show how the Internet electronically empowers individuals to communicate. 
Post thus thinks that many practices on the Internet have a democratic legitimacy 
of their own, but in an apolitical sense. Many events and trends take place in open, 
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yet segmented and compartmentalized practices; they are enterprises with their 
own standards and are highly self-regulating. In these practices, people operate 
independently from political agencies that have a built-in proclivity to check the 
democratic legitimacy of such initiatives, whatever that may entail. Post stresses: 
I have no quarrel with the notion that the code/architectures of cyberspace 
embed fundamental values, and I have no quarrel with the notion that each 
of us, confronting the design of these new cyberplaces, faces a choice 
among different values. … But I do quarrel with the notion that because 
there are choices to be made among value-laden architectures, these are 
“political” decisions that should necessarily be subject to “collective” 
decision-making.53
For sure, people show a great keenness to deliberate and exchange information 
about the quality of their digital communication, yet most of the time they do this 
independently from processes of political will formation. I would even hypothesize 
that people develop new practices on the Net precisely to be more free from practices 
that are more directly influenced by politics—blogs to be free from newspapers, 
file-sharers from the big music corporations, moveon.org from partisan politics, 
Open Source from classic copyright regulations, and so on. Perhaps it is therefore 
more apt to say that the motivation to perform on the Net grows not out of a political 
ideal but out of what I call a civil ideal, which avoids the ubiquitous pressure to 
justify and validate actions before the public at large. 
 I would like to state that civil practices should not be characterized as poor, 
potential, and private manifestations of deliberation, but as initiatives that have an 
intrinsic democratic quality. The publicity imperative obstructs a more optimistic 
interpretation of the democratic value of the Internet and increasingly transforms it 
from a solution into a problem. The case of the Internet shows that the real problem 
of democracy is not adequately understood, let alone solved, by emphasizing the 
publicity imperative, which blocks other perspectives to politics. Processes of will 
formation on the Internet are only understood as conditional to the ideal of political 
will formation; they are not being valued in themselves or, better, according to their 
own intrinsic standards. Social processes of will formation have many different 
standards of valuation, and their own political significance ought to be taken 
seriously. Without having followed ideal-typical procedures of deliberation and 
communication, the hundreds of thousands of postings for Wikipedia have made up 
an encyclopedia that can compete with the eminent standards of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. And it is the same with blogging: an exceptionally diverse culture of 
homemade journalism has seen the light. The political question therefore is not the 
quality of Internet communication according to the ideal of public reason, for this 
question can only be answered substantively and contextually. Instead, the political 













n question is how Internet communication relates to the political system, that is, how 
the intervention of public authority into the institutional fabric of the Internet can 
be justified.54 I call this the question of political jurisdiction.
1.4 Approaching the problem: The public/private distinction
In this section, I explain how the idea of the publicity imperative goes back to 
a specific interpretation of the public/private distinction. This should clarify the 
dominance of a conception of politics in which the transformation of people’s 
preferences has obtained such a central place. My hesitation to see issues of the 
Internet through the perspective of the publicity imperative comes from a belief that 
politics is not about preference formation in the first place, but about something else. 
My contention is that this intuition goes back to the question of how to interpret the 
distinction between public and private.
 The public/private distinction is an important conceptual compass in political 
theory. In the most general terms it refers to a normative relationship between 
the individual and the collective, in which “private” represents or refers to the 
interest of individuals or individual entities, while “public” represents the interest 
or significance of the political body as a whole (be it democratic, aristocratic, or 
autocratic). A recurring political question of the public/private distinction concerns 
the right ratio between the centripetal claims of the body politic and the centrifugal 
concerns of individuals.
 In this respect, Richard Rorty’s distinction between the “private ironist” and 
the “public liberal” is a good illustration of the moral force of the public/private 
distinction in political theory. The interesting thing, of course, is that Rorty is often 
depicted as a famous critic of the traditional liberal distinction between public and 
private. Rorty the postmodernist is well aware of the distinction’s complexity. He 
is critical regarding overoptimistic didactic interpretations of the distinction and 
does not believe in a universal rationality that draws from the natural sentiments 
of solidarity.55 To Rorty, the public/private distinction encapsulates two states 
or attitudes of the subject that deal with an unsolvable tension between what he 
calls “self creation” and “solidarity.” The first state is “ironical” and belongs to 
the private sphere. The private ironist is someone who believes that his words, 
being the instruments for self-description, are basically contingent, non-final, and 
circular in explanation. They ultimately refer to a selfish state. Therefore, ironists 
are “never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the 
terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change….”56 So irony must 
be confined to the private sphere, Rorty says, for in the end ironist politics or public 
irony will be self-destructive to the political web.57 It is individuals’ own business 
to continuously change their perspectives on life,58 yet there are also public aspects 
to their private vocabularies which pose another challenge—namely, “as much 
imaginative acquaintance with alternative final vocabularies as possible….”59 In this 
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way, Rorty thinks, people will be socialized into becoming aware of other people’s 
life stories. This educative process, that should be open to as many perspectives 
and narratives as possible, hopefully will let people acquire a sense of pragmatic 
urgency to avoid suffering and humiliation.60 Yet, that’s about it, Rorty believes: the 
public realm can only be a very limited space of collective action. Moreover, the 
path to public solidarity is shaky, to say the least; there is no neat transition from 
private existence to public solidarity.
 Rorty’s surprising solution is a strict division between public and private. 
Liberalism can be saved from metaphysics if public inquiry into private endeavors 
of meaning results in the discovery of some common truth that is morally superior. 
This hope, however, can only be based on its intrinsic desirability—that is, on the 
worth of political freedom as the condition for private irony.61 The typical liberal, to 
Rorty, is not the politician, academic or philosopher, but the artist, the journalist, or 
the poet, precisely because such figures are especially capable of bringing out that 
refined liberal sensitivity of “sharing a common selfish hope.”62 They are the true 
masters of ironist culture.
 Rorty’s minimalist solution for keeping the flame of liberal hope burning is 
a strong critique of the publicity imperative. He retains little faith in the exchange 
of reasonable arguments in a public debate between citizens that ultimately leads 
towards a just political constitution. It is therefore not surprising that most of 
Rorty’s critics vehemently stress his anti-republican depoliticization and carefree 
aestheticization of politics. The result, they claim, is an elitist politics accompanied 
by private frivolity.63 The question, however, is whether this critique is fair, as it 
is surprising to see how much Rorty’s understanding of politics is also influenced 
by the dualistic relationship between the good life of the individual, on the one 
hand, and the ideal of public justice in the body politic, on the other. He uses the 
same normative division between public and private just as his more republican-
minded critics do. Rorty also interprets politics as a system of values, as a pendulum 
that swings between the forces of egoism and altruism. Politics is ultimately a 
metaphor of moral development moving back and forth between self-interest and 
solidarity.64 To Rorty, pragmatist politics is a will-formation process that ought to 
deliver good results—although not much should be expected. Political discussions 
deal with different types of value preferences, and the question is which of them 
ought to become part of the political discussion. In the end Rorty’s critique of high 
republican expectations embedded in the publicity imperative remains nestled in 
this moralistic paradigm of politics. 65 His conclusion is skeptical: namely, that most 
private beliefs and preferences are not suitable to broach for public consensus at 
all, for which reason a very strict distinction between public and private is needed. 
Although Rorty strongly tones down the moral scope of the publicity imperative, 
his conclusion is still caught in that same political paradigm. Indeed, as with Lessig 
et al, it is not absurd to conjecture that Rorty has come to his skeptical conclusion 













n because he could not perceive politics in a different way. Rorty has only radically 
reduced the effect of the publicity imperative, strongly attenuating the expectations 
of the moral promise of politics, but without rejecting them.
 It seems that the concept of the publicity imperative is difficult to lay aside. 
We have seen that the case of the democratic potential of the Internet turns into 
argumentative vicious regress, while Rorty’s critique of the liberal public/private 
distinction only proves to offer a different way of articulating the publicity 
imperative. In other words, the publicity imperative is well knit into contemporary 
political thinking, and the question is how we are going to unravel it.
1.5 Explaining the problem: Freedom of speech and religion
To conclude this chapter, I would like to sketch a possible way out. As an illustration, 
I will use the debate about the relation between freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion. 
 Freedom of speech can be understood as the right to publicly express one’s 
private opinion. This freedom, as it was classically set out by J.S. Mill, is widely 
seen as a vital ingredient of a liberal democracy.66 Individuals should have the 
right to raise their voice even in the midst of the greatest conformism. Without the 
possibility of private dissent, there can be no question of democratically arriving at 
the public good. In Western societies today, however, the use of free of speech is not 
questioned by a majority but by a religious minority. Appealing to the freedom of 
religion, many Muslims have expressed reservations about the unlimited exercise of 
free speech—the graphic example being the Muslim outrage about the publication 
of sardonic cartoons by a Danish newspaper.67 In their opinion, the right to free 
speech has degenerated into an unqualified claim to publicly criticize and insult 
their religion. They argue that the public bombardment of religious critique has 
undermined the very possibility to have religious beliefs.
 This reaction has fuelled some fierce liberal chauvinism in which it is stressed 
that freedom of speech is the moral complement to freedom of religion: there can 
be no freedom of (private) religion without freedom of (public) speech.68 Visually 
depicting Mohammed might be insulting to some Muslims, but since they are also 
citizens in a liberal democracy, they need to accept that there will be people who 
dispute their religion. The right to believe what one wants to believe implies the 
possibility to publish these beliefs—and this counts for everyone, believers and 
disbelievers alike. We meet again the Kantian linkage of conscience, thinking, and 
publicity. The right to freedom of opinion is impossible to defend if the individual 
right to criticize other opinions is being questioned. To be a free subject implies 
employing one’s reason to the fullest while courageously accepting critique by 
others.69 Citizens in this model are entitled to map out their idiosyncratic paths to 
happiness, but they all have to accept the possibility of a public clash between their 
own private endeavors and those of others. This is how liberal democracies work, 
the liberal says.
 But what exactly is the place of religion in this argument? This question 
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is especially timely because an increasing number of people have difficulties 
in tolerating private opinions that are religiously inspired—especially Islamic 
opinions, to be sure.70 Here the publicity imperative is applied to religious beliefs, 
but it is unclear how it can still be related to the contemporary liberal public/private 
distinction, in which religion is said to belong to the private sphere and politics to 
the public sphere.71 On the one hand, some scholars argue that the right to freedom 
of religion can only be possible if religion forfeits its stakes in the political arena. 
On the other hand, however, they say that since religious beliefs are comprehensive 
and possibly oppressive, they ought to be compatible with public reason. This way 
stated they are part of the political arena, which is demonstrated by John Rawls: 
“Of course, fundamentalist religious doctrines and autocratic and dictatorial 
rulers will reject the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. … They 
assert that the religiously true, or the philosophical true, overrides the politically 
reasonable. We simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within 
political liberalism nothing more need be said.”72 Religion has to be put to the test 
in order to see if it is free of fundamentalism and thus can be part of the democratic 
framework.
 The publicity imperative again has the final say: it transforms religious beliefs 
into moral opinions. On the one hand, freedom of belief is formally protected, taking 
for granted that not all of its aspects can be defended substantially in the public arena 
in terms of reason. At the same time, based on the freedom of speech, religious 
beliefs are open to public scrutiny. Believers ought to be prepared to accept public 
assessments even when they are unable to defend themselves in their own words. 
While discussion is an indispensable aspect of free speech, the opposite is the case 
for religion, in which dispositions such as contemplation, wonder, and hope are 
more appropriate. The believer has to step out of his or her private world, and find 
vocabulary that is in conformity with basic principles of public reason. The rational 
comes before the irrational. Rawls concurs: “A domain so-called, or a sphere of 
life, is not, then something already given apart from political conceptions of justice. 
[It] is simply the result, or upshot, of how the principles of political justice are 
applied….”73 There is thus a principal friction between freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech, which cannot be dismissed as the classic dilemma of keeping the 
balance between the preferences of a dissenting minority and of a ruling majority. 
Precisely in light of the moral distinction between private and public preferences, 
the issue of religion acquires an awkward status in the discussion: religion needs 
to be private, not political, yet its rules and habits ought to be consistent with the 
political values of a liberal society. However, the metaphysical aspect of religion is 
not easy to place in public discussions. The publicity imperative makes it difficult 
to understand the place of religion—its unreasonableness and unjustifiability. 
 Only if we accept a more complex interpretation of the public/private 
distinction it is possible to do justice to the current discussion concerning the relation 













n between freedom of speech and freedom of religion. We need to break into the 
moral conception of politics and start distinguishing between believing, discussing, 
and deciding. These questions all relate to different relations with publicness, which 
cannot be properly understood by referring to a public/private distinction in which 
the private is represented by comprehensive ideas of the good life (of which religion 
is a part) and the public by political matters of justice.74
1.6 Conclusion
The publicity imperative insists on a strong sense of democratic responsibility: 
citizens should publicly deliberate their private preferences. This is a forceful 
demand in political theory—and in daily politics as well, I should add. In this 
chapter, I have given a first impression of the difficulties of such a moral conception 
of politics. The discussion of the Internet and democracy has shown how preference 
formation on the Internet is instrumentalized in relation to the moral idea of politics 
as public deliberation. It takes away the concrete power of processes of preference 
formation on the Internet. Furthermore, we have seen how Richard Rorty could 
not detach himself from liberalism since, at the end of the day, he was working 
from the same perspective as his opponents. Rorty profoundly lowered the liberal 
expectations about citizenship without doing away with the moral assumption of 
democratic politics being a private preference transformer. From another point of 
view, I have tried to show how the publicity imperative negatively influences the 
debate about freedom of religion. Religious beliefs are judged in relation to their 
performance in public discussions. To believe is to have an opinion, and the very 
freedom to do so implies the possibility of being criticized for it and assumes the 
individual’s preparedness to accept it. 
 Behind this identification of freedom of belief with freedom of speech 
lies the conviction that a political system can function only with an overlapping 
consensus of shared moral norms. A process of public deliberation is deemed 
necessary to counterbalance tendencies that point to the fragmentation of public 
morality. People need to become aware of constitutional essentials that provide 
a normative framework for an overlapping consensus. This is the very political 
condition of their freedom. Private morality, in other words, has a conditional 
status, depending on how it facilitates or obstructs public deliberation. Politics is 
based on the moral conflict between self-centeredness and other-centeredness. “If 
there wouldn’t be any claim of the collective,” Thomas Nagel is convinced, “there 
would be no morality, only the clash, compromise, and occasional convergence 
of individual perspectives.”75 Yet, as we have seen with the example of the 
Internet, many processes of communication cannot simply be dismissed as lacking 
democratic vigor. We need to investigate different conceptions of the public and 
private distinction more carefully and develop a more layered picture of morality 
and politics, a picture that does justice to the complexity of the social world.
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The Public and the Private: Bridging Idea and Theory
2.1 Introduction
I have argued that the complexity of political theory has been damaged by the 
domination of the publicity imperative. The idea that the essence of politics is 
public discussion has become a persistent stopgap for fixing the democratic deficit. 
I suggest looking beyond this one-dimensional interpretation of politics, and taking 
the conceptual diversity of the public/private distinction seriously is an important 
step in this project.
 I consider political theory to be a normative science, with optimal practice in 
politics as its common object. In political theory, political phenomena are studied 
and concepts formulated that explain these phenomena from the perspective of 
what the activity of politics should be. The important question is what makes life 
“political,” for obviously, no phenomena are political per se, only phenomena that 
may be interpreted as such. Because political theory is a construction of reality, we 
should look for the idea or perspective that informs the political-theoretical approach 
in which phenomena are eventually given their political status.76 The public/private 
distinction, in this regard, functions as a conceptual bridge: it regroups certain 
basic ideas into a political-theoretical system that is supposed to have explanatory 
or demonstrative power. In Chapter 1, we have seen how the particular idea of 
the publicity imperative informed a public/private perspective that has led to a 
moralistic interpretation of politics. 
 In order to take the complexity of politics seriously again, however, we will 
need to consider a cluster of conceptions of the public/private distinction, because 
a variety of basic ideas that are equally important inform political theory. These 
different public/private distinctions will be set out in the course of the book.
 In this chapter, I first give an account of the theoretical status of the private/
public distinction. The chapter takes off with some views concerning that distinction’s 
merits and flaws (section 2.2). The fact that “public” and “private” are container 
concepts frequently results in the claim that the distinction is ideological—that it lacks 
any real analytical power because it has lost a connection with the “real” world. Such 
an understandable yet erroneous reaction squanders the distinction’s great value for 
political theory. I will argue that by distinguishing between approach (the intellectual 
idea one wants to get across) and method (the way this job is done theoretically) it 
is possible to rescue the public/private distinction from the kind of radical critique 
that it leads to unjustified essentialism. In section 2.3, I demonstrate this conjecture 
by reviewing a book by Raymond Geuss about the public/private distinction: Public 
Goods, Private Good. I have reserved a central place for this book not only because 












n it nicely scrutinizes the merits of the public/private distinction, but because it does 
so by an implicit exhibition of the writer’s personal approach to political philosophy. 
Precisely this combination of analytic rigor and elucidation of stance is interesting; it 
illustrates the interdependency of science and metaphysics. I will argue that Geuss’s 
approach to philosophy illustrates how it is the pre-theoretical mind that pushes the 
scholar onto the path of examination. This underlying motivation gives theory a non-
rational twist. I claim that working with the public/private distinction is not only a 
theoretical, but also metaphysical activity.
2.2 The public/private distinction: Great idea or great ideology? 
The public/private distinction is a promising conceptual carrier of many political 
intuitions—for which reason, perhaps, the concept is so familiar in political theory.77 
It captures the political-theoretical imagination and gives direction to political 
thinking from various angles—for instance, regarding the relations between the 
individual and society, privacy and security, market and state, and sex and social 
conventions. The distinction has intellectual power, yet it is semantically versatile, 
as well. It carries the risk of undermining its own proficiency. 
 The wide array of meanings of the public/private distinction has led Raymond 
Geuss to question its theoretical viability altogether. Geuss thinks that the distinction 
is unavoidably essentialist or arbitrary, and cannot do justice to the intricacy of 
social phenomena. The distinction distorts and redefines them along lines of power 
or according to other vested interests.78
 Norberto Bobbio, however, hails the public/private distinction as a highpoint 
in (Western) legal and political theory. He is impressed by its illustrious history and 
not bothered by any interpretational uneasiness. He calls it a “Great Dichotomy,” 
firstly because it is an exhaustive dichotomy that covers every element of the 
political world. Secondly, the dichotomy is mutually exclusive, he argues, since 
no element of the political world can be covered simultaneously by both concepts. 
Thirdly, it is a dominant dichotomy, for “it subsumes other distinctions and makes 
them secondary.”79
 Bobbio argues that the Roman distinction between public and private law, 
especially, has proven its great value. The classical conception has been succinctly 
described in Justinian I’s Corpus Iuris: “Public law is that which pertains to the 
Roman State, private that which concerns the well-being of the individual.”80 The 
distinction refers to a division between the general good of the republic and that of 
its people separately, a division that is “exhaustive,” says Bobbio, for it dominates 
all other legal distinctions. Moreover, the categories of private and public are 
employed inter-reliantly: they “mutually [define] themselves in the sense that the 
public domain extends only as far as the start of the private sphere (and the reverse 
is also true).”81 Finally, they are hierarchically proportioned: first comes the general 
interest, regulated by a superior authority (i.e., the state), then individual interests, 
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regulated by single members of that group, defined by the general interest.82 The 
res publica ultimately overrules the res privatus in Roman law.83 According to 
Bobbio, the original meaning of the public/private distinction is thus a reflection 
of the situation of a group which distinguishes between what belongs to the group 
as a group and what belongs to single members or, more generally, between the 
society as a whole and other incidental, lesser groupings (such as the family) or else 
between a superior central power and inferior peripheral powers which enjoy only 
a relative autonomy, if any.84
 It is fair to say that Bobbio is leaning heavily on a well-known and often-
used interpretation of the Roman public/private distinction and is neglecting other 
possible historical interpretations. Geuss indeed argues that the etymological origin 
of the “publica” component in res publica is far from clear. It stems from the 
adjective publicus and the noun populus. In the course of Roman times, populus 
shifted from (1) “the body of men under arms to the whole population”85 to (2) the 
more abstract and judicial meaning of the Roman people as a whole and ultimately 
to (3) “the body of citizens.” It is the same with publicus, whose meaning also has 
shifted from fairly concrete, viz., (1) the property of the army, to much more abstract 
connotations, viz., (2) “the status quo of power relations that exist among Romans,” 
(3) “matters of common concern to all Romans,” and (4) “the common good of 
all Romans.”86 Hence, Bobbio seems to overestimate the undisputed clarity of the 
Roman distinction between public and private. On this point, Geuss argues that the 
concept of the State in the unitary fashion in which we have come to know it was 
unfamiliar to the Romans and cannot accurately be read into their philosophy.87 
 As I noted earlier, already, Geuss is skeptical about the conceptual clarity 
of the distinction between public and private. “There is no such thing as the 
public/private distinction, or, at any rate, it is a deep mistake to think that there is 
a single substantive distinction here that can be made to do any real philosophical 
or political work.”88 The terms “private” or “public” in themselves neither explain 
nor justify a certain design, action, preference, or interest; rather, Geuss stresses, 
they facilitate and legitimize a carefree application of ideas until they regress into 
worrisome ideologies.89 For instance, if someone wants to interfere with something 
I call my own business and wants my explanation for my behavior, I cannot answer 
that he should keep out “[b]ecause it is private,” says Geuss.90 This would only be 
a reformulation, not an explanation of the point. And any subsequent explanation 
for a desired privacy that is more specific will likely turn into a narrative that 
will eventually be impossible to characterize as an instance of the public/private 
distinction. Still, Geuss claims, many liberals91 do point out the existence of a 
private realm which is “a politically and socially distinct and protected sphere of 
life within which each individual is and ought to be fully sovereign, and … contrast 
this sphere with a public world of law, economics, and politics….”92 This dualistic 
idea is naive and illusionary, he thinks. These alleged distinct spheres do not exist, 












n with so many diverse and highly contested ideas of reality, which is “criss-crossed 
with divisions and swarming with tribes, corporations, states, social movements, 
alliances, ‘nations,’ oppressing and oppressed populations who have radically 
different resources, power, institutional structures and conceptions of the good.”93 
Hence, Geuss says, “we will be stuck with a welter of various kinds of goods, 
some private, some public, with no clear principle for structuring them under a 
single conception of a unitary good.”94 A proper genealogy of the public/private 
distinction would reveal the many issues that are structured by the same distinction 
and, hence, would highlight its artificiality: “A discussion of human shame and 
how to deal with it in a social context is a question that is in principle distinct 
from the question of the ownership of the postal system or the rail network by the 
government or profit-driven capitalist corporations.”95
  Geuss’s way out is a less utopian and ideological idea of the public good. 
This approach has serious consequences for a political theory—liberalism—that has 
relied so heavily on this dichotomy. Strangely enough, though, despite his austere 
critique of the liberal public/private distinction, Geuss gives no example of an 
exclusivist interpretation of the liberal public/private distinction. Though he names 
several, probably typical, liberal principles, such as “antipaternalism,” “respect for 
private property,” “limitation of state powers,” or the idea of the “public good,” 
he does not demonstrates that liberals claim all these principles as species of one 
liberal public/private genus distinction, the distinction Geuss has set himself up to 
argue against. Indeed, the very fact that Geuss distinguishes between these different 
liberal interpretations of the public/private distinction seems to neutralize, if not 
contradict, his primary thesis that “there is no single clear distinction between public 
and private.”96 Another problem would be to denote what Geuss exactly means 
by the liberal public/private distinction, given the existence of so many different 
intellectual positions that liberals themselves have taken over time (from Kant to 
Mill, from Hobhouse to Hayek, from Popper to Rawls).
2.3 Raymond Geuss’s approach to political theory
Still, the most important point Geuss is keen to get across seems to be the 
methodological one. He fiercely rejects a deductive and counterfactual approach to 
political theory as advocated by Rawls,97 Habermas and the like. The liberal method, 
he writes, is doomed to failure due to its unrealistic but also highly normative 
message.98 “My general aim is to get away from a certain approach to political 
philosophy that presents itself as being particularly systematic but which is, in my 
view, merely abstractive, reproducing in a general form fables convenus.”99 Geuss’s 
message can be interpreted as a critical note to many proponents of the Anglo-
Saxon political-analytic school.
 Geuss’s critique of the public/private distinction is convincing insofar as 
he carefully shows the semantic inconclusiveness of the distinction. Moreover, he 
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correctly stresses that a constructive abstraction from reality should not be made by 
means of counterfactual or hypothetical assumptions, for it would lead to the very 
disappearance of reality’s complexity.100
[I]t is not the case that we must or should adopt a two-step procedure, first 
getting clear about the public/private distinction, assuming all the while 
that there is a single distinction to be made, and then, having discovered 
where the line falls between public and private, going on to ask what we 
can do with that distinction, what attitude we should adopt toward it, what 
implications making the distinction correctly might have for politics. 
Rather, first we must ask what this purported distinction is for, that is, why 
we want to make it at all. To answer this question will bring us back to 
some relatively concrete context of human action, probably human political 
action, and it is only in the context of connecting the issue of the public and 
the private to that antecedent potential context of political action that the 
distinction will make any sense.101
 Geuss says that the art of abstraction lies in the capacity to retain a sense of 
reality; otherwise, theory becomes empty and ideological. This conjecture makes 
indeed a lot of sense, and hopefully will be the starting point of any study. Political 
theory should abstract from reality without obscuring reality’s complexity.
 So, Geuss does not dismiss the fact that any study of complex and contingent 
situations starts with preliminary distinctions. I would add, however, that such 
distinctions are not—as Geuss would have it—necessarily morally restrictive, 
remain in noncommittal abstractions, or articulate human action in an absolutist 
way. Conceptual constructions are unavoidable in science, and distinctions about 
our rich (or chaotic) world have the welcome effect of a director’s first cut or a 
painter’s sketch. A distinction between private and public can provide for this kind 
of broad coverage, as well, I argue.102
 It is interesting to see how Geuss himself drafts his public/private concept. 
He clearly appreciates a down-to-earth, non-metaphysical approach, making an 
appeal for reconstructing the categories of private and public through what he 
calls a “naturalistic” view of the world. Elements of the human condition do not 
present political ideas to us on a silver platter; instead, they “are factors on which 
we will have to fix our attention carefully and have reflective views, if we want to 
be serious about understanding politics.”103 Thomas Hobbes was such a scholar, 
Geuss writes, someone who operated in a levelheaded manner. Hobbes took things 
such as the biological need for food or shelter, the fact of mortality, and the drive 
for self-preservation as a starting point for his political ideas. This is not to say, as 
Geuss stresses, that Hobbes’s ideas were ultimately the right political answers to the 
human condition, but that his approach towards them was sound.












n  Geuss puts certain basic human “facts”104 in the center of intellectual attention. 
This is the only sensible response to an indeterministic worldview, he believes. 
Interestingly, in this respect the public/private distinction can be understood 
as a dichotomous conceptualization of phenomenological experiences, such as 
the “‘public’ mutual ignorance of the ‘private’ intentions of individuals.”105 The 
distinction between public and private brings certain basic human phenomena into 
spatial perspective, although the conceptual specification may completely differ: 
emphasizing man’s irrationality, for instance, can as easily result in a theory of 
Leviathan as of Utopia.106
 Geuss is keen to change political discourse by bringing it back to practical 
essentials. We should ask ourselves why we would want to use the public/private 
distinction and what purpose it serves. Geuss strives for a “practically significant 
distinction between public and private” that is sensitive to the question of what 
reason underlies such a distinction—i.e., for the realization of what good.107 Only 
in that way can we get rid of utopian and moralistic political theories. It will lead to 
public/private distinctions “for particular purposes in particular contexts.”108 
 By pinpointing the importance of the practical use of the public/private 
distinction implies that Geuss needs to explain the way the practical value of the 
distinction is judged. Yet, he does not say much about this, except by indirectly 
referring to his genealogical method, which is influenced by Nietzsche and 
Foucault.109 He appropriately calls it perspectivism: “[t]he view that the history 
of our present extends back indefinitely, but our possible cognitive grasp of that 
past eventually peters out in the same way. That is, the farther back we go the 
less information we will have and the vaguer will be the outlines of the story we 
can tell.”110 In this respect, he says, the public/private distinction “results from a 
complicated historical process in which originally completely distinct elements 
… come to be conjoined.”111 The genealogy of history examines the values that 
have been produced by certain institutions (or, for that matter, conceptualizations): 
that is, “what level of culture [history] has made possible for humans to attain.”112 
In other words, constructing a public/private distinction (or distinctions) would 
be considered “practically significant” if it realized human values or a certain 
culture that is to be applauded in Geuss’s eyes. This result does not mean that the 
distinction is “true,” Geuss is keen to stress, but, as he paraphrases Nietzsche, that 
it does better justice to one’s self-affirmation (of life).113 He further explains this 
almost aesthetic perspective: “Any morality will represent only one choice among 
a potentially infinite plurality of possible objects of admiration, although it won’t 
be a ‘choice’ any individual human being makes ad libitum; as such it will always 
float over a lagoon of anarchic, partially unstructured acts of individual admiration 
and disgust.”114
2.4 Political metaphysics
The above analysis shows that the distinction between theory and approach is 
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important. Our very incapacity to know how our forebears lived their lives, for 
instance, should bring caution in the design of our own world, Geuss says. An 
awareness of our own conceptual limitations should teach us to stick to basic facts 
of life, and perceive the human fabric of the world with great care and detail.
 Still, there are peculiarities in Geuss’s approach. Ironically, he introduces his 
perspectivist approach as an alternative to theoretical essentialism. Nevertheless, 
Geuss is very explicit about his thoughts on the human race and its history. His 
perspectivism can be said to depend on a pre-theoretical outlook that informs his 
further theorizing. Perspectivism, as Geuss himself puts it, sees the social and 
political world as “a large, unsurveyable, and extremely unwieldy object,” while 
“the living past is overwhelmingly a realm of gross historical contingency.”115 An 
essentialist or metaphysical position seems to inform Geuss’s conceptualizations. 
Geuss himself gives the impression that his perspectivism, accompanied by some 
ideas about basic human experiences, is a commonsensical way of debunking 
metaphysical conceptions of the private/public distinction. To me, however, it is 
just another metaphysical standpoint—anti-essentialist metaphysics, perhaps. 
This is not a revolutionary statement, given that I understand metaphysics not as a 
search for a monolithic truth about the world but as a reflection on aspects of human 
existence that cannot be expressed in the language of the natural or social sciences. 
The utter intricacy of the world brings with it a body of knowledge that lies beyond 
the empirical or physical realms but nevertheless plays an important part in science. 
This knowledge “exists” and is expressed in music, poems, philosophies, fairy tales, 
beliefs, and the like. It plays its part in weaving the web of human cultures. J. Trusted 
writes: “If metaphysics is overtly rejected either there must be complete scepticism 
as to knowledge of anything but personal sensations or else metaphysical beliefs 
will be covertly smuggled in to the purportedly metaphysics-free system. For … we 
must make some assumptions that are not derived from [empirical] experience.”116 
The observation that numerous interpretations of the world have existed in different 
times and places117 should remind us that, although we carry our view of the world 
as a truth, it is in theory a relative truth. This acknowledgement rescues to speak of 
metaphysics and certainly does not have to lead to its rejection. As Otto Duintjer 
puts it:
Assertions from traditional metaphysics are not simply untrue or 
nonsensical, yet their validity span is more limited than usually assumed. 
… Ontological statements do not refer to the reality in itself, but clarify 
our understanding of what we take as ‘existence’ or ‘reality,’ given the 
context of a certain praxis, or broader, given a dominant world view within 
a certain time and culture.118
So, while the world is filled with constructed artifacts, intuitions and ideas play an 
influential role underneath such theoretical architectures. This is no exception in 












n political theory. And that observation is exactly the great merit of Geuss’s book. 
Besides being scholarly and sharp, it provides us with an inside view of a political 
philosopher’s position in the world, and how his intellectual work proceeds from it. 
A view such as this one is quite rare, to be sure. Geuss gives the reader an excerpt of 
his academic state of mind, or, as Alasdair MacIntyre has written, “puts in question 
not just this or that particular philosophical thesis, but some of the larger projects 
in which we are engaged.”119 Political theory is not just an analytic puzzle about 
conceptions that need to be cohesively ordered, with no place for the connection 
between theoretical activity and the world itself. Doing political theory requires not 
only defending conceptual cohesions, but also explaining where those conceptions 
come from and what are the informing ideas behind them. This more engaged 
practice is political metaphysics.
 Because our relationship with the world permeates our thinking in 
general, keeping this caveat in mind when doing philosophy is not so much an 
autobiographical frivolity as a necessary inquiry into the sensational120 and idealist 
aspects of theorizing. As I will argue more fully in Chapter 4, this non-linguistic 
or intuitive component of philosophy is not to be underestimated. Without pathos 
there will be no theory, as is nicely explained by Martin Heidegger (inspired 
by the Greeks): “The pathos of astonishment thus does not simply stand at the 
beginning of philosophy, as, for example, the washing of his hands precedes the 
surgeon’s operation. Astonishment carries and pervades philosophy.”121 Differently 
put, philosophy can be called paradigmatic in the double sense that Thomas 
Kuhn attached to the word. Philosophy is based both on exemplars and their 
rationalizations. More specifically, political theorizing is fed by a metaphysical 
impression of the world that is both particular (based in experience) and general 
(based in thought). Politically experiencing the world and simultaneously putting 
this experience into conceptual terms is a back-and-forth process that provides food 
for political thought.122 Geuss’s perspectivism is typical of a metaphysical theory 
that is dominated by certain particular experiences. Since the relation between 
experience and idea can be very intimate, with the choice of a particular theoretical 
perspective being tied up with one’s own view of the world, the process of political 
theory cannot be fully reconstructed and accounted for. Predilections of thinking 
can be justified and explained to a great extent, but some of them fall short of 
explanation since they are tied to the theorist’s own idea of world. I would say 
that to “be” a “pragmatist” or an “idealist” is ultimately not an autonomous choice 
but a stance, a way of life, and thus ultimately unjustifiable—which, of course, 
does not imply that nothing can be said about it. This peculiar but also beautiful 
aspect of science, the intimate co-existence between one’s particular experience 
and one’s general view of the world, is important to include when theorizing the 
act of reflection itself (e.g., political theory). As scholars, our pre-theoretical stance 




Practicing political philosophy is guided not merely scientifically but also non-
scientifically. Without a strong desire for discovery, the readiness to understand 
and analyze will remain latent. Science appeases a hunger that is intellectual yet is 
produced by non-rational sentiments. Such sentiments are the source of intellectual 
curiosity and give theory, inevitably, a metaphysical edge. The public/private 
distinction, in this respect, serves as a conceptual bridge between metaphysics and 
theory. It informs political theory in two ways: on the one hand, by conceptualizing 
very particular experiences of reality, and on the other hand, by helping to generate 
and structure highly abstract ideas. Directed towards an anthology of ideas but still 
rooted in concrete cases, the distinction is a manifestation of both particularity and 
abstractness. Political theory is thus informed by basic ideas and experiences that 
can be very well articulated by the public/private distinction. Utilizing the distinction 
effectively, however, requires taking its great conceptual ambiguity into account. 
This is only to be expected, since theorizing the categories of public and private 
means taking account of the many complexities intrinsic to life itself; political 
theory needs to incorporate and not simplify them. Carefully differentiating the 
public/private distinction in the course of this study is the way to adequately explain 
the different aspects of thinking about the polity. The public/private distinction does 
not represent an overriding truth but is a conceptual tool to excavate certain ideas 
that do play an important role in the fabric of our individual, social and political 
world.
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CHAPTER 3 
Mind the Gap: Three Models of Democracy, and One 
Missing; Two Political Paradigms, and One Dwindling
3.1 Introduction
I have cast doubts on the domination of the publicity imperative in politics. Our 
contemporary understanding of politics leans heavily on dealing with the opposition 
between selfish and social preferences. I call this conception “politics as will 
formation.” 
 In this chapter I continue my argument against this idea of politics.124 I will 
propose a different public/private distinction as the basis for developing a political 
theory: one between society and state. This distinction is the conceptual carrier of 
an alternative paradigm of political theory, which I call “politics as jurisdiction.” 
Taking this distinction as the starting point for theorizing politics does more justice 
to the inherent ambiguity of politics, which is dominated by the tension between 
civil freedom and public authority.
 To bring my argument into perspective, I revisit an article by Jon Elster in 
which he provides a defense of deliberative democracy (section 3.2). Deliberative 
democracy results from answering two basic questions about politics, Elster argues: 
firstly, whether its process is to be defined as private or public, and secondly, 
whether its purpose is to be defined as instrumental or intrinsic. For Elster, these 
two questions result in three possible views of politics (or democracy). Deliberative 
democracy is one of them. I will complement Elster’s three models with a fourth 
one, which is diametrically opposed to the deliberative view of politics. I explain 
Elster’s omission by referring to his underlying paradigm of politics—politics as 
will formation (section 3.3). Informed by the moral idea of the publicity imperative, 
the paradigm of political will formation blocks Elster’s view to another approach to 
politics: politics as jurisdiction (section 3.4). 
 Arguing for politics as jurisdiction strongly improves the plausibility of the 
missing fourth model of democracy. Politics is not a moral discourse about public 
and private preferences, but about the ratio between governmental authority and 
civil liberty. To understand processes of will formation and the question of how to 
structure them is what politics as jurisdiction is about (section 3.5).
3.2 The “Market” or the “Forum”
In this section I will revisit two basic questions of political theory as posed by Jon 
Elster. First, what is the purpose of politics, and, second, how is its process to be 
defined? For Elster, these two questions result in three views of political theory that 














n today. Elster has given his influential exposition in the article “The Market and 
the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory” (1986), his aim being to give a 
critique of social-choice theory, or, in his words, the market approach to politics. 
The alternative he proposes is the forum approach, which is represented by two 
political theories: discourse (deliberative) theory and agonistic theory125 (or: 
republicanism).
 Elster calls social-choice theory a market approach to politics because it 
sees politics merely as a method for aggregating preferences in the interests of 
the common good.126 Private preferences are coordinated according to a supply-
and-demand mechanism, the typical example of which is the (secret) ballot, on the 
strength of which a political representative is chosen.127 For this reason, Elster defines 
the object of social choice as “instrumental:” politics is a means to maximize the 
good and is essentially concerned with the optimum expression, aggregation, and 
distribution of private preferences. Moreover, social choice takes these preferences 
as a given, out of a respect for individual choice, which, it claims, is the central 
value of democracy. Elster therefore argues that social-choice theory defines the 
political process as “private.” Citizens’ preferences should be respected and not 
simply accepted conditionally. Hence, politics should merely be a translation of 
private preferences and must refrain from trying to influence them, since this would 
amount to paternalism.
 In the tradition of nineteenth-century liberal revisionists such as T.H. Green 
and L.T. Hobhouse,128 Elster firmly rejects the methodological individualism of 
social-choice theory.129 To begin with, the assumption of given preferences “may 
not be a good guide as to what [people] really prefer,” and second, “what they 
really prefer may in any case offer a fragile foundation for social choice.” So it is 
not entirely clear, says Elster, “that the outcome of the social choice mechanism 
represents the common good, since there is a chance that everybody might prefer 
some other outcome.”130 Expressed preferences often differ from real preferences; 
for instance, expressed preferences may be based on adaptive choices—i.e., on the 
feasibility of their success rather than on their desirability—or on strategic goals.131 
Elster concludes that the social-choice model of politics lacks a conception of 
autonomous preferences; it needs a theory in which preferences are consciously 
formed, “not shaped by irrelevant processes.” Social-choice theory fails to take 
account of the normative dimension in will formation, since it does not take 
seriously the fundamental distinction between private preferences and public 
preferences, “between the kind of behaviour that is appropriate in the market place 
and that which is appropriate in the forum.”132 In the market place, egotistical 
behavior may be coped with and need not be problematic, but in the political forum 
it usually is. “[T]he task of politics is not only to eliminate inefficiency, but also 
to create justice—a goal to which the aggregation of prepolitical preferences is a 
quite incongruous means.”133 The forum is the proper metaphor for politics, since 
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it shows that only norms that are the result of public deliberation can be called 
democratic. “The core of the theory, then, is that rather than aggregating or filtering 
preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them 
by public debate and confrontation.”134 The forum approach is taken seriously by 
the other two views of political theory: discursive (or deliberative) and agonistic 
(or republican) theory. According to Elster, these views “arise when one denies, 
first the private character of political behaviour, and then goes on also to deny the 
instrumental nature of politics.”135 Politics is not an institutionalized mediation of 
private preferences, but a publicly concerted effort to bring about morally justified 
preferences. Both the agonistic and discursive views of politics take citizenship to 
be “a quality that can only be realized in public, i.e., in a collective joined for a 
common purpose.”136
 Elster’s analysis of the three models is renowned and has been widely 
followed in contemporary political theory. Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib 
speak respectively of “three normative models of democracy” and “three models 
of public space,” while Will Kymlicka employs a similar distinction between 
liberalism, communitarianism, and citizenship theory.137 Like Elster, they take the 
market approach to politics as their main target and suggest the forum approach to 
be its only serious alternative.138 Importantly, they take notice of but seek to renew 
“the republican tradition,” in which, as Habermas puts it, “the political public sphere 
acquires, along with its base in civil society, a strategic significance; it should secure 
the autonomy and integrating force of the citizens’ communicative practices.”139 In 
this respect, the republican tradition diverges radically from social-choice theory, 
which has more affinity with the liberal tradition, in which the political public sphere 
is given less of a strategic or participatory function and more of a constitutional 
or juridical significance. The liberal focus is on the rightful degree of liberty and 
protection that citizens ought to have and to get from government.
 This is precisely why the republican tradition is so critical of the liberal 
tradition: a mere juridical notion of politics ignores the political right to decide 
and deliberate democratically and runs the risk of silencing unwelcome views. As 
Benhabib puts it, 
it is the very process of unconstrained public dialogue that will help us 
define the nature of the issues we are debating … For it is only after the 
dialogue has opened in this radical fashion that we can be sure that we have 
come to agree upon a mutually acceptable definition of the problem rather 
than reaching some compromise consensus that will silence the concerns 
of some.140
Preferences need to be exposed to public scrutiny before we can accept them as 














n individual has the opportunity directly to participate in decision-making... that he 
can hope to have any real control over the course of his life or the development of 
the environment in which he lives.”141
 So, to Elster et al142 republicanism is not a fully satisfying answer to the 
liberal tradition; it needs to be modified. They see Hannah Arendt as its classic 
spokesperson. Arendt defended an intrinsic conception of politics, understood as 
a passionate statement against the decline of the public sphere and the “rise of the 
social.”143 She intellectually anticipated the need to save politics from economic 
commodification and technocratization by introducing issues of the good life on a 
public level. According to Arendt, politics needed to be rejuvenated with a grand 
display of political virtues so that it would again function according to the spirit of 
ancient Greek politics.
 Deliberative democrats have been criticizing republicanism for being so 
overambitious and naïve. They say that it overlooks the hazards of elitism and 
perfectionism. Put differently: in its definition of the political purpose, republicanism 
fails to make a proper distinction between the ethical and moral dimensions of 
democratic will formation. While it is true that politics must be based on publicly 
deliberated reasons, these reasons should not be seen as constituting a substantive 
will of the people. Instead, public reasons can only bind subjects if they are the 
result of a higher level of intersubjectivity embodied by a fair procedure that 
guides processes of democratic will formation. The binding force of deliberation 
is ultimately being exerted by the universal will to follow these procedures and to 
give public reasons in line with their conditions. The republican political process 
of deliberation, however, is fueled by particularistic cultures, and consequently 
becomes caught up in a public exercise and exposition of ethics. The unavoidable 
result is not consensus but an agonistic clash of interests and worldviews in which 
the only solution possible will necessarily be an undemocratic solution, as an 
intersubjective standard is absent. Elster blames republicanism, then, for defining 
“[t]he political process [as] an end in itself, a good or even the supreme good for 
those who participate in it.” This leads to a political process that is “narcissistic,”144 
because individuals or organization use politics to publicly advance their particular 
idea of the world. We have come across similar criticisms by Rawls.145 According 
to Rawls, classical liberals such as J.S. Mill and Kant also relied on ethical, 
“comprehensive” doctrines as the moral basis for their political theories.146 Like 
Elster, Rawls stresses that a political conception of justice cannot function as a 
substantive ethical theory due to the fact of pluralism. Only the ideal of the political 
conception itself is substantial. “A political conception is at best but a guiding 
framework of deliberation and reflection which helps us reach political agreement 
on at least the constitutional essentials and the basic questions of justice.”147
 To be sure, although deliberative democracy wants to avoid republicanism’s 
essentialist tendencies, it holds onto the ideal of using critical and public discussion 
to reach political agreement. But if public norms are to be valid and collectively 
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binding, they cannot be based on comprehensive (intrinsic) reasons but, instead, 
need to be procedurally legitimized.148 We may conclude, therefore, that with regard 
to the political purpose, deliberative democracy upholds the very instrumentality 
of social-choice theory. Despite a different conception of the political process, 
deliberative democracy has the same conception of the political purpose. Although 
it fundamentally disagrees with social-choice theory about how to handle private 
preferences, it conflicts only in relative terms with what the process of politics 
should achieve. Regardless of whether politics is based in compromise (social 
choice) or consensus (deliberative democracy), it should ultimately be instrumental 
to the ideal of justice that is epitomized by the general notion of the public good. 
The purpose of politics is to serve society, not the other way around. Elster puts it 
like this: 
Politics is concerned with substantive decision-making, and is to that extent 
instrumental. True, the idea of instrumental politics might also be taken in 
a more narrow sense, as implying that the political process is one in which 
individuals pursue their selfish interests, but more broadly understood it 
implies only that political action is primarily a means to a non-political 
end, and only secondarily, if at all, an end in itself.149 
Thus, as Elster makes clear, deliberative democracy upholds a broad rather than a 
narrow instrumentality; it rejects a narrow instrumentalist conception of politics 
as a means of mere private preference satisfaction but supports a conception of 
politics as broadly instrumental, because politics is subservient to its purpose. The 
main contrast between the deliberative and the social-choice models concerns their 
political modus operandi, not their political telos. Although Elster observes that there 
are many “technical and conceptual” problems with social-choice theory, its main 
problem lies in the assumption and acceptance of people’s given preferences.150 He 
concludes that this is unacceptable because the essence of politics is its publicness: 
“[P]olitics must be an open and public activity….”151
 Provided that we distinguish between broad and narrow instrumentality, we 
can summarize the three varieties of political theory set out by Elster as follows:
(1) The social-choice view, according to which the political process is 
private and the political purpose is instrumental;
(2) The discursive view, according to which the political process is public 
and the political purpose is instrumental;
(3) The agonistic model, according to which the political process is public 
and the political purpose is intrinsic.
Elster states that republicanism overexposes politics. Its intrinsic view results in an 














n but for instrumental (moral) reasons. On the other hand, social-choice theory 
underexposes politics. Its market view results in a neutralization of politics and 
makes political will formation immune to moral claims. Discursive political theory, in 
Elster’s view, has steered the right course—that of public instrumentalism, “defined 
as public in nature and instrumental in purpose.”152 According to Elster, a discursive 
politics publicly scrutinizes private preferences, yet upholds instrumentality through 
public will formation and decision-making.
 But if we follow Elster’s analysis consistently and describe his three models 
with a diagram, we are confronted with a fourth view of political theory. As we 
can see in the figure, this new model, like discourse theory, also merges aspects 
of social-choice theory and agonistic theory, but highlights exactly the opposite 
characteristics: a private political process and an intrinsic political purpose. The 
question is, first, why Elster has neglected it, and second, what we would make of 
this model? 
Figure 1: Jon Elster’s three varieties of political theory, plus a missing one
3.3 Politics as will formation
Elster has probably neglected the fourth model of politics due to his unconditional 
allegiance to the forum model of politics. After all, the main object of his article is 
to find a workable alternative to social choice’s civic privatism. And after having 
convincingly argued that the political process of will formation should indeed 
be defined as public, he moves on to characterize the political purpose, which 
amounts in his account to the encounter between discursive and agonistic theory 
(or deliberative democracy versus republicanism). Although the fourth model was 
clearly a theoretical possibility, the domination of the publicity imperative was 
again very effective: a political theory that portrays the process of democratic will 
formation as private becomes completely counterintuitive. For Elster, the “market 
or forum” issue has already been settled—the next issue being the definition of the 
purpose of the public process of democratic will formation, which leads to the well-
known debate on the differences and the relationship between ideas of good and the 
principle of right.
        Instrumental










 Yet I believe that this debate amounts to barking up the wrong tree. Elster 
should have discussed the fourth model of political theory—and not so much for the 
sake of analytical consistency but because of the model’s normative significance. 
As I have already suggested, it makes a great deal of sense to portray processes of 
will formation as “private,” since the very democratic aspect of these processes lies 
in their independent (hence “private”) status in relation to public authority. And, 
what is more, the very object of these processes can be said to be intrinsic—not 
instrumental, as social-choice theory would have it. The purpose of deliberation 
and communication is not simply a means for moving toward the ideal of human 
progress and welfare, but that ideal’s very embodiment. Nevertheless, despite 
supporting an intrinsic conception of democratic will formation, the fourth model 
differs from the republican conception, for it constitutes a civil society instead of a 
political one.
 In addition to this argument in favor of a fourth model of democratic will 
formation, it appears that there is a more far-reaching implication to consider. For 
if the fourth model of democracy puts the idea of civil privatism at the center of 
democracy, one might ask what the public aspect of democratic will formation is. I 
would like to show, however, that this is the wrong question, since it still assumes 
that political theory is about democratic will-formation processes in the first place. I 
believe, however, that an argument for depicting democratic will formation as private 
calls precisely for a reconsideration of that very approach to politics. Obviously, 
this reconsideration involves questioning the paradigm—which precedes Elster’s 
two questions of political theory—of politics as will formation. In particular, my 
line of questioning casts doubt on the political interpretation of the private/public 
distinction in terms of an opposition between the market and the forum.
 As mentioned earlier, the main political issue for Elster is how people’s 
preferences should be dealt with democratically—that is, how the forum approach 
relates to the market approach in this respect. Elster states: “Politics, it is usually 
agreed, is concerned with the common good, and notably with the cases in which 
it cannot be realized as the aggregate outcome of individuals pursuing their private 
interests.”153 I believe that this idea of politics is essentially why Elster dismisses 
potential alternatives to social choice, alternatives in which politics is also defined 
as private. If politics is defined in terms of will-formation processes, then surely it is 
difficult if not absurd to conceive of it as a collection of private wills. That would be 
almost a contradiction in terms, for the very rationale of—democratic—politics is 
its dependency on the public deliberation of citizens. We can therefore understand 
Elster’s decision to reject the fourth model if we accept his paradigm of politics as 
will formation. However, whether politics should be understood in this way is a 
question that needs to be examined first.
 To restate there are two issues at stake here. First, what does the missing 














n look like? Second, what precisely is the central subject matter of political theory? 
I begin with the second of these issues. Only in Chapter 6 will I fully outline the 
fourth model of democratic will formation, by relating it to the political theory of 
Aristotle. I will call this fourth model “civil democracy.”
3.4 Politics as jurisdiction
As said, the main issue in Elster’s article is how we arrive at the public good—that 
is, whether processes of will formation should be relegated to the market mechanism 
or dealt with via deliberative forums. I see this as the wrong question, for it assumes 
politics to be primarily concerned with processes of will formation.
 Instead of defining politics as a will-formation process, I define it as 
jurisdiction. Politics should be concerned with explaining, structuring, and justifying 
public authority, with the intention of achieving the right balance between, on 
the one hand, the desirability of an autonomous realm of civil practices and, on 
the other, the inevitability of the interventional authority of the state. In terms of 
Elster’s article, I would say that politics deals with the question of how both market 
and forum processes of will formation should be legally institutionalized—along 
with many other types of will formation. Politics as jurisdiction is the art of defining 
the foundation and limits of the state’s authority to govern and legislate in relation 
to these processes. 
 The obsession with seeing civic deliberation and public discussion as the 
nexus of politics has overshadowed the crucial political virtue of jurisdiction 
and, therefore, pushed aside the art of political institutionalization—that is, the 
authoritative organization of civil processes and practices of will formation. Politics 
is not the moral pinnacle of democratic will formation but, instead, is about the 
question of how public authority can protect but also intervene in these practices 
and processes of will formation. 
 Jurisdiction is the underpinning of politics, and I believe its relevance has 
grown rapidly. The very legitimacy of the democratic mandate of public authority 
is at stake. Debates about the viability of the European Union, the relation between 
religion and integration, and the status of the “war on terror” are all basically 
concerned with describing and circumscribing public authority in relation to 
societal processes of will formation. The problem in these cases is not so much a 
fragmentation of public justice but a fragmentation of public authority. The question 
that binds these debates is the jurisdiction of the political body—that is, the question 
of how public authority should execute its power to intervene.
 Take the debate about the future of the European Union. What is the 
democratic issue at stake? It seems that many people find it difficult to understand 
what the Union represents, what mandate they have actually given their political 
leaders. Even pro-Europeans express skepticism about the legitimacy of the whole 
project. They accuse public authorities of incompetence and the unwillingness to 
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justify and explain their actions. The irony is that politicians themselves respond to 
these criticisms in terms of will formation, namely, on the one hand, by complaining 
about a lack of citizenship and by promising democratization in order to regain the 
trust of the voter, on the other hand. However, instead of wanting a greater say in 
matters of state and more political participation, the voter seems to prefer to have 
a greater insight into the jurisdiction of the Union, to know how the lines of its 
interventional authority are drawn in relation to their civil autonomy. The problem 
is how political authority represents itself in relation to its interventional power.
 The “war on terror” is another example. Although many may agree about 
the great menace of international terrorism, there is concern and uncertainty about 
the potential “Big Brother” effects of countervailing measures by the state. People 
may not argue about the threat posed by terrorism, but they do disagree about the 
appropriate breadth and depth of the state’s interventions in the interests of public 
safety and about the implications such interventions may have for personal and 
private practices of will formation. 
 It could be argued that the great democratic problem is that public authorities 
themselves have a flawed sense of jurisdiction. They display an inability to explain 
either the responsibility that adheres to their being invested with public authority 
or the meaning of this responsibility in relation to the civil sovereignty of people’s 
practices. This incapacity could lead to a situation in which citizens no longer know 
why the state deserves their mandate, since they will have come to perceive laws 
more as obstructions than as accommodations to their life practices. This could 
mean that the very raison d’être of politics—i.e., the willingness to be subjected to 
public authority for the sake of civil sovereignty—may be disappearing.154
 Political jurisdiction depends on a different commitment than the deliberative 
commitment of confronting private preferences to public reason. The legitimacy of 
the political system does not depend on the result of democratic will formation, 
namely, a set of common norms. Instead, politics as jurisdiction is concerned with 
acquiring and holding the balance between, on the one hand, the inevitability of public 
authority, and the desirability of the autonomy of civil processes of will formation, 
on the other. According to a theory of politics as jurisdiction, democratic legitimacy 
is based on a political commitment that is embedded both in the preservation of 
the autonomy of civil practices and in the justification and explanation of state 
authority. This political theory is the practical effect of the idea of democratic self-
organization: in order to be free, the people install a government that represents 
the state, and they accept its authority based on how it uses its mandate. Politics as 
jurisdiction is about balancing both aspects of the need for public authority and civil 
freedom.
 The principal difference between these two features of a democratic system is 
well explained by Rousseau.155 He distinguishes between two different “reciprocal 














n “the act of association.”156 At the civil level, the individual associates “as a member 
of the sovereign in relation to individuals.”157 Association is different at the political 
level, where the individual is “a member of the state in relation to the sovereign.”158 
Because he is co-constitutor of public law, he must be subjected to it as well, and 
since he cannot do this himself, the law needs to be enforced by a public authority: 
the state. To constitute a state, the individual has made an indissoluble pact and 
subjected himself to the general will. He renounces “that part of his power, his goods 
and his liberty which is the concern of the community….”159 The social—or better: 
political—contract thus cannot be seen as a result of a democratic will-formation 
process, but only as an act in itself. To put it in analytical terms: the general will is 
the only plausible legitimation of public law. Precisely because popular sovereignty 
implies the equality of each person, no representational exception can be made at 
the political level. Rousseau stresses that at the political level it is thus vital that 
relations among subjects remain limited, since “[n]othing is more dangerous in 
public affairs than the influence of private interests….”160 Public law can only rest on 
the full support of all.161 That is the democratic paradox: democratically organizing 
the body politic means accepting that “[s]overeignty cannot be represented for the 
same reason that it cannot be alienated; its essence is the general will, and cannot 
be represented—either it is the general will or it is something else; there is no 
intermediate possibility.”162
 Still, although theoretically the general will cannot be represented, from 
a practical point of view, of course, it must be.163 And this is where politics as 
jurisdiction comes in: it is concerned with the practical—not original—representation 
of the general will by public authority. Hence, “democratic legitimacy” in this sense 
implies the explanation, delineation, and justification of the state in accordance with 
public law. Democratic legitimacy centers on the public discussion concerning the 
actions of the state in respect of its task of democratic representation. The sovereign 
has installed the state to provide for its freedom and can hold the state accountable 
for its actions accordingly. Democratic legitimacy implies, therefore, a delicate 
balance between freedom and authority.
 Still, contra Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau makes clear that the acceptance of 
public authority never implies submission to it.164 The principal idea of democracy 
rests on popular sovereignty represented by each subject’s will. As Rousseau writes: 
“Power may be delegated, but the will cannot be.”165 What follows from Rousseau’s 
observation is the need to deal politically with an institutional framework of civil 
processes and practices of will formation. Democracy’s will formation aspect, which 
counterbalances the political representation of the general will, is the complement 
of politics as jurisdiction. Crucially, the political meaning of civil society is not its 
potential to create public reason but to flourish in its own terms, as a social web of 
institutions and practices of will formation. For, after all, this is why the sovereign 
has installed the body politic: to reach civil liberty.166 
65
 The basic idea that informs the political public/private perspective and brings 
politics as jurisdiction into perspective is the distinction between state and society. 
In this respect, civil society is private, while its activities can be characterized as 
intrinsic. Civil society is a place for potential public support and consensus, but 
equally for public protest and dissent, which is part and parcel of democracy. For 
civil society’s countervailing power is ultimately the very basis for limiting and 
influencing the state’s practical representation of the general will. Indeed, politics 
as jurisdiction must be complemented by a substantial theory of democratic will 
formation, which I call “civil democracy” and will explain much more fully in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Without such a theory of will formation, surely, a conception of 
political jurisdiction would be void.167
3.5 Politics as will formation versus politics as jurisdiction
According to the paradigm of politics as will formation, the legitimacy of politics is 
established through a continuous and communicative process of preference formation 
(or association in Rousseau’s terms).168 Politics is the intersubjective continuation 
of civil processes of will formation—namely, public deliberation based on fair 
procedural conditions. The will-formation paradigm thus observes no essential 
difference between the civil and the political levels of democracy. By contrast, 
politics as jurisdiction stresses the irreducibility of the civil and political levels. 
Both represent intrinsically different democratic processes and commitments. At the 
political level, the legitimacy of public authority is established through a controlling 
and preservative juridical structure. This task is much more complex than merely 
integrating deliberative rationality within the representational function of public 
authority. Jurisdiction implies the democratic legitimation of state authority, not an 
optimal incorporation of public will formation in political structures. Jurisdiction 
suggests a certain amount of autonomy on the part of public authority.
 The irony is that a deliberative interpretation of public law will bring about 
the opposite of its initial goal: the weakening rather than the strengthening of 
popular sovereignty.169 Because civil pluralism is conceptualized antagonistically, 
that is, characterized by private preferences that are fundamentally opposed 
and incommensurable, political will formation unavoidably acquires a strong 
transformative and integrative function. Its object is to reach consensus by 
exchanging and sharing public reasons for private preferences. The result is an 
unfortunate confusion of the civil and the political commitments.
 More specifically, politics as will formation undermines both the 
jurisdictional function of the state and the institutional autonomy of civil processes 
of will formation. To start with the latter: according to politics as jurisdiction, a 
civil commitment is what invigorates democratic processes of will formation and, 
accordingly, the possibility of consensus. As I will set out in Chapters 6 and 7, 














n triggered by a drive for happiness and a desire to lead a good life. In other words, 
civil society is characterized by what I call an institutional plurality of pluriform 
practices: a wide array of relatively self-sufficient institutions, which are determined 
by particular customs and rules. 
 The discursive response to republicanism is to respect civil self-sufficiency 
by rationalizing (and thus neutralizing) it within political procedures. Civil 
practices, however, should not be involved in political decision-making procedures 
in the first place. In this sense they need to remain private—or apolitical. Their 
very particularity can survive only in a situation of institutional autonomy, which 
is clearly demarcated by and from public authority. If not—that is, if processes 
of will formation are seen as conditional to political justice—civil commitments 
between individuals will be explained as political demands, and the result will be 
the public alienation of individuals. Alienation, however, should take place only 
at the political level, where individual citizens give a part of themselves to the 
community and where they implicitly mandate public authority to curtail will 
formation in order to protect it. Will formation itself should not be politicized as if a 
continuing social contract between citizens and the state is at stake and private wills 
are to be subjected to public association understood as transformation.170
 Furthermore, the jurisdictional function of the state will be undermined 
if it is based on moral assumptions of intersubjective rationality.171 Deliberative 
democrats oppose this; they see intersubjectivity as the core of political rationality, 
as necessary to abstract from social complexity in order to encourage further social 
integration.172 Although they emphasize a principled distinction between discursive 
and other forms of rationality, they unmistakably see will-formation processes 
in the light of the growth of discursive rationality. According to Habermas, the 
core of civil society is composed of associations that “institutionalize problem-
solving discourses on questions of general interest within the framework of public 
spheres.”173 These civil practices arrange the conditions for a communicative politics 
in which “social integration [is] accomplished by democratic means … through a 
discursive filter.”174 In other words, political will formation steps in where private 
will formation fails to be functionally integrative. Deliberative politics, Habermas 
continues, is a “reflexively organized learning process that removes the burden on 
latent processes or societal integration while continuing these processes within 
an action specialized for relief work.”175 Anthony Laden adds that the ultimate 
justification of political principles is through the endorsement of “actual people 
acting politically in actual societies,” and this inevitably implies thinking of “the 
necessary preconditions for the possibility of reasonable political deliberation.”176 
The goal of politics as jurisdiction, on the other hand, is non-integrative. It locates 
the integrative component of democracy only indirectly in civil processes of will 
formation; politics itself has no integrative task. In this respect, it is important to 
distinguish between integrative discussions within associations that are concerned 
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with their specific interest, and discussions between associations in public spheres 
that are concerned with the general interest. The former type of discussion involves 
reflections about the idea of a good practice, such as running a hospital, or managing 
a warehouse, while public sphere discussions are more abstract. They deal with the 
question of how the many different processes, practices and institutions of will 
formation relate to each other—quite similar to the Platonic idea of dialectics.177 
 It is important to note, however, that these kinds of discussions do not 
automatically imply the inclusion of a political aspect. There is no straight line from 
public spheres to politics. A discussion becomes political only when conceptions 
from public spheres get related to the task of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is concerned 
with the matter of how public authority ought to structure the dynamics within private 
and public spheres of civil society, while keeping the initial pluralism as intact as 
possible. The political rationality that is appropriate here cannot be intersubjective, 
if intersubjectivity is understood as a public agreement of private wills. Politics 
as jurisdiction deals with the justified intervention and decision-making of the 
political body. While our civil commitment may be aimed at consensus, political 
commitment is necessarily directed towards compromise. After all, as citizens, we 
consider how governments may ensure that civil institutions and practices of will 
formation can coexist peacefully. And as such, the problem-solving capacity of civil 
associations or citizens cannot be regarded as ultimately preparatory for attaining 
political intersubjectivity. Civil harmony is fundamentally different from political 
harmony, and can be only indirectly effective for political peace and stability. 
Politics is not a continuous communicative forum in which private preferences are 
laundered and then selected following deliberation, after which they qualify for 
consensual legislation. Such a depiction of political rationality completely ignores 
what is necessary both to constitute the necessary legal institutional framework of 
a political community and to preserve its stability and endurance.
 To illustrate this difference, let me touch upon the question of how politics 
as jurisdiction forms a political bond between an atheist and a believer, and how it 
stands out against deliberative democracy in this regard. First, at the civil level of 
democracy, the atheist expresses, explains, and defends his or her idea of goodness 
and truth, as does the believer. Each speaker might try to demonstrate how the 
other is deviating from rightness and aim to convert the other to the opposing 
view. If necessary or required, both speakers will explain their beliefs and hence 
compare them in public spheres—and they may harangue each other and argue 
fiercely. While they live in different private worlds, they will not forego arguments 
in favor of their beliefs in places where their worlds coincide or collide. And this 
is what democracy is about. Yet, at the political level, ideological conversion must 
be halted and disagreement pacified, for here it is necessary to construct a world 
where both the atheist and the believer can coexist. The deliberative impulse is 














n believer and the atheist can come up with public reasons for their beliefs that both 
of them can understand and share. Under this commitment lies the new assumption 
that the believer and the atheist are also willing to politically question possible 
dogmatic aspects of their worldviews, which can result in the willingness to forego 
certain particular views of the good.178 However, the political realm cannot live 
up to such great expectations.179 A deliberative depiction of politics will not create 
the stable institutional context that the believer and the atheist need to pursue their 
ideas of a good life at the civil level. If these two citizens are expected to engage 
in discourse about their preferences, this time at the political level, the result will 
be an unwanted politicization, or smothering, of their preferences.180 Politics as 
jurisdiction, by contrast, puts public consensus to one side, and concentrates on the 
juridical structure necessary for a peaceful modus vivendi. It explicitly reserves the 
ideal or possibility of consensus for the civil level, yet is at the same time conscious 
of the ideal’s fragility. At the political level, therefore, the aim is to preserve and, 
if necessary, coercively safeguard the plurality of civil society. This cannot happen 
without the moderation of power relations embedded in civil processes and practices 
of will formation, which, as I have explained, puts a justification of the intervention 
of public authority at the center of politics.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced a different conception of politics. Against the 
deliberative idea of politics, which I have argued is a symptom of a political paradigm 
called “politics as will formation,” I have proposed “politics as jurisdiction.” 
Provided that politics is understood as jurisdiction, democratic will formation (or 
association) is private in its process and intrinsic in its purpose. I call this conception 
of will formation civil democracy. The adjective “civil” encompasses, first of all, the 
idea that will formation is fundamentally autonomous (private) in relation to public 
authority, and second, that will formation deals first and foremost with intrinsic 
conceptions of the good. 
 By analyzing the article by Jon Elster, I have shown how the publicity 
imperative does its work in political theory. It blocks out a conception of politics in 
which processes of will formation are seen as private. Indeed, proponents of social-
choice theory do have a strong argument to make in respecting processes of will 
formation, but for the wrong reasons. Processes of will formation are private, but not 
because of a market lingo in which the political is seen as the instrumental facilitator 
for these privately depicted economic processes. Instead, it is greatly preferable to 
explain the private status of processes of will formation in terms of their relative 
independence. A private depiction of these processes reveals that politics is not their 
ultimate sanctifier. Politics itself does not fabricate good preferences and actions, 
but rather makes laws that secure and protect processes in which good actions can 
be cultivated. The democratic value of will-formation processes consists in their 
capacity to cultivate virtue.
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 Many contemporary commentators depict “publicness” as the epitome of 
politics. Politics should be democratic—that is, centered on the deliberation of 
people’s preferences. The political end is also said to be instrumental, for public 
deliberation should focus on social justice: it should create in society the conditions 
for fairness. The theory of deliberative democracy is seen as the ideal account of 
this view of politics. My aim in this chapter has been to introduce and stress the 
importance of a fourth model of democracy next to the familiar three, one called 
“civil democracy.” In its characteristics, civil democracy stands diametrically 
opposed to deliberative democracy, because it assumes a different paradigm of 
politics: politics as jurisdiction. Deliberative democracy fails to distinguish between 
the civil and the political level of democracy, and unfortunately understands politics 
as a combination of both: politics as public will formation. 
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CHAPTER 4
The Distinctiveness of Politics: Political Theory as a 
Third-Order Construction
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I introduced a concept of politics as jurisdiction as an alternative 
to politics as will formation. At bottom lies a different political public/private 
conception, namely the distinction between society and state. Understanding the 
phenomenon of politics as facilitating civil liberty on the one hand and maintaining 
public authority on the other keeps one away from making politics into a moral 
competition between interests and preferences. In this chapter, I will make an 
analogous argument, but from an epistemological point of view. I will be asking 
what the scientific status of theorizing politics is. Because political theory studies 
how practices of will formation or association need to be ordered (jurisdiction), we 
will need to consider the epistemology of such processes. This consideration will 
require us to understand how such practices are socially constructed and can be 
conceptualized in terms of political theory.
 The chapter is structured as follows. First, I describe three postulates of 
political theory that often return in the literature: the practical, social constructivist, 
and intersubjective elements of political theory (section 4.2). I critically analyze 
these postulates in the light of a key epistemological issue, called the “epistemic 
problem.” This move will lead into a classification of social constructions and a 
critique of the pragmatist conception of political theory (section 4.3). Finally, I will 
revisit the three postulates of political theory (section 4.4).
4.2 Three postulates of political theory
This section is a report on some widespread assumptions about the scientific basics 
of political theory. This is not to imply that there are certain authors who share all 
of these postulates, but that there are many authors who are to a considerable extent 
influenced by them. Three postulates of political theory frequently pop up in the 
political-theoretical debate, so it is important to clarify them.
4.2.1 Postulate 1: Political theory is practical, not metaphysical
Ever since John Rawls forcefully defended the importance of non-metaphysical 
thinking in political theory, many political theorists have redefined their object of 
study accordingly.181 Contrary to what I defended in Chapter 2, these scholars oppose 
political metaphysics182 and instead underscore William James’s adage that theories 
should be “instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest.”183 The 
resoluteness to reject the suitability, desirability, or even the possibility of political 












n metaphysics is prevalent, even though—at least in my opinion—most insights from 
political philosophy are highly abstract and, on the whole, selective generalizations 
of innumerable relations between phenomena. To understand political philosophy 
as metaphysical is nevertheless characterized as old-fashioned and sometimes even 
as dangerous. According to Rawls, “a continuing shared understanding of one 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only 
by the oppressive use of state power. … [T]he Inquisition was not an accident; its 
suppression of heresy was needed to preserve that shared religious belief.”184
 But if political metaphysics is rejected, what alternative standards do define 
the quality of political theory? The common answer—also in Rawls’s by now 
classic words—is that political theory should be political,185 that is, it should solve 
social problems in a political fashion, which means through publicly justifiable 
principles that settle conflicts between (groups of) people. Jon Elster called this 
“broad instrumentality,” a term that emphasizes that the purpose of political theory 
is to provide society with a neutral deliberative procedure in order to solve political 
conflicts fairly. And as Habermas explains, the fairness of such a deliberative 
procedure “resides in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow 
from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding. In the final 
analysis, this normative content arises from the structure of linguistic communication 
and the communicative mode of sociation.”186 In other words, the practical use of 
political theory is to theorize modes of intersubjective communication based on 
modes of association in order to engage with political conflicts.
 Comprehensive moralism has to be avoided, it is said, however, due to what 
Rawls calls “the fact of pluralism.”187 People have diverse ideas of the good, which 
makes it impossible to construct a reasonable public conception of political justice 
based on a conception of the good.188 Political theory has to respect ethical diversity 
and stick to “a political conception of society, which is based on some fundamental 
ideas embedded in “the public political culture of a democratic society.”189 Political 
neutralism is secured if these fundamental ideas are made explicit in reasonable 
political conditions and procedures, which ought to guarantee a just and cooperative 
result for all parties within a political society.190
 Gerald Gaus agrees with Rawls about the importance of de-essentializing 
political theory. The central mission of political theory, in Gaus’s conception, is to 
obtain a publicly justified conception of politico-legal norms.191 The relation between 
justified beliefs and thoughts about the world itself is a different thing, according 
to Gaus. What matters is the reasonability of the political rules that constitute 
practices. Political theorists should therefore concentrate on the epistemological 
justification of people’s beliefs—that is, on the question of how these beliefs can 
be publicly justified and, in the end, how they can serve as the basis for political 
rules.192 Only after testing their “reasonability” can their political feasibility be 
ascertained.193 Gaus states: “because there is no such thing as an uncontentious 
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theory of justification, an adequately articulated liberalism must clarify and defend 
its conception of justified belief—its epistemology.”194 In this respect, it is clear that 
the term “publicly justified metaphysics” is a contradiction—like its mirror image, 
“private politics”—since, in a deeply plural society, a particular metaphysical 
conception will never be shared by all.
 Not metaphysics but epistemology, then, is what is needed. To illustrate how 
a political theory can be epistemologically successful, Gaus uses the metaphor of a 
map. A map should help the user to make sense of the world by simply and consistently 
showing the landscape and making possible a route from A to B.195 The construction 
underlying the map can be called “successful” insofar as it fulfills these functions 
well.196 Similarly, to produce a useful theory, one must find concepts that are suited 
for successful practical action (and communication).197 Theory serves the case at 
hand and is judged according to its usefulness, after which social expectations can 
be justifiably established—and ultimately institutionalized.198 Gaus wants theory 
to guide and clarify human action, and this should be the object of political theory 
as well—to offer practical help by “navigating us around the political world.”199 
Because political theory should serve as a kind of map for all people, its standard 
of success needs to be publicly justified. Political theory has to meet two conditions 
simultaneously: that of functioning well and that of being publicly reasonable.
4.2.2 Postulate 2: Political theory is social constructivist
Many scholars have taken seriously Ludwig Wittgenstein’s criticism of observational 
language—that theories do not represent the world in a straightforward way.200 
Theories cannot be empirically fixed and are therefore subject to a plurality of 
interpretations. Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, language in general cannot be 
understood independently from the practices in which it is being uttered. Theories 
are the socially constructed products of practices and this means that without prior 
knowledge of a particular practice, it is difficult to understand the language that is 
internal to the practice.201 Social constructivism suggests, then, that political theory 
cannot be straightforwardly distinguished from theory in general, because it does 
not have an exclusive role in constructing practices—all theory does that.202
 The social construction of reality makes reality artificial, in a sense; and since 
reality can be said to be a human construct, it cannot be taken for granted. Among 
social theorists, Langdon Winner has been an influential proponent of the idea that 
theorizing has built-in political characteristics due to its social-constructivist nature. 
Winner has given some eye-catching examples that illustrate how science designs 
the world through technologies. These technologies can be called “political,” 
Winner claims, because they influence human action by empowering or limiting it.
Many technical devices and systems important in everyday life contain 
possibilities for many different ways of ordering human activity. 












n Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies 
choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to 
work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time. 
… In that sense technological innovations are similar to legislative acts 
or political foundings that establish a framework for public order that will 
endure over many generations.203 
Illustrating the non-neutral, or political, character of technological designs, Winner 
refers to Baron Haussmann’s Parisian boulevards and Robert Moses’s motorway 
crossings in New York. According to Winner, these designs were political designs, 
because they influenced practices by arranging and conditioning human behavior.204 
Winner thinks that the social influence of technologies, architectural designs, or 
artifacts underscores the need to develop a sense of democratic responsibility 
towards their design and construction. Political theory’s object, Winner insists, 
should be to put the value-embeddedness of technological practices into normative 
perspective and to redress their inherent or effective injustices. Implicit social 
constructions should be made politically explicit and subject to public discussion. 
The complementing hope is that people will develop an ethical sensibility in dealing 
with them. 
 With this solution, Winner pays tribute to Dewey’s suggestions of conceptual 
reconstruction, namely, that “[p]olitical concepts must be tested and continually 
revised on the ground of the consequences they produce in existential application.”205 
To understand a theory or conjecture, we must be connected to the practical 
phenomena that are its object. Gaus emphasizes that “language is part of living; 
to understand the words of that language one must understand the ways of living 
of which that language is a part.”206 Giving meaning to words and denoting things 
in reality are learned in “practices” because that is where those words are actually 
being used and constructed. Likewise, political theory is science in action207: the 
meaning of political concepts cannot be distinguished from what they produce. Here 
Postulate 1 meets Postulate 2—and leads to Postulate 3: the meaning of a political 
construction should be established by its practical effect, which can only be done 
by bringing in the participants, who discuss their use of the political construction in 
practice. 
4.2.3 Postulate 3: Political theory is intersubjectivist
The third postulate of political theory is closely related to both the first and the 
second. Since the public participates in political practices, the value of political 
rules needs to be intersubjectively constituted as well. Making sense of the world, 
generally speaking, takes place in a process of intersubjective communication. 
As Peter Winch puts it: “Establishing a standard is not an activity which it makes 
sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation from other individuals. 
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For it is contact with other individuals which alone makes possible the external 
check on one’s actions which is inseparable from an established standard.”208 A 
practice is constituted intersubjectively because giving meaning is necessarily 
an interactive process. Participants incessantly exchange meaning by implicitly 
relating certain concepts and rules to what actually happens in practice. Through 
this back-and-forth process, they understand a certain joke, gesture, or saying.209 
Language is participatory: it can only be learned by the public exchange of meaning 
in practice.210
 Rawls, however, stresses that, without the standard or the rule, people would 
not be able to understand each other in the first place. A standard is a vital condition 
of communication. Rawls illustrates this with reference to the game of baseball: 
“No matter what a person did, what he did would not be described as stealing a 
base or striking out or drawing a walk unless he could also be described as playing 
baseball, and for him to be doing this presupposes the rule-like practice which 
constitutes the game.”211 Without the institutionalized set of rules that make up the 
game of baseball, the activity of suddenly running from one cushion to another 
could not be identified as “stealing a base.”212 Hence, Rawls stresses that practical 
communication can only be an intersubjective process if participants discursively 
exchange their experiences with reference to the rules that constitute the practice. 
Moreover, I would add, although there is no independent way of establishing 
meaning in a practice, there always will be some sort of qualification regarding the 
participants that are involved in changing the rules. Depending on size and activity 
of the particular practice, the degree of intersubjectivity in a practice is always 
limited: a community of beekeepers is not particularly qualified to discuss the rules 
of baseball, and vice versa. 
 The epistemology of intersubjective communication seems to reinforce 
Winner’s call for democratization. If social constructions can be called “political” 
because they influence participants of a practice, they ought to be open for discussion. 
This call for discussion has a special significance for political theory, because in 
politics the beekeeper argument fails: we are all legitimate participants. A political 
practice’s public is inclusive, its standards the concern of the public at large. Hence, 
political theory needs to take notice of politics’ inherent democraticness: every 
member of the public has a right to contribute to the functioning of a political 
community.213
 The importance of publicly deliberating preferences is the consequence 
of applying an intersubjective epistemology to political theory: they mutually 
reinforce each other. Recall Larry Lessig’s description of politics as “the process 
by which we reason”214: it is both a democratic right and a collective responsibility 
to deliberate about influential social, economic, and technological developments. 
Political theory is democratized science in its purest form because in the polis we 
all are legitimate stakeholders.215












n The three postulates of political theory can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Political theory needs to be publicly practical, not metaphysical; it is 
justified if it brings solutions to political problems;
(2) Political theory is not a representation but a social construction of reality; 
like all theory, political theory is thus political, because by constructing 
reality it has practical consequences;
(3) Political theory needs to take into account that practices are constituted 
intersubjectively, which brings an extra pressure to political theory because 
the moral stakeholder of the political practice can be said to be the public 
at large.216
Incorporating the above postulates, political theory may be defined as the study 
of publicly justified social constructions that solve political problems. Democratic 
discussion not only clarifies and explicates the social construction of the world but 
also provides the solutions to the problems that are created by it. Political theory 
searches for ways to reasonably construct political solutions. We may call this 
pragmatist political theory, since elements of non-essentialism, practicality, and 
social constructivism are central to it.
 Do these three postulates fulfill the quest for an adequate epistemological 
characterization of political theory? For a beginning of an answer it is helpful to 
return to Winner’s observation about political technologies. According to Winner, 
social constructions are value-embedded and influence human action; hence, they 
can be called “political.” The right response is to subject them to democratic 
discussion in order to make sure that they do not illegitimately obstruct certain 
practices. It remains unclear, however, what the special significance of political 
theory is according to this conception. Given the social-constructivist point about the 
inherent political effect of language, we need to clarify the contention that political 
theory should study how to democratically deal with social constructions.217 What 
exactly is so political about making things public and discussing them? In line with 
the general point concerning politics as will formation, it seems to be only relatively 
different—not qualitatively—from critical activities in journalism or literature.218 
In these domains people also take the trouble to scrutinize the powerful effects of 
architectures, policies, artifacts, or ideologies. Is democratic deliberation enough 
to tackle the negative implications of the socially constructed world? The political 
question involved seems to be more complex.
4.3 Deconstructing social constructions
In considering the adequacy of the plea for publicly discussing social constructions, 
it is important to find out what the epistemological status of a social construction is. 
If politics is said to be concerned with the public discussion of social constructions, 
79
we need consider what these constructions actually refer to and what the constructed 
object of discussion is. With these criteria in mind, we can turn to consider the very 
possibility of relating a construction to its functioning in a practice.
4.3.1 The difficulty of defining a construction 
According to pragmatism, the meaning of a construction (a linguistic translation of 
reality) is tied to its function—that is, how the construction is used in a practice. The 
definition of a construction depends on the definition of the construction’s practical 
success. This, however, suggests a communicative structure, in which thoughts and 
experiences about the practice are exchanged and understood. In order for such a 
process to be effective, tacit understandings of the quality or function of the practice 
need to be made explicit; they need to be translated into a common vocabulary in 
order to assess the practical success of the theory.219
 But making meaning explicit is more easily said than done. Although in daily 
life people usually interact in fluid ways, this does not imply that they understand 
each other all the time. All sorts of are happening in a practice in which participants 
give meaning and communicate. Defining such a practice would imply assessing, at 
the very least, its physical context (e.g., place, time, weather, objects) and the way 
participants are attuning to it220—how they are coping with each other and how they 
are integrating their own psychological state (e.g., their feelings, habits, experiences, 
tacit knowledge). Any discursive explication of a practice that is observed from 
such a perspective will inevitably be a selective rationalization. Language cannot 
represent such dense context and endless dynamics, neither quantitatively nor 
qualitatively. How participants actually function and interact is in constant flux, 
a dynamic state that theory—artificial and abstract—cannot capture. There is an 
immense difference between the particular reality to which a theory refers and the 
description the theory offers of it. This limitation has important consequences for 
the attempt to account defining a theory itself—not least for a political theory.
 The difference between the practical and theoretical status of a construction 
can be exemplified by Gaus’s example of the map. If users of a map want to 
come to an agreement about the map’s functional success, they must be able to 
discursively explicate their understanding of its function. Participants—a group 
of people traveling by car, perhaps—need to agree that it was specifically the 
guiding function of the map that led them to their destination, and their definition 
of this guiding function must be mutually understood. These criteria are not 
unproblematic: discursively sharing the function of a practice (as a way to agree 
about the meaning of a construction) is different in principle from actually sharing 
the function in concrete experience. A definition of practical success, then, often 
remains ambiguous; it relies not only on the selection of some aspects of reality over 
others, but on the translation of these experiences into descriptive terms, as well. If 
the travelers need to agree on the meaning of the map, there might be differences 












n of opinion when linking its general meaning (finding a location) to the meaning 
of the larger practice (traveling). Was it, during this particular occasion, the map 
that led the travelers to their destination, or was it pure luck, acquaintance with the 
itinerary, or the intuitive driving skills of the chauffeur? If the travelers consider the 
specific map in the car to be the principal cause that led them to their destination, 
their choice would represent only a selective rationalization of the practice. The 
actual experience of the practice (jointly traveling by car) is too intricate to connect 
it straightforwardly to the directional success of the map. The point to make is that 
although words or constructions are generally understood through their function in 
a practice (a map is understood to show you the direction from A to B), this does not 
imply that their theoretical meaning can be simply connected to a specific practice. 
Defining the theoretical meaning of a term by directly linking it to the practice in 
which it is used inevitably leaves a translation gap that cannot be filled.
4.3.2 Orders of construction and the epistemic problem
Drawing attention to the principal difference between understanding constructions 
by their practical application and by their theoretical meaning, Liesbeth Huppes-
Cluysenaer has argued for a distinction between first-order and second-order 
epistemological constructions.221 A first-order construction is a tacit, or natural, 
form of knowledge, while a second-order construction is a scientific, or theoretical, 
form of knowledge. There is a great difference between them. “Natural language,” 
Huppes-Cluysenaer writes, “relates to the way people use language in face-to-face 
contact. … Scientific language, however, is the attempt to give words an independent, 
context-free definition….”222 In a first-order construction, meaning is implicit, fluid 
and informal, and although communication at this level is not explicitly defined, 
by and large it is usually sufficient for effective communication. A second-order 
construction, however, defines the very terms of first-order constructions, the 
terms through which the constructions obtain an objective and institutional status. 
Although communication at a second-order level certainly takes into account the 
dynamics of first-order constructions—that is, the communicative particularities of 
the practices under consideration—the actual meanings of first-order constructions 
are lost in translation at this abstracted level. In daily communication (e.g., in 
schools, concert halls, kitchens, restaurants) the understanding of, say, “a glass of 
water” is generally successful, despite the many different contexts in which a glass 
of water appears. People will understand what I mean if I speak of that glass of water 
on the table. They know for instance—or perhaps better: expect223—that drinking 
from it quenches thirst. Such tacit knowledge of the water glass’s practical meaning 
is sufficient in many circumstances. It becomes a different story if the very object 
in question needs to be defined: giving a theoretical definition of a “glass of water” 
(or “quenching one’s thirst”) is a difficult thing—most people will not be able to do 
it—and only has a vague connection with the context in which it is used.
 Although second-order constructions are induced by particular experiences 
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of a practice, they have an independent status in regard to these experiences. A 
professional athlete’s exercise regime, for instance, is a translation and interpretation—
a construction—of many specific exercises. Its status is theoretical and normative 
by bringing first-order exercizing dynamics into perspective. However, it cannot 
be a direct empirical reflection of the athlete’s training activities, not only because 
it is necessarily interpretive, but also because it is exclusive of the many aspects 
of exercise that are difficult to capture in words. Put differently, despite its fluidity 
and fluency, a first-order construction is already a translation of a situation. It is 
therefore necessary to further distinguish between a first-order construction and a 
zero-order construction. A daily practice, for instance, a training at a soccer field, is 
a social construction, since its point of reference—the particularity and immediacy 
of the situation as experienced by the participants—cannot be straightforwardly 
communicated. This becomes apparent when a certain aspect of the training is 
described or discussed, such as the interaction between defender and goal keeper 
after an unnecessary goal. Such an interaction might appear to be natural, yet it is 
in fact a communicative interpretation and interaction of their individual states. 
The participants will have different personal ideas and feelings about it, since many 
of their initial experiences were different. Interestingly, the moment when there 
is an argument, or some other friction, these semantic gaps will appear, and the 
participants might move to a second-order level where they will try to define and 
explain the situation more explicitly. At this level, differences of opinion concerning 
a specific situation will include zero-order constructions. The particular experiences 
of the participants (experiences I called “metaphysical” in Chapter 2) lie “beneath” 
the first-order dynamics of communication. These sensations are intuitive and non-
linguistic; they precede conceptualization and cannot be described without losing 
their particularity.224 This awareness—that thoughts and words cannot replicate 
the particularity of a situation—is what Huppes-Cluysenaer calls “the epistemic 
problem” [het kenprobleem], which she describes as follows: “The individuality 
of things has a separate existence outside the mind. A problem arises from the 
impossibility to describe this individuality.”225 Huppes-Cluysenaer makes clear that 
there is a fundamental difference between experiencing and describing the world: 
its particularity, diversity and richness cannot be copied.226 Any (re)construction 
of the world needs to take language’s epistemic limit into account, its reduction of 
reality.
 To sum up, three orders of construction (or levels of knowledge) can be 
distinguished in a given practice: non-linguistic knowledge of the practice (zero-
order), natural knowledge of the practice (first-order), and theoretical knowledge 
of the practice (second-order). The differences between the orders are absolute, not 
gradual. In the movement from one level to another, something is lost and something 
else takes its place: from “zero” to “one,” situational particularity transforms into 
informal communication; from “one” to “two,” informal communication changes 
into theoretical communication.












n 4.3.3 The pragmatic approach to social constructions
Pragmatist epistemology, which is based on a dynamic and informal conception of 
communication, leads to the integration of non-linguistic and theoretical aspects 
of knowledge. In pragmatism, non-linguistic knowledge becomes part of the 
discussion only if it is rationalized, while the success of theoretical knowledge 
can only be ascertained by practical application at a first-order level of informal 
communication. 
 According to pragmatism, theory is a consequence of human action, hence 
always subject to change. Theory is “passing,” as Donald Davidson renders it, its 
status under construction and ready for adjustment in accordance with a changing 
world.227 Second-order constructions, in other words, are temporary recordings 
of successful human functioning, and therefore they should not be conceptually 
separated from first-order constructions. Their success depends on their functionality, 
and, paraphrasing Rorty, it hardly matters how the trick is done if the results are 
satisfactory.228 To pragmatism, language in general is contingent, because, as 
Davidson writes, there is no real distinction between “knowing a language and 
knowing our way around the world generally. For there are no rules for arriving 
at passing theories that work.”229 We need to try out theories, hypotheses, and 
thoughts, since without trying we never will know if they work.230 Yet they cannot 
be understood as final, since they are created by human endeavor and not by a 
supernatural force.231
 According to pragmatism, then, the theoretical meaning and practical 
function of a word cannot be separated. Second-order constructions do give semantic 
guidance and direction, but only first-order constructions can keep second-order 
constructions up-to-date. Participants know how to use words only because they 
can relate their meanings to what happens on the floor.232 Words are empty, and 
acquire meaning by practical interaction. Language in this respect is an instrument, 
although a vital one: without the speakers’ being able to actually articulate and 
communicate with reference to the implicit rules of a practice, meaning cannot be 
established in the first place.233 In this respect, social constructions have a public 
and practical status. “Public” because the actions of participants in a practice can 
only be explained and judged in terms of the rules of the practice that are known to 
all; “practical” because social constructions derive their meaning and value from 
their application. 
 Many pragmatists thus follow Wittgenstein in his rejection of private 
language.234 Reasoning or thinking assumes the condition of following a rule that 
can be known to others. Otherwise, it would not be possible to distinguish a right 
reason from a wrong reason. In pragmatism there is no epistemic problem, in other 
words: when individuals are asked about the why and wherefore of their actions, 
they cannot refer directly to their private experiences of the world but must put 
them into language. Constructing the world takes place at a first-order level, and 
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is thus inherently social. Experiences are meaningless until put in terms that are 
publicly accessible and understandable. As Rorty explains: “Only descriptions of 
the world can be true or false. The world on its own—unaided by the describing 
activities of human beings—cannot.”235
 In conclusion, pragmatist epistemology combines a dynamic (practical) with 
a rational (public) approach to human communication. The practical application 
of a construction establishes its intersubjective meaning if participants put their 
particular experiences and sensations of the construction into rational terms that 
can be understood and discussed. It can be argued, accordingly, that pragmatism 
fails to appreciate the epistemic orders of construction in their own right. Pragmatist 
theory neglects two basic aspects of human communication: non-contextual 
standardization and non-rational experiences. As we will see, these conceptual gaps 
in pragmatic epistemology have an effect on pragmatist political theory as well.
4.3.4 Pragmatist political theory 
Pragmatist theory in general has a strong normative dimension, since it is focused 
on renewal and critique; it concentrates on establishing what is worth striving for. 
William Galston writes: “Philosophy, like deliberation, is the collective effort of 
preparing ourselves to recognize what is worthy of our assent.”236 Political theory, 
in turn, can be said to be the collective effort of deliberating about what is worthy 
of our assent. From the perspective of pragmatist epistemology, it is thus quite 
plausible to state that political theory is concerned with procedures that regulate 
the public deliberation of (the value or meaning of) social constructions.237 The 
meaning of constructions cannot be assumed as final; hence, public control 
mechanisms are needed to check their just status. And since the people are the 
stakeholders in political practice, they need democratic platforms where they 
can discuss the functionality of political practice. Full public deliberation is the 
only means to a result. A reasonable political theory would thus be, in the words 
of Gutmann and Thompson, “morally justifiable from the perspective of each 
citizen.”238 Analogous to pragmatist epistemology, then, pragmatist political theory 
has a radical democratic twist: it is only valuable if it “works,” yet this can only be 
ascertained with full public discussion. So, pragmatist political theory studies how 
the community reconstructs and reflects on the status of social constructions of 
reality.239 Its goal is to find out how interests, opinions, and rules can justifiably be 
publicly articulated and weighed against other interests. Lessig writes: “Ordinarily, 
when we describe competing collections of values, and the choices we make among 
them, we call these choices ‘political.’ They are choices about how the world will 
be ordered and about which values will be given precedence.”240
 What is needed then is a context of “publicity,” as Rawls (after Kant241) calls 
it, a situation in which people “are in a position to know and to accept the background 
social influences that shape their conception of themselves as persons, as well as their 












n character and conception of their good.”242 Publicity is thus a context in which people 
become conscious of the choices they have or, because of inhibiting constructions, 
do not have. Scholars like Elster, Benhabib, and Winner say something similar: they 
emphasize the importance of increasing public awareness of the political nature of 
artifacts and technologies by openly discussing their potentially detrimental effects. 
Since morality is no blueprint but, instead, needs to be created by reason, it is 
important to explicate the artificial and provisional status of preferences. This is 
done by formulating principles that frame the public discussion about the unwanted 
consequences of social constructions (preferences, values, beliefs, actions etc.).243 
With this concern in mind, political theory needs to deal not only with the procedures 
that guide deliberation but also with the moral competences that ensure the use of 
public reason and thus the quality of argumentation. Moral competences should 
guide civic discussion, and this implies taking seriously such values as reciprocity, 
generality, and accountability.244 Tully aptly sums up the pragmatic idea of political 
theory: “It is a form of practical reasoning: the manifestation of a repertoire of 
practical, normative abilities, acquired through practice, to use the general term, as 
well as to go against customary uses, in actual cases.”245
 I argued in Chapter 3 that the deliberative model of political theory is 
flawed because it is understood as the study of public deliberation. Deliberative 
democracy follows pragmatist epistemology in this respect: the process of political 
theory—the deliberation of social constructions—is public, and its purpose—the 
search for a practical (non-essentialist) solution to conflicts about constructions—is 
instrumental. My critique was concerned with the identification of politics as public 
deliberation—which process, I argued contrarily, has a private status in relation 
to politics. I established that politics is concerned with authorizing practices of 
preference formation (social constructions) from the perspective of keeping the 
balance between civil liberty and public order. Next, I argued that processes of 
deliberation themselves are not just private in relation to politics (civil), but also 
intrinsic, that is, focused on the good life. This intrinsic quality makes it necessary 
to include contextual and particular aspects of preference formation that cannot be 
well communicated.
 In an analogous way, the same critique applies here. Because in pragmatist 
epistemology the epistemic problem is neglected—no principal distinction is 
made between the orders of construction—political theory is seen as a normative 
theory in which social constructions are understood as temporary or conditional, 
ever ready for public scrutiny. According to pragmatist political theory, the real 
value of social constructions can be determined only by public communication, 
which means that their practical meaning—which is full of non-rational aspects 
of course—is inherently rational. Moreover, the very standardization of social 
constructions is temporary, since an update of the standard will become necessary if 
new insights emerge about the practical application of the particular constructions. 
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An integration of both non-rationality and authority is imperative for any political 
theory, though—just as it is in any adequate epistemology of communication.
 Wittgenstein’s insight that language is a human construction and not an 
empirical fixation is important, to be sure. Words do not have an intrinsic meaning 
but only acquire meaning in practice. This means that constructions need not only 
to be firmly rooted in practices so as not to become devoid of functionality, but 
also to be rationally explicated. This is the main pragmatist argument. In our terms: 
second-order constructions need to be in touch with first-order constructions, while 
the latter also need to be occasionally checked by the former. 
 But Wittgenstein’s insight points to two other issues, as well. First, 
something is lost in the act of constructing reality—namely, the non-linguistic 
sensation of reality. If a social construction must be related to its functioning in a 
practice—as Wittgenstein argues—it can be argued therefore that somehow these 
zero-order constructions need to be incorporated in socially constructing reality. 
But since—obviously—rationality is not equipped to encompass non-rationality, 
social-constructivist epistemology will need to include a metaphysical element.246 
As I said in Chapter 2, beneath the many (semi-)theoretical constructions, all kinds 
of non-rational sensations exist. The fact that they are hard to communicate does 
not diminish their importance. 
 Second, social constructivism must lead to a defense of formal or authoritative 
standardization. It could be argued that because meaning is socially constructed, the 
great difference between a word and the way it is used needs to be protected with a 
criterion that orders processes of social construction. Precisely because constructions 
acquire their real meaning in the dynamics of the practice, an automatic renewal of 
a standard (each time new and potentially valuable insights arise) will obstruct the 
necessary space between the construction of reality and its experience. A detailed 
structuring of the practice would lead to stagnation, because it would artificially 
close the space between the practical creation and the theoretical standardization 
of meaning (second order construction). The issue of installing authority, in this 
respect, is important in order to protect the essential differences between the orders 
of construction.
4.4 Postulates of political theory revisited
I conclude this chapter by revisiting the postulates of political theory. It is my aim to 
revise them in the light of the critical analysis of pragmatist epistemology so far.
4.4.1 Political theory is not simply social constructivist but is a third order 
construction
If we revisit the second postulate—about the social constructivist nature of political 
theory—it is now rather unclear what this actually means. Given my foregoing 
analysis concerning the different orders of conceptual construction, both statements 












n in the postulate—that all theory is social-constructivist and that political theory 
needs to make this explicit—deserve some scrutiny. The question is what should be 
made publicly explicit and what the so-called political status of a public discussion 
is. To simply deduce from social constructivism that reality is inherently politically 
constructed and that political theory needs to deal with it only increases the 
vagueness as to what political theory is about.
 What is needed is a conception of political theory that not only rises above the 
call for public discussion but takes seriously what lies beneath it. In line with the dual 
task of politics as jurisdiction—that is, executing public authority while preserving 
civil liberty—political theory needs to investigate the statuses of social constructions 
in order to attain the intellectual authority to legally structure these processes. To be 
sure, then, political theory is involved in public discussions about the effects of the 
social world, but it speaks from a political point of view. Public discussions are not 
automatically political discussions, and vice versa. In this respect, an epistemology 
of will formation is needed in relation to the need of authoritative rule. Political 
theory is about understanding how to scrutinize society and rule it. To this end, it 
rationalizes society at different levels from the perspective of the polity.247 
 In relation to the orders of construction, i.e., from an epistemological 
perspective, I therefore call political theory a third-order construction. Political 
theory investigates how to reconstruct second-order rationalizations (institutions, 
rules, protocols, regulations) of natural first-order practices in the light of the 
need for a public authority that rules—that is, that assembles practices of second-
order constructions (institutions) into a political whole. Political investigation is 
done with a specific purpose: to provide a balanced juridical framework for social 
practices. Between these practices, public discussions should take place in which 
general insights about the practice are being examined and compared without 
drawing political consequences. Political theory, then, is not about such public 
deliberations, but about legally constructing second-order constructions. It studies 
not how to organize a good childcare practice, for example, but how legal rules can 
encourage childcare practices to develop and improve themselves—and in which 
public deliberation certainly can be valuable.
 The pragmatist conception of politics focuses on public discussion, because 
it does not fundamentally distinguish between the different orders of constructions; 
differences between, on the one hand, experiencing a practice and discussing it 
and, on the other, between regulating a practice and discussing how the regulations 
relate to its functioning. In a pragmatist conception, public discussion about the 
practice suffices. On the one hand, having sensations and experiences takes place 
in a public language, while ill-functioning rules will be adjusted to fit valuable 
experiences explained and justified through public deliberation. No independent 
epistemological status for political theory is being distinguished here.
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4.4.2 Political theory is not only practical but also metaphysical
The next postulate (initially the first) is about the purpose of political theory. It was 
said that the success of political theory lies in its practicality (or, in Elster’s words, its 
“instrumentality”). It should solve political problems by reconstructing conflicting 
social constructions. “Practicality,” however, means not that social constructions 
are merely reconstructed in a helpful or useful way, but that this reconstruction also 
needs to be done fairly. This condition implies a public framework of deliberation 
and justification to check the reasonability of the political reconstructions. This 
must be done without reference to comprehensive doctrines about the good life. 
Because political reconstructions should pass the test of public reasonableness, no 
particular ideas of the world can play a part in such a discussion;248 they ought to be 
justified to others, Gaus says, because—and now he quotes Jeremy Waldron—our 
arguments “are our connection with the considerations that ultimately matter to 
us.”249 Public reason voices what we care and feel strongly about. But is it public 
reason itself that we feel so strongly about, or is it the content of what is voiced 
by public reason? Surely, it must be the latter. Recalling Gaus’s own distinction 
between publicly justified beliefs and our thoughts (or considerations) about the 
world itself,250 it seems peculiar to distinguish between them beforehand. How can 
beliefs that matter to us be justified without relating them to the way we conceive 
of the world? If I care about good childcare and I would like to publicly discuss 
that interest, a whole array of very particular convictions will inevitably play a part 
in the discussion. Not just about ideal opening hours or safety precautions but also 
(or rather: especially) about the circumstances in which a child feels safe, or what 
particular character traits make a good child care employee. What matters in such a 
discussion is always closely connected to how we see the world, or what we think is 
a proper way of living. To politically deal with practices of childcare in a reasonable 
way, it is thus necessary to have comprehensive knowledge of these practices.
 Differently put, if political theory is to be defined as practical, a connection 
also needs to be made with certain particular experiences in practices that will 
not easily conform to a public language, but are meaningful nevertheless. This 
knowledge needs to be incorporated in order to successfully reconstruct a practice. 
This does not mean that the political theorist (or the politician) needs to know all 
the intricacies of a practice in order to know how to govern it—if only because 
zero-order constructions can hardly be communicated. Just as Plato argues, in 
the words of Mary Louise Gill, “The statesman directs the experts who are, as it 
were, the practical arms of his expertise: the orator, the general, the judge, and the 
teacher.”251 Hence, precisely from the perspective of political theory as a third-order 
construction, the ins and outs of a practice can only be taken care of by legally 
organizing its rules (second-order constructions).252
 The above considerations lead to the conclusion of the inevitability of 
political metaphysics.253 When we conceive of political theory as a third-order 












n construction—one which, on the one hand, makes highly abstract interpretations 
of practices and, on the other, connects these abstractions with the experiential 
world—political metaphysics is its logical consequence.
4.4.3 Political theory is intersubjectivist – but symbolically
In pragmatist political theory, intersubjective communication is pictured not only 
as an epistemological inevitability but as a normative necessity. Democratic politics 
has a wide river of public legitimacy to cross. The political practice is “owned” by 
the demos. Hence, a political theory should focus on the intersubjective constitution 
and justification of the political practice.
 Now, although democratic politics surely has an intersubjective element, we 
need to be cautious about the scope of our inquiry. In the light of our investigation 
into the different orders of construction—and of the contention that politics is a 
third-order construction—we should reject the identification of the normative and 
epistemological elements of political intersubjectivity. From the perspective of 
political theory as a third-order construction, “political intersubjectivity” means 
something different than it does from the perspective of political theory as a public 
process of rational reconstruction. As I pointed out, we should have reservations 
about the possibility of attaining intersubjectivity at a second-order level of 
construction. The achievement of a consensual definition about the meaning of a 
practice at this level is already much more difficult than the attainment of a certain 
interactive harmony in coping and attuning with the practice (at the level of the 
first order).254 The intersubjective discussion by a group of people doing a project, 
for example, can be related to the actual first-order dynamics of this project, while, 
at a political level, this reference to first-order constructions is simply impossible 
(only indirect narratives remain). The participants, being real-time witnesses of the 
occurrence, talk about what has happened. Making such first-order constructions 
explicit, nevertheless, requires a drastic second-order translation. Every participant 
has different opinions about certain things and does things in an individual way. 
Second-order rules, accordingly, inevitably have a conciliatory status, being a 
balanced summary of (zero- and first-order) practices. Practical intersubjectivity is 
here already quite a radical translation of the other orders of personal meaning-giving 
and mutual attunement. Discourse about second-order constructions explores the 
possibility of a joint understanding of the practice’s function, with the preliminary 
purpose that participants feel comfortable in it, both on a personal level (zero order) 
and on the day-to-day level of getting along with each other (first order). However, 
if this second-order discussion brings no success—keeping in mind that participants 
will never be equally pleased with the agreed-upon rules—decisions need to be 
made. The next issue on the group agenda, then, is how to order the practice in a 
manner that accepts the impossibility of rational consensus—a question that cannot 
be answered properly without taking into account the knowledge obtained at the 
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other levels of construction. At this point, participants need to formulate a conception 
of the practice that describes its practical success as an abstract conception, one 
which nevertheless refers both to the substantiality of the practice itself and to the 
experiences of the participants.
 Intersubjectivity at a third level is even more abstract. It needs to make sure 
that participants in a second-order practice have the constructive tools, so to speak, 
to order their practice successfully. The intersubjectivity reached at a third-order 
construction is thus determined by the successful relation that participants can 
establish between their satisfaction about the practice’s functioning and their new 
access to constructive theoretical tools. The idea of political intersubjectivity is 
very different than the discursive-consensualist idea of political intersubjectivity of 
the pragmatist. Even though the public is the legitimate participant in any political 
practice, the public’s expertise about the functioning of the practice is severely 
limited. The public “experiences” politics indirectly, through the way third-order 
constructions influence social institutions. Hence, despite being the source and 
target of political rules, the public will experience a great interpretational divide 
between the realities of their practices and the way these practices are translated by 
their representatives as object of political rule.
 The morality and epistemology of democratic politics do not match, 
accordingly. Notwithstanding the democratic inevitability of public involvement 
in the political practice, the public can be no expert in politically translating or 
reconstructing different orders of knowledge into political constructions. Political 
theory should investigate how the public can cope with political ordering. In spite—
or perhaps because—of the epistemic problem, it is essential to politically construct 
an abstract third order by reconstructing second-order practices while respecting 
first-order intersubjectivity. The polis needs a third order in which people can have 
the notion of being political members of the state, despite their hampered practical 
participation in the political practice. This implies that political intersubjectivity—a 
public political culture—is symbolic, but is nevertheless felt in the daily experience 
of practices.
4.5 Conclusion
All three postulates of political theory introduced in this chapter point to the idea 
of political theory as the study of public discussions about the quality of social 
constructions and practices. Political theory should provide the conceptual 
instruments to reconstruct society in a fair way—it is a pragmatic do-it-yourself kit 
for democracy, as it were.
 I have argued that political theory is about organizing the polity in all its 
aspects. What I have called political theory as a third-order construction is aimed at 
an understanding of how people give meaning to things and construct knowledge, 
not just how they ought to reason and deliberate. An epistemology of processes of 












n will formation is the study of how reality is conceptualized and constructed, how 
knowledge is generated and communicated, and what kinds of knowledge can be 
distinguished. This analysis of the social construction of reality is a crucial aspect 
of political theory, assuming its object to understand how to structure or govern the 
institutional or theoretical reality of civil practices in which reality is constructed. 
 Politics as jurisdiction means governing the institutionalization of practices 
of will formation, and this implies having a notion of how wills or preferences 
are formed. The study of politics entails unraveling the complexities of social 
constructions in order to provide a public framework that structures these 
constructions.
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intuition by Aristotle.” Huppes-Cluysenaer, “The Individual Realism of Aristotle,” pp. 16-17.
 225 Huppes-Cluysenaer, “The Individual Realism of Aristotle,” p. 6. Huppes-Cluysenaer 
has set out the epistemic problem by a close reading of Aristotle’s work. See also Huppes-
Cluysenaer, Waarneming en theorie, pp. 19 ff.












n  226 A nice analogue is how athletes describe the non-rational qualities of their 
performances. It can make sports interviews either notoriously boring or outright 
fascinating. The description of these qualities is inevitably vague. Explaining their success, 
for instance, athletes say things like, “I felt very relaxed that day,” “It all came together,” 
“I stayed cool,” “I just did my thing.” There is a gap between their experiences at the time 
of action and the words that describe them. Still, despite the imprecision, these words 
do make sense. The phenomenon of the difference between a particular sensation and 
expressing it by words is familiar to artists as well. The pianist’s explanation of why the 
collaboration with the orchestra was so truly magic that night is similar to the athlete’s: 
vague and abstract. Only the best of orators can effectively narrate the original feeling.
 227 See also Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 14, where he agrees with 
Davidson: “Davidson’s point is that all ‘two people need, if they are to understand one 
another through speech, is the ability to converge on passing theories from utterance to 
utterance.’”
 228 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 17. Or as Jaap van Brakel puts it 
(following W.V. Quine): “Meaning requires no more than fluency and effectiveness of 
dialogue: successful negotiation and attunement, smooth conversation.” Van Brakel, “De-
essentializing Across the Board,” p. 61.
 229 Davidson cited in: Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 15. Rorty himself 
says: “Our language and our culture are as much a contingency, as much a result of 
thousands of small mutations finding niches (and millions of others finding no niches), as 
are the orchids and the anthropoids.” Ibid., p. 16.
 230 “You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the 
stream of your experience.” James, Pragmatism, p. 26.
 231 “A criterion that functions as an intersubjective rule for testing assertions of 
correct use in some circumstances is itself questioned, reinterpreted, and tested in other 
circumstances, relative to other criteria that are provisionally held fast.” J. Tully ([2002], 
2004) “Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity,” p. 90, italics GD. 
 232 “Only by reference to the practice can one say what one is doing.” Rawls, “Two 
Concepts of Rules,” p. 39.
 233 “It is the mark of a practice that being taught how to engage in it involves being 
instructed in the rules which define it, and that appeal is made to those rules to correct the 
behavior of those engaged in it. Those engaged in a practice recognize the rules as defining 
it.” Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” p. 36. See also ibid., pp. 37 ff. See also Winch, Idea 
of Social Science, p. 32, and Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 117.
 234 “The limits of one’s language mark the limits of one’s world.” T. Ball, J. Farr, and 
R.L. Hanson (1989) “Editors’ Introduction,” p. 2.
 235 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 5. See also: ibid., pp. 21-22. “For it is 
essential to my view that we have no prelinguistic consciousness to which language needs 
to be adequate, no deep sense of how things are which it is the duty of philosophers to 
spell out in language. ... [W]e shall not think of our ‘intuitions’ as more than platitudes, 
95
more than the habitual use of a certain repertoire of terms, more than old tools which as yet 
have no replacements.”
 236 Cited in: Van den Hoven, Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, p. 16, nt. 16.
 237 See e.g. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 90 ff.
 238 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 26, italics GD. Rawls 
calls this the liberal principle of legitimacy, writing that “a political conception of justice 
that all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis of public 
reason and justification.” See: Rawls, “Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” p. 137. See also: 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 137, 218.
 239 J. Campbell (1992) The Community Reconstructs: The Meaning of Pragmatic 
Social Thought. According to Hilary Putnam “the intelligent conduct of communal inquiry 
is what democracy is all about, for John Dewey.” Cited in: Van den Hoven, Information 
Technology and Moral Philosophy, p. 44. To be sure, however, a radical pragmatist like 
Rorty does not argue for a publicity condition but for, what can be called, a plurality 
condition: from a multiplicity of private conceptions of the good he believes (temporary) 
conceptions of the public good will emerge, analogical to biological evolution.
 240 Lessig, Code, p. 59.
 241 See section 7.4.
 242 Rawls cited in: S. Mulhall and A. Swift (1992) Liberals and Communitarians, p. 
197. See also Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 95-127.
 243 For an early formulation of this idea, see Rawls, “Outline,” p. 10: “Perhaps the 
principal aim of ethics is the formulation of justifiable principles which may be used in 
cases wherein there are conflicting interests to determine which one of them should be 
given preference.”
 244 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 13 ff.
 245 Tully, “Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity,” p. 90, italics, JT. “Public reason” 
refers to the “kind of reasons on which citizens are to rest their political cases.” Rawls, 
“Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” p. 165.
 246 Cf. M. Oakeshott (1962) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 1 ff.
 247 Indeed, this is in the spirit of Plato (Symposion, p. 246) and Aristotle, both of whom 
consider politics the science of sciences. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b1-
11 (“[P]olitics uses the rest of the sciences”), and also 1102a1 ff. See also Aristotle 
([ca. 330 BC], 1984) The Politics, 1260a15-22: “Hence the ruler must possess virtue 
in completeness (for any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and 
rational principle is a master-craftsman); while each of the other parties must have that 
share of this virtue which is appropriate to them.” See also L.J. van Apeldoorn (1933) 
Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandse Recht, p. 6. Henceforth: Inleiding.
248 See also the discussion in section 2.4. 
 249 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 40.
 250 Section 4.2.1.












n  252 Likewise, it would be nonsense—and ultimately impractical—to exclude the 
particularities of a religion from the political debate merely on the grounds that it would be 
impossible to reach consensus about certain religious values (understood as comprehensive 
ideas of the good). Political theory is not a moral debate but a jurisdictional debate. In the 
end, the object is to give law to practices of will formation. The practical aspect of political 
theory, therefore, does not engineer results in line with certain values but governs them; it 
reconstructs in order to let people realize things themselves. Ultimately, the people decide 
themselves what they deem important, and hence what needs to be considered politically.
 253 See also section 2.4.
 254 And hopefully to be more specific than Habermas when he states, quite beyond 
understanding: “The intersubjectively shared space of a speech situation is disclosed when 
the participants enter into interpersonal relationships by taking positions on mutual speech-
act offers and assuming illocutionary obligations.” Habermas, Facts and Norms, p. 361.
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Constant’s Legacy: The Modernist Misunderstanding 
About the Greeks
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I rejected a view of politics as will formation. I established that 
politics should not be understood as a grand agora where citizens gather to make up 
their minds and weigh their private interests for the sake of the public good. Nor is 
politics concerned with a public translation of preferences; it ought to concern itself 
instead with the juridical organization of civil practices in which preferences—
independently of political decision-making—are generated, defended, criticized, 
and institutionalized. Politics as jurisdiction is based not on the distinction 
between private and public preferences, but on that between state and society. I 
have established a view of democratic will formation processes as non-political 
(“private,” according to Jon Elster’s scheme) and of their purpose as focused on 
concrete knowledge concerning human activities (“intrinsic” according to Jon 
Elster’s scheme). My new, fourth model of democracy, civil democracy, has begun 
to make sense in light of this crucial distinction between civil processes of will 
formation and the political process of jurisdiction. 
 Now, in the second half of this thesis, I will elaborate on the problematic 
aspects of politics as will formation and try to show some ideological roots of 
politics as jurisdiction by way of a conceptual-historical study of the “public” and 
the “private.”
 In the next two chapters, my focal point will be Greek political theory255, 
since it advances strong arguments for the civil model of democracy in relation 
to political jurisdiction. In contemporary political theory, however, a modernist 
understanding of Greek thought dominates: Greek political theory is depicted as 
precisely the opposite of the modern liberal tradition. The “private” is taken to 
stand for individual necessity in Greek thought and “the public” for freedom, while 
the modern liberal tradition alleges the opposite: the “private” stands for individual 
freedom and the “public” for political necessity. In Chapters 1 and 2, I already 
argued that a liberal portrayal of modern democracy is rather misleading, given 
the dominance of the publicity imperative. The Janus face of the modern idea of 
freedom is a critical awareness of the need to grapple with private preferences.256 In 
this respect, Greek political theory could be characterized as more liberal than the 
modern tradition, because, as I will argue, the distinction between will formation 
and jurisdiction is more strictly drawn in Greek political theory. It is a modernistic 
misunderstanding to emphasize the republican or deliberative aspect in Greek 














n with Greek political theory in the next chapter, in which I will also give an overview 
of some Greek public/private distinctions, notably of Plato and Aristotle.
5.2 Politics of “Ancients” compared with that of “Moderns”
Western modernity is often characterized as a heroic project starring “the Individual,” 
who is on a mission to emancipate himself from a manifold of imperatives that are 
irrationally justified by heredity, tradition, habit, force or divinity. Interestingly, this 
quest for individual autonomy is seen as the moral justification of modern politics; 
it is taken to be what democracy is about. Popular sovereignty is the political 
complement of individual emancipation: the individual as citizen is a rational 
lawgiver.
 This view runs the risk of idolization, and anyone who defends it will need 
to explain how an individualistic account of modern history is consonant with the 
pervasive collectivist aspects of Western culture.257 The relation between individual 
liberty and the publicity imperative is a problematic one, as I said earlier; the 
steady moral pressure to emancipate is a questionable aspect of modernity. And 
as I have argued in the previous chapters, to establish democratic politics on the 
basis of a moral process of intersubjective reason-giving undermines the idea of 
the privateness of society. An instrumentalist portrayal of politics as a defense for 
individual rights seems to be converted into its opposite: an instrumentalist portrayal 
of private freedom that needs to be constantly scrutinized in public as way to attain 
political legitimacy.
 The Enlightenment ideology of individual emancipation has greatly influenced 
historic retrospectives of the public/private distinction—the Greek account in 
particular.258 The inception of this process can already be traced at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Benjamin Constant’s speech at the Athenée Royal in 1819 
was—and remains—very influential in advancing a modernist interpretation of the 
Greek public/private distinction.259 In that speech, Constant salutes the modern idea 
of freedom and argues that only with the “commercial tendency of the age” and the 
rise of the nation-state has the preservation of individual freedom become possible. 
The state, as Constant describes it, has become a public keeper of a system of 
private rights, thereby ensuring freedom and “the enjoyment of security in private 
pleasures” for its subjects. By contrast, Constant criticizes ancient liberty for 
being overly political, contending that “among the ancients the individual, almost 
always sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations.”260 To 
the ancients, Constant argues, real freedom only existed in the public domain, the 
place where individuals stepped out of daily life and reflected on philosophy and 
politics. The fact that the Greek citizen could politically realize himself was the very 
embodiment of freedom. However, Constant cautions that introducing the Greek 
idea of freedom in modern times—and specifically its notion of political power 
as the locus of freedom—would be dangerous and would lead to paternalism and 
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oppression. Constant reminds his audience of the tyrannical transformation of the 
high ideals of the Enlightenment, referring especially to the harmful influence of 
Rousseau’s political ideas “steeped in ancient views which are no longer valid.”261
 Many contemporary authors over the years have referred to Constant’s 
speech, endorsing his thesis about the Greeks’ disdain for the private sphere and 
their appreciation of the public sphere.262 Habermas, for instance, describes the 
Greek public/private distinction in terms of the familiar opposition between oikos 
and polis: “Just as the wants of life and the procurement of its necessities were 
shamefully hidden inside the oikos, so the polis provided an open field for honorable 
distinction: citizens indeed interacted as equals with equals (homoioi), but each did 
his best to excel (aristoiein).”263 Like Habermas various scholars have argued that 
the Greeks deemed the private sphere to be mediocre and inferior to the public 
sphere. The private sphere—the life of production and procreation—was associated 
with the household, in which the Greeks were driven by their wants and secured 
their livings. In contrast, the Greek public sphere is often characterized as the realm 
of freedom, the stage where immortality and greatness (kleos) could be achieved. In 
public, Greek men engaged in discussion and debate and escaped the exigencies of 
private necessity. The Greek public/private distinction functioned rather distortedly, 
it is often stressed: the public realm was reserved exclusively for male citizens and 
was thought to be superior to many aspects of the private sphere.264
 The modernist interpretation of the Greek public/private distinction has 
created a stereotypical opposition between the classical and the modern public/
private distinctions. As Benjamin Straumann puts it: “The thrust of Constant’s 
argument exhibits thus very clearly a dichotomy between ancient republicanism 
and liberalism, a dichotomy which was to feature prominently in the historiography 
of political thought in general….”265 Indeed, Constant’s speech has become the 
archetype of the market/forum distinction—which is the backbone of the “politics 
as will-formation” paradigm.266 The modernist interpretation of the Greek public/
private distinction underlies many debates between republicans or communitarians, 
on the one hand, and liberal or deliberative democrats, on the other. It seems, 
however, that scholars who employ such a disapproving interpretation of Greek 
political theory do so especially to reinforce their own liberal defense of individual 
liberty and instrumentalist politics. Applauding democracy yet warning against 
Greek decadence may serve them more as a rhetorical device—ensuring that they 
will be praised as true defenders of individual liberty—than as an accurate conception 
of the Greek public/private distinction.267 The Greeks were quite conscious of the 
intricacies and peculiarities of the relation between individual liberty and public 
authority. Portraying the private as dependent and subordinate to the public is just 
too simplistic an interpretation of the Greek distinction. As Robert Wallace puts it: 
“An Athenian’s freedoms were almost entirely unrestrained so long as he posed no 














n although differently understood, were central to Greek political thought, yet they 
were judged in relation, not in opposition, to the public good. The technicalities and 
necessities of private life had a tangible effect on politics.269
 As I will explain in the next chapter, both Plato and Aristotle were concerned 
with the relation between knowledge and politics, and technical knowledge, to be 
sure, was part of this question. Greek politics was not just an aristocratic display of 
virtue, but an activity of epistemic sharing across-the-board.270 The topic of Greek 
politics, which I describe as the issue of how much can be shared among citizens, 
included also economical and technical aspects of life.
5.3 The Greek affinity with a private depiction of will formation 
It can be argued that the “jurisdiction approach” to politics has more affinity with 
Greek political theory than the “will-formation approach.” This point can be 
illustrated by returning to Elster’s article “The Market and the Forum,” in which he 
criticizes Hannah Arendt’s republicanism.
 Arendt is greatly influenced by Greek political philosophy, as is well known, 
but Elster questions her reading of it. Arendt’s conception of Greek politics is 
too republican, he argues, since she understands it as a virtuous agonist show of 
passionate argumentation and rhetorical performance.271 Elster turns to the classicist 
M.I. Finley to support his dissaproval of Arendt’s agonist portrayal. Finley argues 
that the Greeks were more liberal and actually held a lot of thought in common 
with the modern conception of politics. According to Finley, the Greeks accepted 
an instrumental conception of politics and favored the possibility of exercising 
political rights over the actual execution of them.272 Finley’s claim that the Greeks 
were modernists avant la lettre strengthens both Elster’s rejection of Arendt’s 
interpretation of Greek political theory and his support of deliberative democracy—
Greeks have more in common with deliberative democracy than republicans are 
willing to admit being the message.
 Arlene Saxonhouse, however, disagrees. She claims that Finley has a somewhat 
“magical” understanding of Greek democracy when he suggests that the Greeks 
“located the source of authority in the polis, in the community itself, and [that] they 
decided on policy in open discussion, eventually by voting, by counting heads.”273 
Saxonhouse strongly opposes such romanticized classicism, since it gives the false 
impression that the ancient polis was the role model for modern democracy. The 
Greeks were not really interested in legislation, she points out—not so much because 
they deemed politics to be instrumental (“a means to a non-political end,”274 as Finley 
and Elster would have it) but because they perceived politics as much more complex 
than just an instrument of public deliberation and legislation.275 George Sabine 
makes a similar point. According to him, the democratic element of Greek politics 
was especially characterized by its control mechanism: “The interesting thing about 
Athenian government is … not the Assembly of the whole people but the political 
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means which has been designed to make magistrates and officials responsible to 
the citizen-body and answerable to its control.”276 Greek politics was not a public 
decision-making tool for civic preference translation and transformation; the rule 
of law, not democratic assembly, was its ultimate goal. Precisely for this reason, 
Aristotle distinguishes between a conception of democracy “where all have a part in 
the offices, provided only they are citizens, but [where] law rules” and a conception 
in which “the multitude has authority and not the law.” No doubt he preferred the 
first option, for “where the laws are without authority, there popular leaders arise.”277 
Ironically, and notwithstanding Elster’s doubts, Arendt actually acknowledges the 
Greek primacy of the rule of law, holding that “the Greeks, in distinction from 
all later developments, did not count legislating among political activities. In 
their opinion, the law maker was like the builder of the city wall, someone who 
had to do and finish his work before political activity could begin.”278 Political 
jurisdiction was ultimately the controlling element in the polis, for otherwise, as 
Saxonhouse puts it, the people would lose their individuality.279 Politics, Aristotle 
says, is the result of the impossibility of full civil liberty, that is, of living just as one 
would like. Unstable on its own, civil liberty needs to be safeguarded by political 
authority.280 In this respect, Judith Swanson’s thesis on the central place of “the 
private” in Aristotle’s political philosophy makes a great deal of sense. She argues 
that Aristotle conceives of the private as “constituted of activities that cultivate 
virtue and discount common opinion.”281 Swanson’s analysis of Aristotle stands 
in opposition to Elster’s account of Greek political theory in general. While Elster 
stresses the deliberative element in Greek politics, Swanson and Saxonhouse stress 
its juridical element in relation to the inherent political relevancy of civil liberty.282 
 As will be explained more fully in the next chapter, Aristotle’s notion of politics 
is a prime example of a political theory that rests on an intrinsic understanding of 
the private as a place where people strive to act their best. Politics only works if a 
great investment is made in the institutionalization of virtuous practices, because 
without practical virtue there is no political virtue to begin with.
5.4 Conclusion
Ever since Constant’s speech on ancient and modern liberty, Greek political 
theory has often been understood as a conflict between public freedom and private 
necessity. In general, however, the Greeks saw the city as a setting in which public 
and private elements were interdependent. In the city, as Saxonhouse puts it, “there 
was no opposition between the self and the political entity of which one was a 
part,” which is not to say that the Greeks were “exclusively duty-bound who cared 
only for the welfare of the community.”283 Rather, they accepted the dependency of 
their own individual well-being upon the well-being of the polis. In this respect, the 
Greeks had a private conception of will formation. 














n finds its roots in the classic defense of democracy, Elster misconstrues the Greek 
conception of politics.284 When he imputes the modernist mistake to the ancients, 
he shows how he himself—taking the private as the sphere of necessity and the 
public as the sphere of freedom—misunderstands the Greek idea of democratic 
will formation. The modern world’s pejorative reinterpretation of the classical 
distinction between private and public is both wrongheaded and simplistic, given 
how central individual freedom was to Greek political thought. Indeed, perhaps it 
was even a more unconditional prerequisite for practical wisdom than it is to the 
moderns.
(Notes)
 255 Let it be clear that when I say “Greek”—as most scholars do—I mean “Athenian,” 
acknowledging Josiah Ober’s following caveat: “Whenever someone claims that the history 
of ‘the Greeks’ can teach us about ourselves, we should ask ‘which Greeks?’ ... The point is 
that today, when we say ‘the Greeks,’ we usually mean ‘the democratic Athenians’—and it 
is important to remember that Athens was not a community that manifested a typical ‘Greek 
culture.’ It is not generic ‘Greek culture’ that is relevant to modernity; it is the culture that 
developed in Athens and spread to other poleis in the late classical and Hellenistic periods.” 
J. Ober (2005) “Democracy, Knowledge, and Moral Change.” To be sure, although the term 
“Greek” is already too unspecific, the term “classical” would be even more so. There are 
considerable differences between for instance, Cicero and Aristotle, the former’s political 
theory being much more collectivist than Aristotle’s. To illustrate: “[O]ur country has 
given us birth and education ... so that she may appropriate to her own use the greater and 
more important part of our courage, our talents, and our wisdom, leaving to us for our own 
private uses only so much as may be left after her needs have been satisfied.” Cicero ([44 
AC], 1828, 2000), The Republic, Book I, iv, p. 8.
 256 See for more depth Chapter 7.
 257 The ideological roots of which I sketched in Chapter 2, a typical, though 
impressionist, example being the collective desire for a pair of Nike sneakers as a way to 
show one’s freedom and individuality on the streets.
 258 In the next chapter it will become clear that there is no such thing as “the Greek 
public/private distinction.”
 259 For a recent approving citation of Constant, see J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness: 
A Restatement, p. 2, see also pp. 142 ff.
 260 All three quotes: B. Constant ([1819], 1988) “The Liberty of Ancients Compared 
with that of Moderns.”
 261 “Through their failure to perceive these differences, otherwise well-intentioned 
men caused infinite evils during our long and stormy revolution. … The men who were 
brought by events to the head of our revolution were, by a necessary consequence of the 
education they had received, steeped in ancient views which are no longer valid, which the 
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philosophers whom I mentioned above had made fashionable.” Ibid. Constant’s liberalism is 
in line with the reactionary/restorative moment of that time, the Vienna Treaty having been 
signed 3 January 1815. Ironically (and regrettably), a few decades later Mill wrote in On 
Liberty in a Constantian spirit: “The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to 
practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every private conduct 
by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and 
mental discipline of every one of its citizens....” Mill, On Liberty, p. 13.
 262 E.g. I. Berlin ([1958], 1988) “Two Concepts of Liberty,” pp. 129, 172. J. Rawls 
(2001) Collected Papers, pp. 583, nt. 29 and 343, nt. 4. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
pp. xxiii, 134. For neorepublicans see Ch. Mouffe (1996) “Democracy, Power, and the 
‘Political’,” p. 246. Benhabib, Public Space, pp. 78-79. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, p. 295. Arendt, Human Condition, p. 30.
 263 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 4. See also Arendt, Human Condition, 
p. 30 ff. Cf. John Dewey severely criticizing Greek assumed dedain for the empirical 
world, which reality, according to the Greeks, Dewey thought, was “crass, and obdurate, 
stubbornly un-ideal in character.....” Cited in: R. Rorty (1990) “Pragmatism as Anti-
Representationalism,” p. 2.
 264 For another clichéd interpretation: “It is the myth that rationality consists in being 
constrained by rule. According to this Platonic myth, the life of reason is not the life of 
Socratic conversation but an illuminated state of consciousness in which one never needs 
to ask if one has exhausted the possible descriptions of, or explanations for, the situation. 
One simply arrives at true beliefs by obeying mechanical procedures.” Rorty cited in: J.P. 
Murphy (1990) Pragmatism: From Peirce to Davidson, p. 105.
 265 B. Straumann (2006) “Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural 
Rights in Hugo Grotius’ Early Works on Natural Law,” p. 3.
 266 Cf. the remark by Carl Schmidt’s: “In a very systematic fashion liberal thought 
evades or ignores state and politics and moves instead in a typical, always recurring 
polarity of two heterogeneous spheres, namely ethics and economics, intellect and trade, 
education and property.” Cited in: Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 46.
 267 See for instance Will Kymlicka’s observation that “[w]e no longer seek gratification in 
politics because our personal and social life is so much richer than that of the ancient Greeks,” 
which can be seen as a mark of intellectual idleness, a typical modernist way of dismissing 
Greek political theory. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 297-298.
 268 R.W. Wallace (2007) “The Legal Regulation of Private Conduct at Athens: Two 
Controversies on Freedom,” p. 171. Henceforth: “Legal Regulation of Private Conduct at 
Athens.”
 269 Ibid.: “Their laws protected the substantive, material interests of citizens or the 
city. Virtually every infringement of individual liberty responded to substantive, material 
dangers to other citizens or the community. Absent such dangers, the Athenians never 
doubted that in their private lives they were free, and so they were.” See also M. Foucault 
(1995) Breekbare vrijheid: de politieke ethiek van de zorg voor zichzelf, p. 89. Cf. the 












n ironical and pointed words by George Sabine: G.H. Sabine ([1937], 1961) A History of 
Political Theory, pp. 16-17 (henceforth: History of Political Theory). “The Greek was 
happily free both from the illusion that he had an inherent right to do as he pleased and 
from the pretension that his duty was the ‘stern daughter of the voice of God’.” See for 
a contrasting viewpoint: “[F]or Platonism, the relation between private and public spirit 
is purely an affair of contrasts. Private spirit is blind, while public spirit shows genuine 
insight; private spirit disintegrates, while public spirit binds together....” R.C. Lodge (1925) 
“Private and Public Spirit in Platonism,” p. 24, italics GD.
 270 Cf. J. Ober (2006) “From Epistemic Diversity to Common Knowledge: Rational 
Rituals and Cooperation in Democratic Athens.”
 271 See for similar arguments: Benhabib, “Models of Public Space.”
 272 Elster, “Market and Forum,” p. 24.
 273 Cited in: A.W. Saxonhouse (1996) Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and 
Ancient Theorists, pp. 26-27. Henceforth: Athenian Democracy. See also note Z in Ernest 
Barker’s translation (1946) of: Aristotle’s Politics, p. 128.
 274 Elster, “Market and Forum,” p. 19.
 275 Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy, p. 28.
 276 Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 6.
 277 All quotes: Aristotle, Politics, 1292a9-10. Cf. ibid., 1282a42-b6. 
 278 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 194. As I will explain in greater detail in Chapter 
7, the self-legislative element of politics was introduced only during the Enlightenment, 
with the idea of politics as will formation thus emerging as a typical modernist way of 
understanding politics. 
 279 Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy, p. 132; cf. J.A. Swanson (1992) The Public and 
the Private in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy, pp. 95 ff. Henceforth: Public and Private.
 280 Aristotle, Politics, 1316a40 ff.
 281 Swanson, Public and Private, p. 2. See also: C. Hupperts and B. Poortman (1997) 
“Introductie,” pp. 50-54.
 282 See also Huppes-Cluysenaer, Waarneming en theorie, pp. 19-22; and Huppes-
Cluysenaer, “Individual Realism of Aristotle.”
 283 Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy, p. 364.
 284 It is worthwhile to note that Arendt’s basic critique of modern politics concerns 
its degeneration into an instrumental human activity. According to her, the substantive 
meaning of politics already was lost in the Latin translation of zoōn politikon with animalis 
socialis, which, she writes, “indicated an alliance between people for a specific purpose, as 
when men organize in order to rule others or to commit a crime.” Human Condition, p. 23. 
To Arendt, precisely because of this focus on instrumental justice, the distinction between 
private and public withered away. “[W]e know that the contradiction between private and 
public, typical of the initial stages of the modern age, has been a temporary phenomenon 
which introduced utter extinction of the very difference between the private and the public 
realms, the submersions of both in the social.” Ibid., p. 69.
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CHAPTER 6
The Possibility of Political Unification: Plato and Aristotle 
on the Public and the Private
6.1 Introduction
I concluded in the last chapter that the Greeks held a more sophisticated understanding 
of politics than is often suggested. In this chapter I will expand that argument by 
presenting a historic-conceptual development of the Greek public/private distinction. 
Instead of the usual opposition between oikos and polis, I will defend a double public/
private distinction, one that I call “ethical,” on the one hand, and “administrative” on 
the other. Plato and Aristotle worked out this approach, the origins of which can be 
found in pre-Platonic views. Both scholars developed on the early Greek dialectic 
between private sacrifice and public sharing (section 6.2), shaping it into a more 
sophisticated theory. Their philosophies scientifically articulate the political art of 
balancing the affection for private autarky with the call for public sacrifice. Plato 
elaborates on the distinction between politics and science in two ways: at one level, 
he casts it as the relation between individual and political ethics, and at another, he 
recasts that same relation as an individual struggle within a legal context (section 6.3). 
Aristotle builds on Plato and examines what knowledge people can share politically. 
This brings him to distinguish between three forms of rational knowledge and 
connect them to politics. Aristotle’s take on the public and private results in a plea for 
civil self-sufficiency that is based on an argument about sharing knowledge in a civil 
environment (section 6.4). In this respect, Aristotle can be named founding father of 
the idea of civil democracy: that the process of developing and sharing knowledge is 
private—that is, civil or nonpolitical—and that its purpose is intrinsic—focused on 
living well (section 6.5).
6.2 Early Greek thoughts on public and private 
Pre-Platonists such as Homer and Aeschylus give forceful portrayals in their 
writings of what is considered to be an irreconcilable conflict between the polis and 
the family. The polis commands male citizens to be ready to die for the benefit of the 
community, while the family expects the patriarch to fulfill his duty as protector and 
provider. Arlene Saxonhouse explains this dilemma of political loyalty or obligation 
with a reading of Aeschylus’ Oresteia. In that play, Agamemnon personifies the fated 
struggle between the private and public. He seeks to defend his family by retrieving 
his brother’s wife, Helen, who has been abducted by the Trojans. Agamemnon’s 
intention, however, eclipses itself, causing instead a complete disruption of the 
family. The vicious force of war causes great despair and devastation. On his way 
to revenge the Trojans, Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter Iphigeneia,285 while his 












n wife Clytemnestra, full of wrath, takes over the family back home.286 Saxonhouse 
believes that the Oresteia shows how Agamemnon’s attempt to protect his family 
leads instead to its sacrifice for the sake of the city. No natural harmony exists 
between oikos and polis.
 Political loyalty was still an important issue much later in Greek history, 
as the funeral oration of Pericles illustrates.287 Perlicles’ speech can be seen as an 
ultimate attempt to resolve the tragedy of the relationship between political power 
and private intimacy. The realization of the supreme good is represented by the life 
of the city, Pericles argues, with which both family and business matters need to 
conform. The city’s glory is the good cause for which the soldiers of Athens gave 
their lives.288 Pericles stresses that without actually fighting for the city’s greatness, 
no satisfaction of private affairs would have been conceivable.289
 Despite a thriving Athens at that time, the rule of Pericles proved to be the 
end of Athenian supremacy. His words point to the impossibility of integrating 
the public and the private as long as the city’s existence depended on physical 
domination. In his attempt to weigh the private against the public, Pericles took 
notice not only of the family unit as the element that needed to sacrifice some of 
its own concerns, but of the family’s separate members as well. Not without reason 
did Pericles pay special attention to the individual, as it was an ultimate effort 
to convince the Athenians of the importance of waging war with the Spartans.290 
Pericles’ rhetorical exertions were, nevertheless, in vain: the process of Athenian 
individualization was steadily undermining civic loyalty for the city—which 
would be aptly illustrated by the later rule of the sophist Alcibiades.291 Still, amidst 
the troubling times in Athens, Pericles made the Athenian ideal very clear in his 
oration. In a famous passage, he speaks of a harmonious balance of public and 
private:
There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse 
we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he 
does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though 
harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private 
intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented 
from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws, having an 
especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured 
as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of 
them the reprobation of the general sentiment.292
These words on private open-mindedness and public restraint must surely have been 
an inspiration for both Plato and Aristotle. Pericles’ vision provided them with a 
perfect working example for the development of their own political philosophies.
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6.3 Plato: Knowing and sharing excellence
Later, in Plato’s work, he studies the complex ways in which the public and the 
private knit the city into a whole.293 It is clear to him that the city cannot be preserved 
merely on the basis of individual sacrifice for the sake of a collective good. The 
public/private distinction is not a black-and-white choice between family and city, 
for such a choice would do justice to the richness of neither the private nor the 
public aspects of life in the city.
 Plato builds on the Periclean dichotomy—thereby providing for another 
refutation of the modernist interpretation of Greek political theory. One of Plato’s 
important moves is to draw the line between the public and the private along the 
politics/science distinction. His main interest is in the connection between knowledge 
and politics. He wants to know how the ideal of political harmony can be thought 
of as a life science, so that it can be known, mastered, and taught: “We are trying 
to define the whole conduct of life—how each of us can live his life in the most 
profitable way.”294 According to Plato, to know the intricacies of accomplishing 
political harmony means understanding the complexities of the art of living itself.295 
Instead of seeing politics as a conflict between oikos and polis, between family and 
polity, Plato understands politics psychologically (in the broad classical sense, to be 
sure). The art of politics depends on knowledge of the soul’s dispositions, and this 
is why science (or philosophy) is so important: it studies the dispositions that cope 
with, and express, the desire to live well and master life’s challenges.296 Politics thus 
cannot do without rulers who, in the midst of governing the polis, are also capable of 
contemplating the good life; good governance implies soul searching and virtuous 
action. Learning how to become wise by understanding the nature of goodness and 
then acting accordingly should bring good political results. It is in this respect that 
Plato’s infamous plea for the philosopher king must be understood.297
 Plato elaborates the politics/science distinction in two ways.298 The first sub-
distinction involves the relation between individual and political ethics—that is, 
between virtue and politics. Knowing how to live well is the condition for knowing 
how to rule the polis. Plato, in this respect, locates the private within the dynamics 
of the soul itself; the very harmony that is reached by balancing the parts of the soul 
makes a man just. Plato speaks of this interior justice precisely because he believes 
that there is no principal difference between private and public justice; balancing 
the soul has a generalizing effect, representing in miniature what it takes to live 
together in the polis. Plato explains that “the just man in his turn, simply in terms 
of his justice, will be no different from a just city. He will be like the just city.”299 
Ultimately, for Plato, the condition for justice lies in the possibility of controlling 
the three parts of the soul—the rational part by being wise, the appetitive by being 
temperate, and the spiritual by being dignified.
 The process of thinking about justice takes place within an institutional 
setting, however: within the legal boundaries of the city. This is the second Platonic 












n elaboration of the distinction between public and private, embodied in his writings 
by the images of the philosopher and the city. The central issue of this distinction 
is well described by Michel Foucault, namely, “how philosophical truth and moral 
virtue relate to the city through the nomos [law, GD].”300 The tension between truth 
and law is, of course, perfectly embodied by the person of Socrates. Being a natural 
philosopher, whose truth-telling is independent from power and interests (family 
ties, economic bonds, and state interests), Socrates thinks and speaks of the ideal 
city. He seeks to bring his conscience in tune with the Forms that define justice 
itself.301 Socrates is a private man, a nonconformist, whose sole concern is to be a 
parrhesiastes, a man of truth.302 Socrates thus states in the Apology: “It is necessary 
that one who really and truly fights for the right, if he is to survive even for a 
short time, shall act as a private man, not as a public man.”303 And to strive to act 
justly as a private man also implies the courage to defy the city and its laws for 
the sake of truth and justice.304 As Plato puts it in The Laws: “What is required, in 
all probability, is some daring human being who by giving his unusual honor to 
outspokenness will say what in his opinion is best for the city and the citizens.”305 
Even if these collisions between man and law are exacting, they are also vital. The 
city cannot do without men who dare to speak the truth.
 But Socrates is also a great admirer of the united city. He demonstrates his 
allegiance to the polis by answering in the affirmative Glaucon’s rhetorical question 
as to whether “the best-regulated city is the one in which the greatest number 
of people use this phrase ‘mine’ or ‘not mine’ in the same way about the same 
thing.”306 He personifies the problematic relation between public law and private 
truth.307 Socrates’ ambiguous position is dramatized to the full when, given the 
option by Crito to escape the death penalty, he gives his obedience to public law as 
the highest oath of loyalty a citizen can make.308 Indeed, Plato shows how Socrates 
represents the dual interpretation of the distinction between science and politics. 
As a philosopher, he discerns the ideal forms that make up men’s horizon, and he 
is free to do so; yet, as a citizen, he recognizes that having this freedom also means 
consenting to be a legal subject.309 Although truth and law might harmonize in the 
mind of the philosopher king,310 the actual actions of the street-level philosopher 
expose the tragic relation between them, which may even end in his acceptance 
of the death penalty. Plato draws a sharp line right through the science/politics 
distinction: even though there is no principal difference between practical wisdom 
on an individual (ethical) and on a political scale, acting virtuously, or deliberating 
wisdoms can bring a private citizen into conflict with public law.
 At this point, some modern scholars say: behold Plato, the notorious rationalist, 
being rigid in his oath to the world of Ideas.311 Such a reaction would be reinforced 
by, for instance, Plato’s skeptical sketch of the artist.312 Yet Plato—author of such 
magnificent literature himself—did not hate art; he was concerned only about the 
menace of art being made public. In his desire to produce beauty, the artist (or the 
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philosopher) easily acquires a manipulative force at a public level, which may lead 
to the disintegration of the city. Plato was not particularly confident in the sanity of 
public opinion, contending that the public itself is the greatest sophist: “With justice 
and beauty, lots of people might settle for the appearance of them. Even if things 
really aren’t really just or beautiful, they might choose to do, possess or think them 
[so] anyway.”313 Plato tells us that publicizing beauty or truth can be a dangerous 
thing to do and is only reserved for the excellent. To have a grasp of things and to 
explain it is not the easiest thing to do; and even for one who has mastered this, 
actually doing so in public may lead to the fate of Socrates.
 Plato is no enemy of the open society;314 quite the opposite, since he is well 
aware of the great discrepancy between theory and practice for the sake of which 
he deems an analysis of the public/private distinction so crucial. Plato is wary 
of the tyranny of the majority, a phenomenon that comes along with democratic 
participation.315 Plato’s democratic skepticism, ironically, makes Socrates seem an 
idiot not only in front of the law but also in front of the common man, considering 
how bluntly he confronts the bigot in the agora. By explicating Socrates’ paradoxical 
positions, Plato tries to deal with political complexity; and such an assessment 
demands taking on some radical positions that Socrates personifies. Saxonhouse 
explains Plato’s position very aptly:
While many have taken Socrates’ proposals here as serious, as a rationalist 
vision of an ideal polity, it seems to me that Plato is rather suggesting 
the ludicrous extremes to which politics must go in order to transcend 
the eternal conflict between public and private, the extreme distortions of 
nature which politics must perpetrate in order to secure its existence.316 
This implies, more specifically, a need to acknowledge politically at least two 
levels of the public/private distinction: an ethical distinction, within the soul, and a 
political distinction, within the polis.
6.4 Aristotle: The scope of political commonality
Aristotle confronts the Platonic public/private distinction and takes it a big step 
further. He examines the internal state of the soul by distinguishing types of 
rational knowledge, and he further develops the relation between ethics and 
politics by posing the question of political management. Aristotle’s basic point 
is clear: practical knowledge (or wisdom) is concerned with human functioning, 
and happiness is its ultimate end. Like Plato, Aristotle states that because political 
knowledge is concerned with human action and living well, this type of knowledge 
rests most heavily on practical knowledge.317 “The student of politics, then, must 
study the soul”318 in order to perceive “what sorts of thing conduce to the good life 
in general.”319 The goal of political theory (or science, as Aristotle calls it) is to 












n understand how citizens become virtuous and how they communicate their virtues 
so that laws can be devised and preserved “[u]nder which anyone might act in the 
best manner and live blessedly.”320 Moreover, political theory needs to study how 
politicians can legislate in order to foster this spirit of proper human functioning.
 Aristotle is keen to find out how to deal with the potential tragedy between 
practical and political wisdom that Plato depicted. Much more of a political scientist 
than Plato, Aristotle is concerned with building and preserving the polis rather than 
merely understanding its ideal form and potential hubris—intrinsic tensions. He 
wants to connect the virtues of both ruler and philosopher without heading towards 
an all-out confrontation. While Aristotle holds on to both Platonic distinctions 
(ethical and political) between private and public, he looks for ways to appease the 
ambitions of virtue and law. The central question is how to politically institutionalize 
virtue or knowledge. A political regime can be constituted and organized only if it 
is clear what knowledge citizens can share how, and to what degree. To Aristotle, 
then, it is perfectly natural to think of the city from a public point of view, for “to be 
partners in nothing is impossible.”321 The city is a koinonia, a place where people 
share things; if they had nothing in common, civilization would not be possible in 
the first place.322 In this respect, then, the city can be called a natural habitat for 
man.323 
 Aristotle however stresses that because the good is volatile and only becomes 
real in the course of action, the political theorist should look not for an ideal of 
goodness but for “a way of life which it is possible for most to participate in, and 
… most cities can share.”324 Similar to the individual who searches for a practical 
mean in his life, this kind of politics has the object of finding a mean according to 
which citizens can develop themselves in the best possible way. “The master of 
any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this—the 
intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.”325 It can be said that politics 
should create an environment in accordance with this rule of thumb.
 The connection between knowledge and politics, according to Aristotle, is 
vital. Both the politician and the political scientist ought to be men of the world who 
understand the world in its many aspects.326 Without having a rich life experience, 
they would have no idea what they were talking about, let alone the capacity to 
relate ethics to politics.327 Aristotle stresses throughout his work that, because the 
good concerns an optimal activity of the soul, its very Idea cannot be represented 
by a term that denotes something substantially in reality.328 The good’s offspring 
appear in the moment; they cannot be written down without losing their particular 
meaning.
 According to Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, Aristotle is one of the first, if 
not the first, formulators of the epistemic problem: the impossibility to describe 
the individuality of things.329 Aristotle makes a strict distinction between talking 
about the good and actually doing and experiencing it. Although people have an 
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intuitive idea of goodness that they can narrate and describe, he writes, the very 
truth of goodness lies, in the end, in the activity itself: “of honour, wisdom, and 
pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. 
The good, therefore, is not something common answering one Idea.”330 Instead, 
the good only appears in the mind and can be particularly experienced in practice. 
Put differently, although words acquire meaning only in the context of application, 
contextual knowledge, in its turn, cannot be contained within the words. This 
implies that actions can only symbolically or incoherently be connected to rules 
of the practice in which these actions fall. The semantic gap between words and 
their practical meaning is inherent. Rationality is concerned with potentiality, yet is 
highly limited in realizing it. The irony, then, is that although practical knowledge 
and political knowledge have the same quality, the contingency of goodness makes 
politics extremely limited in actively promoting and realizing goodness. The ideal 
of political unification is limited therefore.
6.4.1 The inexpediency of progressive political unification
With Aristotle’s take on Plato, we have arrived at the dual task of politics as 
jurisdiction: investigation and authority. Political theory, in this respect, is, in 
Aristotle’s words, of a “controlling kind,”331 a “supreme and comprehensive 
science.”332 In our terms, political theory is a third-order construction: it studies the 
authoritative organization of democratically institutionalized knowledge.
 As we have seen in Chapter 4, however, judging the scope of politically 
sharing knowledge is a whole different matter.333 Although striving for unity is a 
normal and necessary ambition for the city, it does not automatically imply the 
goal of progressive political unification.334 The need to share knowledge politically 
is clear, but Aristotle doubts whether it can be stated in advance that “it is best for 
the city to be as far as possible entirely one.”335 Aristotle believes that the process 
of political unification must be strictly tempered if the political body in question 
wants to remain a city at all.336 The greater the number of people involved in a 
“partnership,” the more complex the unifying process becomes. The individual is a 
more unified entity than a household, while a household is more unified than a city 
can ever be.337
 To exemplify the idea, Aristotle assumes a city to be truly unified in, for 
instance, a situation where children are common property (referring Plato’s 
Republic), such that all men can say of any boy in the city, “This is my son.” To 
Aristotle, this statement is nonsense and has a merely formal significance. It suggests 
that what each male member of the group means is something more like, “This 
boy is like a son to me”; the public spirit, so to speak, determines their individual 
emotions concerning the child. Yet only one man can actually say that the boy is 
his son. Therefore, if Socrates wants to hold on to his conjecture that a common 
interest in children is a sign of true unification of the public, he needs to show that 












n an artificial group of fathers is actually a better caretaker than an individual father; 
and, Aristotle adds, this needs to be shown not only for the one child, but for all of 
them in the city. Aristotle is convinced that this is not true at all: “What belongs in 
common to most people is accorded the least care: they take thought for their own 
things above all, and less about things in common, or only so much as falls to each 
individually.”338 Common care of children will not enhance the happiness of the 
city, nor of the children themselves. “Each of the citizens comes to have a thousand 
sons, though not as an individual….”339
 With this argument, Aristotle points precisely to the difference between 
talking about the good and knowing it: or, to put it differently, to the inexpediency 
of strong political unification, due to the inherent limit of epistemic sharing. 
Although there is a wealth of knowledge concerning the raising of children, raising 
a child properly, in the end, can be done only from a basis of practical knowledge 
of the child itself. Generalizing non-explicit knowledge (as a zero- and first-order 
construction), stripping it from context, will do injustice to the particular subject the 
knowledge is concerned with (i.e., the specific child). Here a political argument for 
the privacy of parenting arises out of an epistemological argument. Not the polis but 
a lower stratum of human organization (the family) may prove to be better providers 
of unity, owing to the superiority of its care-taking virtues to those of an artificially 
unified multitude. Aristotle’s point is that the idea of “common children” doesn’t 
mean anything until it is actually put into practice, and experience overwhelmingly 
shows that indeed the value of taking care of children is generally better realized in 
compact rather than in large environments.
 Aristotle’s example is a plea for a city build on self-sufficiency. He is 
convinced, in the words of Saxonhouse, that “there must be a private realm which 
retains respect and support if there is to be a viable public realm.”340 To be sure, 
this implies not just a degree of civil autonomy for institutions like families or 
corporations, but also for the individual. As Plato already indicated, virtue needs 
proper and careful development by the individual as well, for in the end only the 
individual can optimally judge situations in which he acts.341 Put differently, the 
importance of institutions and individuals leads Aristotle to argue for two types of 
civil self-sufficiency for the sake of limiting progressive political unification. The 
scope of political commonality, however, is also determined by understanding the 
specific knowledge involved in civil practices of will formation. As both Plato and 
Aristotle have made clear, becoming political requires knowledge of one’s soul. 
An understanding of the human faculty of knowing is the basics of both ethics and 
politics.
6.4.2 Three forms of rational knowledge 
As a consequence of the epistemic problem, Aristotle distinguishes between non-
rational knowledge and rational knowledge. Using knowledge in the course of action 
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is very different from thinking or talking about it. Sharing knowledge sometimes 
means sharing rational knowledge, knowledge as a second-order construction. But 
to share knowledge politically often means to share rational knowledge, as the real-
time, face-to-face situation is absent in political abstraction. Politics is a third-order 
construction.
 From a rational point of view, however, there are great differences involved 
in sharing different types of information. It is very different to share rational 
knowledge about how to raise children than about how to construct a highway. The 
former is more difficult than the latter. From a rational point of view, it is easier to 
build and manage a highway than it is to raise and educate children. Children are 
unique, growing creatures, more particular than a highway will ever be. A different 
political outlook is thus needed for each activity, since different types of knowledge 
are involved. 
 Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of rational knowledge (second-
order constructions342): theoretical343 and calculative.344 Calculative knowledge is 
further divided into the categories of technical knowledge and practical knowledge. 
These three intellectual virtues (or rational parts of the soul) run analogously to 
three human activities: thinking, producing, and acting. In contrast to theoretical 
knowledge, both technical and practical knowledge are concerned with the 
variability and contingency of reality. Theoretical knowledge, in contrast, deals with 
the invariability of reality, with finding out its fundamental principles, independent 
of human action. Theoretical knowledge has no practical consequences and no 
utility outside itself.345 Man’s happiness has no part in it. The object of theoretical 
knowledge is contemplation, thinking about reality itself.
 Technical knowledge is instrumental knowledge. It deals with understanding 
the means that achieve a certain result—such as building a chair or baking a pie—that 
can be reproduced if necessary. The object of technical knowledge can be precisely 
defined and easily reconstructed in theory: by carefully following the instructions, 
it should be possible to actually bake a pie, or to build a chair. Technical knowledge 
is in principle easily shareable, although of course it can become very complex 
(building a quantum computer, the Space Shuttle or the Large Hadron Collider), 
while the end result will always depend on other, less “accurate,” circumstances 
and factors, such as natural circumstances or a personal “feeling” for the object at 
hand.346
 Practical knowledge deals with acting well. Rationalizing acting well is quite 
artificial, since it cannot be straightforwardly applied to situations. The “proof” or 
“truth” of practical knowledge lies in the action itself; it is intricately connected 
with the particular context. Hence, Aristotle states, practical knowledge studies 
things that are good, “but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man 
to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are 
states of character.”347 In contrast to technical knowledge, then, practical knowledge 












n cannot be scientifically proven or copied.348 The verdict of a good action lies in the 
action, and changes with the situation in which it is performed. Hence, “acting well 
or doing good” can be defined only generally, as something like “an activity of the 
soul which follows or implies a rational principle [logos, GD].”349 
 Accordingly, practical knowledge is difficult to share—which of course is not 
to say that practical knowledge should not be shared. Sharing practical knowledge 
depends on narration, demonstration, and illustration. Indeed, it has a symbolic 
quality to it: it can be reconstructed and exemplified, yet not empirically proven.350 
Thinking of how to use practical knowledge requires, as Huppes-Cluysenaer puts 
it, a “mental reconnaissance,” that is, “imagining the basic case while varying 
particular characteristics and inquiring which variation would make a certain kind 
of conduct [appropriate].”351
 Technical knowledge is quite different from practical knowledge. It deals 
with understanding the means that realize a concrete end, or, more generally, that 
realize the conditions that bring about certain consequences.352 The activity of 
producing is different from the product itself; it is instrumental to it.353 The proof 
of producing well, in other words, lies in reconstructing the means towards the 
end, to see if they have caused the wished-for result. Although practical knowledge 
is also concerned with a goal (acting well), the goal is delineated by the action 
itself. In reality, of course, both types of knowledge run through each other all the 
time: production cannot be independent of the knowledge of how to do things in 
particular situations, while practical knowledge cannot do without the technical 
knowledge about certain facts concerning the circumstances (e.g., weather, food, 
money) that influence practices.
 Theoretical knowledge is unlike technical or practical knowledge. It is 
concerned with the reality that is independent of man’s existence. Theoretical 
knowledge considers not the human action of production but reality itself. It is 
natural knowledge (mathematics, physics, metaphysics), whose truth is independent 
from the human praxis and thus has no direct utility. Politically speaking, theoretical 
knowledge is less important because political happiness is concerned with human 
accomplishment.354 Utterly incompetent men can have the brightest minds—think 
of the image of the clumsy, absent-minded professor. Aristotle writes that 
while young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise 
in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom 
cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with 
universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, 
but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives 
experience….355
This, of course, does not mean that theoretical knowledge does not play a role 
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in these activities. Theoretical knowledge can be used for all kinds of purposes, 
thereby becoming technical knowledge, such as knowledge on the laws of gravity 
or algorithms. However, theoretical knowledge itself does not produce political 
happiness or unhappiness, for it merely theorizes the mechanisms of reality.
 For Aristotle, as I said earlier, political wisdom is concerned with how to 
share knowledge about proper human functioning from a rational point of view, 
especially regarding production and practicality. To appreciate the scope of political 
commonality, it is thus essential to distinguish between the types of knowledge I 
detailed above. It is generally easier to share technical knowledge than practical 
knowledge because its goal (and result) can be externalized; the public can discuss 
it much more precisely (for instance, ecological problems, the construction of a 
building, or the arsenal of an army). The more exactly a particular goal and its 
causes can be operationalized, the easier it is to share that knowledge. In today’s 
terms, we would say that the empirical coherence of technical knowledge is high, 
while that of practical knowledge is low. Teaching someone how to boil water is 
easier than telling him or her how to become a happy-go-lucky person.356 The latter 
is context-dependent and very hard to empirically operationalize.
 Technical knowledge is not just easier to share, it is vital for survival, 
Aristotle emphasizes. One needs to have the basics right in order to become a well-
functioning human being. This suggests coordination and collaboration, and a form 
of collectivity as well. Man’s life depends on the city, for one “who is without a city 
through nature rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man….”357 
Man is a political animal by natural necessity.358 “[O]ne’s own good cannot exist 
without household management, not without a form of government.”359
 The city is the basis of social life; citizens need the polis to share life itself, 
“for without the necessary things it is impossible either to live or to live well.”360 
Still, although the city comes “into being for the sake of living, it exists for the 
sake of living well.”361 Humans feel pleasure and pain, like animals, and voice 
these emotions. But because they are gifted with speech (logos), they are able to 
discern what is good or bad, just or unjust. As humans we cherish the good life as 
the experience of mastering our character in the light of striving for the good—“and 
partnership in these things is what makes a household and a city.”362 In human 
practices we value and admire people therefore not so much for the skills and 
techniques they have mastered, but above all for the way they have developed their 
character all along. To have perfect technical control over life itself is only a limited 
reward.
6.4.3 Two types of civil self-sufficiency
The possibility of rationally sharing knowledge depends on the epistemic quality 
of sharing. The question is what knowledge is involved (technical, practical, or 
theoretical). As we already have seen in Chapter 4, politically sharing rational 












n knowledge is even more limited, not only because of the inherent qualities of 
knowledge itself, but also because political knowledge has a specific object, namely, 
to govern practices in which different types of knowledge are used and shared. 
Sharing political knowledge occurs by means of the authoritative regulation of the 
institutionalization of practices, which can only be done abstractly and loosely. 
From a political perspective, political governance requires respect for a certain 
organizational autonomy. A relatively self-sufficient civil context of will formation 
is crucial for any knowledge to be acquired and shared.
 Aristotle thus rejects the ideal of progressive unification, arguing that the 
purpose of building the city is self-sufficiency (autarkeia).363 He formulates his 
mission statement as follows: “A city is the partnership of families and villages in 
a complete and self-sufficient life. This, we assert, is living happily and finely.”364 
The decisive reason for civil self-sufficiency is the insight as to what a good life 
requires, which is a liberty of action, a sense of reality, and a strong character.365 
These qualities are the conditions for virtuous action. 
 Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of self-sufficiency on the basis 
of two qualifications of the polis. Political wisdom tells us that to rule human 
association and to increase human happiness means to have insight in dealing 
with civil self-sufficiency, seen from the perspective of the political values of 
institutional plurality and human pluriformity. Respecting civil self-sufficiency is 
basic of politics, since “it is evident that as [the city] becomes increasingly one it 
will no longer be a city.” According to Aristotle, the city is a cooperative plurality 
consisting of many smaller forms of cooperation (families, villages, regions, 
corporations) that function perfectly well on their own in many respects. Too much 
striving for political unity, Aristotle writes, would destroy institutional plurality and 
ultimately society as a whole: 
The city is in its nature a sort of multitude, and as it becomes more a unity 
it will be a household instead of a city, and a human being instead of a 
household; for we would surely say that the household is more a unity than 
the city, and the individual than the household. So even if one were able to 
do this, one ought not do it, as it would destroy the city.366 
 
Another reason for civil self-sufficiency is that the polis is “made up not only of a 
number of human beings, but also of human beings differing in kind; a city does not 
arise from persons who are similar.”367 Hence, the polis is not only a body of many 
different practices of will formation, but of many different individuals as well. 
Every human being is distinct, Aristotle stresses, a particular individual unlike any 
of his human fellows.368 Practical wisdom tells us, therefore, that understanding 
someone means taking seriously his particularity, even though doing so is very 
difficult. If the ideal of virtue is that individuals should prosper, it is crucial to 
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respect human pluriformity. Since virtue lies in the activity itself, political legislation 
needs to incorporate the distance between the law that symbolizes general practical 
knowledge and the practices in which people put it to active use. In the end, a man 
can claim to have attained practical knowledge if he “ceases to inquire how he is to 
act when he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part 
of himself; for this is what chooses.”369 And this is exactly why acting virtuously is 
essentially private, according to Aristotle.
 Aristotle concludes that “the more self-sufficing a community is, the more 
desirable is its condition, [and] then a lesser degree of unity is more desirable 
than a greater.”370 Political legislators need to keep in mind the fact that the more 
public the scope of their action, the more difficult it will be to share knowledge, 
and hence the more important it becomes to understand, preserve and respect 
civil self-sufficiency. Respecting the private exercise of virtue in a civil context is 
fundamental to political wisdom. The values of institutional plurality and human 
pluriformity suggest a reproof to the political ideal of progressive unification.
6.4.4 Politics: Sharing and managing knowledge
Returning to the modernist interpretation of the Greek public/private distinction, it 
is clear that Constant’s opposition between modern and classic liberty will not do. 
Plato is well aware of the intricate lines of the public/private web within the polis. 
He shows the effect of the psychological dynamic between ethics and politics within 
a greater juridical setting. Aristotle differentiates the two Platonic public/private 
distinctions to get a better grip on these dynamics by examining the virtues of the 
soul (types of knowledge) in relation to the task of politics. Aristotle’s conception 
of the public/private distinction is much more complex than Constant’s depiction of 
Greek political theory. He differentiates between three types of knowledge, on the 
one hand, and two types of self-sufficiency, on the other. The ethical public/private 
distinction is about sharing three types of knowledge, while the political public/
private distinction is about how to deal with that exchange from the viewpoint of 
civil self-sufficiency.
 Constant’s dichotomy, however, is still very influential. From that perspective, 
one is inclined to interpret the distinction between technical and practical knowledge 
morally and to translate it analogously as a public/private distinction that stands 
for private and public preferences. This is done by Habermas, for instance, who 
(influenced by Kant and Marx) distinguishes between “preference” (strategic) 
and “value” (moral).371 In this respect, Habermas portrays the private as the place 
of preference maximization and the public as the place where such preferences 
are translated into values by democratic deliberation. Many scholars use this 
moralistic notion of politics, for instance exemplified by Jon Elster’s market/forum 
opposition.
 But the moralistic notion of politics is a modernist error. To relate the 












n private to technical matters and the public to moral matters undoes Aristotle’s 
differentiation of politics. The Aristotelean private/public argument concerns not 
differentiating private self-interest from public reason, but differentiating what can 
be epistemologically shared from what cannot. Hence, religion is a private activity 
precisely because belief has an intrinsically private quality to it. And, as already 
argued in Chapter 4, this does not imply that religion has no political meaning (as 
in neo-liberalism) but that the private (irrational) aspect of religion needs to be 
incorporated in the political discussion. The same goes for all activities in which 
irrational aspects play an important part.
 Instead of understanding morality as a way of doing things in a given 
context, Elster sees morality as a discursive activity between people, with the object 
of becoming reasonable and transcending private interests. The result is two very 
different ideas of politics. Aristotle understands political sharing not as a value in 
its own right but as a necessity for human cooperation and survival. Politically 
sharing knowledge about good actions is important, but it is not the prime condition 
for acting well. Morality is best attained in private. Aristotle starts with individual 
action, and only then wonders how ethical know-how can be institutionalized 
(shared). As Swanson puts it: “It’s wrong thinking that Aristotle believes that human 
beings fulfill themselves qua human beings only by way of speech and rational 
action and thus that a political philosopher seeks the conditions most conducive 
to them.”372 The moderns, however, start with public reasoning—that is, rationally 
sharing moral knowledge, which is the condition for acting well and having an idea 
of the good in the first place.373 Aristotle, notably, considers the private to have 
practical qualities as well, while technical matters are also a vital part of the public. 
The Aristotelean public/private distinction does not run parallel to the technical/
practical axis, then, but stands squarely on it. The result is not a simple translation 
of the pairs, but a double combination. Both technical and practical knowledge have 
a private and a public side: agricultural techniques, for instance, can be applied both 
in the household and in the polis.
 The Aristotelean public/private distinction offers political commonality as 
its goal, on both a technical and a practical level, which addresses the complexity 
of running a city but, from the perspective of institutional plurality and human 
pluriformity, doing so without destroying the specific quality of civil practices of 
will formation. The issue of political sharing should be answered by examining, 
first, the type of knowledge involved and, second, the degree of self-sufficiency 
that can be given to the civil practice in question. The activity within a specific 
practice, not the private or public setting itself, is what makes something more 
or less political. The political management of different sort of human activities 
depends on distinguishing their epistemic purpose (producing/acting) and their 
mode (private/public).
 Having political knowledge of how civil associations operate, then, does not 
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imply a promotion of paternalistic politics. Contrary to many misapprehensions,374 
Aristotle does not believe that law should, in the words of Swanson, “command 
the performance of substantive actions but [should instead] stipulate subscription 
to the qualitative conditions of civil association.”375 The fact that the individual 
good is dependent on the political good on certain occasions (such as providing 
for collective goods) is not the same as saying that the political good determines 
the individual good. The political conditions of institutional plurality and human 
pluriformity should provide for the appropriate standard of civil will formation.
6.5 Conclusion
Aristotle’s political theory keeps the liberal idea of pluralism intact more successfully 
than liberalism itself.376 Aristotle highlights the importance of the private (non-
political) status of will formation, but he supplements it with an intrinsic notion of 
will formation by emphasizing the importance of virtuous excellence and practical 
wisdom. That additional emphasis marks the difference from social-choice theory, 
which focuses instead on rational behavior. Aristotle, however, is skeptical about 
sharing rational knowledge in the first place. Moreover, he opposes a minimalist 
state, for “the city is not a partnership in a location and for the sake of not committing 
injustice against each other and of transacting business.”377 The polis exists for the 
sake of living well, which implies that social entities should be facilitated in their 
efforts to lead a complete and self-sufficient existence. We can conclude that that is 
why processes of will formation ought to be defined as “private.”
 Elster, as we know, rejects social-choice theory (or liberalism) for this 
reason. He claims that a description of democratic will formation as private does 
not take seriously the fact that there are many processes that limit, change, or 
manipulate preference formation, thereby preventing people from expressing their 
“real” wishes. Social-choice theory lacks a substantive criterion for accepting or 
selecting preferences—“it essentially lacks openness”378—and hence does not take 
seriously that expressed preferences often differ from real preferences. People need 
to be taken seriously as citizens and challenged to think critically about what they 
want. For Elster, public deliberation—undertaken for the goal of democratic will 
formation—solves the problem of distorted preferences. But this understanding 
seems to suggest that civil will formation takes place without more personal 
moderating mechanisms such as criticism, reflection, and monitoring. Such a 
skeptical attitude towards private morality would be quite unfamiliar to Aristotle. 
The question, moreover, is how public deliberation will provide substantive criteria 
for preference expression and will formation, since Elster (along with Habermas 
and Rawls) stresses that disputes cannot be settled by way of an intrinsic consensus. 
Instead, Elster refers to public proceduralism, in which substantive criteria should 
be embedded in the conditions of deliberation itself. We have seen this in Chapter 
4 as well, in which we distinguished between public justification and ideas of the 












n world. It is highly doubtful whether public proceduralism would help citizens 
handle their social practices. 
 Gaus explains this problem well. Although he defends the public use of reason, 
he admits that ultimately only a few principles can be, in his terms, conclusively 
justified, because “most of our specific moral disputes result in epistemological 
standoffs.”379 And while the principles that are conclusively publicly justified (such 
as those of toleration, free speech, and privacy) have “exclusionary force—they 
exclude some possible norms as permissible—it must be acknowledged that they 
often provide little in the way of positive guidance.” According to Gaus, then, 
taking public deliberation as ultimate substantive guidance would result in another 
state of nature, in which “[i]nconsistent interpretations of each other’s rights 
and responsibilities would lead to conflict and thwart the development of settled 
expectations.”380 Gaus argues for resolving the deadlock by means of a specific 
mode of political justification, directed towards the adjudication of public disputes 
that have been inconclusively justified. At the heart of this mode of justification 
lies the concept of the rule of law, which he sees as “the definitive voice of public 
reason.”381 Thus, due to the vagueness of the procedural principles of deliberation, 
Gaus radically narrows down the purpose of politics so that it serves merely to 
adjudicate conflict through the rule of law. This makes his conception of politics 
quite different from the deliberative one. 
 Gaus’s analysis confirms the importance of distinguishing between the civil 
and the political levels of democracy, between will formation and jurisdiction (or 
adjudication). But it also substantiates the need for a strong theory of democratic 
will formation in addition to the idea of politics as jurisdiction. After all, Gaus’s 
conception of political justification as adjudication is clearly only one aspect of 
politics as jurisdiction. We may agree that the rule of law is ultimately adjudicative, 
but it is certainly not primarily so. If, say, two individuals have an insoluble conflict, 
then adjudication may seem to be the only solution; yet, most of the time, things will 
not go that far. It is precisely for this reason that the rule of law provides particularly 
for civil law, not for public right. Politics as jurisdiction organizes and facilitates 
civil practices and institutions so as to indirectly accommodate and facilitate 
subjects to mind their own business yet still to cooperate virtuously with each other. 
Indeed, in this sense, politics as jurisdiction is supplemented by the virtues of civil 
democracy, since providing law (legislating), which is the main task of politics, 
can only be done with intrinsic information about will formation processes. Indeed, 
much of law (still) consists of civil law, which is not imperative (or administrative) 
but regulative (or facilitative). Private law can be called “intrinsic” because it deals 
with institutional plurality and human pluriformity. And coming to grips with both 
these values is where politics and democratic will formation—or, in Aristotle’s 
words, political and practical wisdom—meet.
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Public Relations: Three Modern Public/Private 
Distinctions
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explain the birth of politics as will formation by setting out three 
modern conceptions of the public/private distinction. These distinctions can be 
understood as the subject’s public relationships with existence (world), humanity 
(society), and authority (state). The historical development of these three notions 
of publicness can be traced from the late fifteenth century onwards (sections 7.2-
7.4). In my analysis, I borrow gratefully from Habermas’s magnificent Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere,382 yet my trajectory will be more conceptual 
and less historic than his. I will, moreover, present some considerable criticism of 
Habermas, concerning his, ultimately, one-dimensional interpretation of modern 
publicness.383 Habermas’s focus is on moral publicness; by following Kant’s 
concept of the publicity imperative, he depicts the public use of reason as the moral 
underpinning of politics and the public sphere as the discursive platform for state 
legitimacy. I will argue, however, that a conceptualization of democratic politics 
needs to include equally all three aspects of “modern publicness”—that it cannot 
neglect its existential and political elements. Properly distinguishing between these 
aspects is a condition for an adequate understanding of politics as jurisdiction.384
 Just as in Habermas’s study, Rousseau and Kant play important roles in 
this chapter. My appreciation of them differs from Habermas’s, however. Instead 
of emerging as the notorious political collectivist he is often taken for, Rousseau 
explains very well the distinctiveness of the three aspects of modern publicness. 
Rousseau’s perspective on the interrelations between world (or what he often calls 
“nature”), society, and state gives his work depth. Kant receives serious attention 
here as well, since he has been the most rigorous in explaining the central idea 
of modern politics: the public use of reason. A concluding comparison between 
Rousseau and Kant will bring into perspective their different approaches to the 
three modern public/private distinctions, as well as the consequences for studying 
politics as jurisdiction (section 7.5).
7.2 The political public/private distinction: Man and authority
The first modern public/private distinction refers to the division between society 
and state. It is the political public/private distinction, which stands at the basis of 
politics as jurisdiction and was already introduced in Chapter 3.385 In this section, 
the distinction will be historically illustrated and further explained. 
 The modern distinction between society and state has been perpetuated as the 













n effect of a discussion about the justification of public authority that started during 
the early Middle Ages. This discussion changed in the course of the sixteenth 
century, when, alongside the justification of public authority, the issue of popular 
sovereignty entered the discourse. The central question became where, ultimately, 
sovereignty (or authority) resided: with prince or people? Two reinforcing processes 
accompanied this discussion: the development of a civil society and the emergence 
of the administrative state.
 The modern process of the democratization of public authority started in most 
of Europe during the Reformation (and in Italy during the high Renaissance). The 
idea of the absolute transcendence of God caused a radical renewal of the grounds 
for the ruler’s terrestrial sovereignty. In Protestantism a strict separation was made 
between religious and worldly affairs: the political sovereign was held solely 
responsible for the temporal order, while the church retained undisputed authority 
over the spiritual order.386 This distinction paved the way for an administrative state, 
a state focused on the maintenance of a temporal order by rational rules and positive 
law.
 The theological-political discussion about the ruler’s sovereignty went 
together with an actual process of state growth.387 French and Italian authors, at the 
end of the fifteenth century, came up with new techniques for governmental rule. 
They developed a conception of state rationality (raison d’état) in order to modify the 
traditional discourse on the immanent legitimacy of manorial power. Foucault calls 
the new concept “biopolitics” or “governmentality.”388 Public authority needed to 
become more dependent on effective control and to acquire “the perfect knowledge 
of the means with which states form, strengthen and maintain themselves, and 
grow.”389 The best-known text in this respect is Machiavelli’s The Prince (1513), 
with its unequivocal advice to the prince on how to gain and hold onto power. The 
prince should radically diminish his reliance on immanent authority, Machiavelli 
argues, and strengthen his principality by investigating, influencing, and controlling 
the behavior of, and the relations between, his subjects (especially the upcoming 
capitalist nobility).390 This required the formation of general rules and rational 
governance. Absolutist power was necessarily compensatory for the loss of immanent 
authority. It led to a concentration of public might and corresponding governmental 
functions at the court and its administration.391 What Habermas calls “representative 
publicness”392 turned into what I will call “administrative publicness”: “[t]he 
bureaucracy, the military (and to some extent also the administration of justice) 
became independent institutions of public authority separate from the progressively 
privatized sphere of the court.”393 Administrative state authority differed from the 
old, Habermas explains, for it “no longer referred to the representative ‘court’ of a 
person endowed with authority but instead to the functioning of an apparatus with 
regulated spheres of jurisdiction and endowed with a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of coercion.”394 With this development from representative to administrative 
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publicness, the political public/private distinction took shape. A distinction between 
the governing and the governed body emerged. As Habermas writes: “‘Private’ 
designated the exclusion from the sphere of the state apparatus; for ‘public’ referred 
to the administrative state that in the meantime had developed under absolutism 
into an entity having an objective existence over against the person or the ruler. The 
public (das Publikum, le public) was the ‘public authority’ (öffentliche Gewalt) in 
contrast to everything ‘private’ (Privatwesen).”395 
 During the seventeenth century, however, the depersonalization and 
rationalization of state authority became infused with a democratic discourse. 
Scholars (see below) started to suggest to replace immanent state authority 
and to connect it with the consent of the public. The state developed towards a 
modern government in which rationality became tied to public justification and 
deliberation. The process of democratization of state authority had two distinct 
phases. During the first, the relation between state authority and public consent was 
central. During the second, state authority was connected to the idea of a public 
will. The eighteenth-century idea of popular sovereignty differed from the older 
conception of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Protestant motive of 
popular sovereignty was not to constitute authority by a self-legislative public, but 
to control authority—to check it—via a constitution in which the public’s rights 
and privileges were laid down.396 State authority was corporatist, grounded not in 
every person being an equal member of the public but in the divine social body as a 
whole—in the words of Althusius, the corpus universalis consociationis. The social 
body carried old privileges and rights that were laid down in the constitution and 
represented by magistrates. Although bound by the constitution and publicly held 
responsible for abiding and respecting it, public authority was specifically granted 
with the authority to manage the temporal order on God’s behalf. The public, 
then, could certainly “decide” to resist and overthrow its government, but only if 
fundamental rights were violated. The early-modern resistance to absolutism thus 
did not turn into a full-blown democratic theory in which the reasons for resisting 
authority referred to a popular will.397 Government was not just an administrative 
extension of public sovereignty. It had a separate responsibility in maintaining 
public order—although still in the name of the public. The early-modern idea of 
popular sovereignty was based on a stricter division between state and society than 
that of the modern idea of popular sovereignty.
 The modern element of popular will formation saw the light only with 
the connection between public authority and the general will.398 A first step was 
to individualize popular sovereignty.399 According to John Locke, the people 
transferred their natural rights to the public authority, which was held accountable 
accordingly.400 Locke individualized the legitimation of public authority by tying it 
to individual and not to corporate rights. Still, he did not tie individual rights to a 
general will. As Sabine explains: “Instead of a law enjoining the common good of 













n a society, Locke set up a body of innate, indefeasible, individual rights which limit 
the competence of the community and stand as bars to prevent interference with the 
liberty and property of private persons.”401 Locke was not concerned with attaching 
state authority to the public sphere of a self-legislative citizenry, as philosophers of 
the later Enlightenment would do.402 He was more concerned with legally binding 
state authority in its task of ruling society. Locke’s concept of consent referred to 
the government’s duty to rightly employ its temporal authority in the name of the 
people. A strong idea of jurisdiction was vital to uphold the social order.403 Locke 
was still very much influenced by the Protestant legitimation of state authority.
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant were the first to formulate 
the social contract voluntaristically. Notwithstanding the absoluteness of the 
contract, both men understood the constitution of the contract to originate from a 
subjective commitment. The notion of public authority became, therefore, radically 
democratized: connected to the idea of the general will, made up and represented 
by rational subjects. If the public was to politically constitute itself, it needed to 
establish a social contract that was unanimously shared. The novel idea behind 
the modern social contract was thus the simultaneous presence of civil freedom 
and the absolute authority of public law. Kant writes: “A state (civitas) is a union 
of a multitude of human beings under laws of right.”404 The citizens’ unanimous 
consent is the ground for public law. As explained in Chapter 3, since citizens are 
the constitutors of public law, they have to be subjected to it as well.405 This is the 
political commitment that Rousseau distinguished from the civil commitment.406 
If public law (the social contract) is not based on the general will, it will revert to 
a law of informal prerogatives. The inherent democratic grounding of the social 
contract is the major difference with feudal law, in which popular freedom is only 
conditional—subject to the clash of private wills that can, for instance, be exchanged, 
sold, loaned, or traded—and in which process the state is a private stakeholder as 
well.407 Rousseau compares the old idea of freedom with the state of nature in which 
everyone has different ideas and interests. The old social contract, Rousseau says, 
is a fraudulent agreement, in reality unilaterally imposed by the powerful.408 Civil 
society, on the other hand, is constituted by the public will of the people, which is 
the only possible means of bringing together liberty and authority. To Rousseau and 
Kant, unlike Hobbes and Locke, civil subjection to the constitution is right only if 
it originates from the public will.409 The citizens’ will has final authority, not the 
government’s for that would amount to despotism.410 Civil society is democratically 
framed if the public is constitutor of its own laws.
7.3 The existential public/private distinction: Man and the world
The second modern distinction between the public and the private is the “existential” 
one. It refers to the relation between the individual and the world. This relation 
shapes the way the person copes with existential publicness, how he develops his 
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own ethos towards life.411 “Public,” in this respect, concerns the world outside of 
him, his existence in the world, while “private” concerns his personal realm, his 
inner essence. The personal realm is the interior space of the individual where 
his experiences and sentiments are accessible exclusively to him and not directly 
knowable by the public at large. It is the space of sensational, non-linguistic 
knowledge (zero-order constructions).
 The growing importance of the personal realm has telling religious roots.412 
The existential public/private distinction received a special meaning during 
the Reformation. The idea of what can be called, after Rousseau, “existential 
sentimentality” was born, which stressed a principled division between man 
and the world.413 The beginning stages of the Reformation undoubtedly gave a 
transcendental shock to the believer. As Weber vividly notes: 
In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine must above all have had the 
consequence for the life of a generation which surrendered to its magnificent 
consistency. That was a feeling of unprecedented loneliness of the single 
individual. In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most 
important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path 
alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him for eternity.414 
Weber’s insight is substantiated by Luther’s remark concerning the purity of the 
personal in worshipping God: “It is evident that no external thing has any influence 
in producing Christian righteousness or servitude.”415 The asymmetrical moral 
epistemology of Protestantism—characterized on the one hand by unconditional 
love for God, while on the other proclaiming the fundamental limits of human 
knowledge concerning His Will—triggered a focus on worldly existence and good 
action: “The valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs was the highest 
form which the moral activity of the individual could assume,” Weber writes.416 The 
answer to this fundamental religious uncertainty was to perceive the world as much 
as possible in a rational way. While God’s grace was in His hands, the world was in 
the hands of man, God’s child. 
 In the writings of Rousseau, the latent anxiety between human action and 
salvation reaches the very surface of critical reflection. Rousseau explicitly relates 
it to man’s place in civil society. The prominence in Luther’s thesis of the exclusive 
personal relationship with God makes way for Rousseau’s thesis concerning 
the solitary experience in nature: le sentiment de l’existence.417 By stressing this 
religious sentiment but combining it with modern vigor, Rousseau emphasizes a 
deep conflict between the subject and civil society. It leads the subject to be in 
a partial, yet constant, state of what can be called “civil anxiety.” Rousseau’s 
idea of the subjective friction with the world is fundamentally influenced by the 
transcendence of the divine. In Protestantism, individual grace is exclusively 













n based on pure privateness, understood as the spiritual contact with the Divine. In 
Rousseau’s philosophy, the reformist spiritual anxiety turns into a preromantic civil 
anxiety. Rousseau rejects the naturalism of people like Locke and Pufendorf and 
stresses the fundamental difference between the reality of the world and that of 
man himself.418 God’s creations are unfathomable and immaculate,419 man’s actions 
conventional and flawed. True justice is divine and beyond man’s reason to grasp; 
it cannot—and therefore shouldn’t—be derived from human nature: “What is good 
and in conformity with order is such by the very nature of things and independently 
of human agreement. All justice comes from God, who alone is its source; and if 
only we knew how to receive it from that exalted fountain, we should need neither 
governments nor laws.”420
 With Rousseau, religious sentimentality becomes human sentimentality; 
although deeply embedded in God’s natural order, man is destined to step 
out and face the confrontation with the discordant civil order. To think himself 
confined to nature is a human illusion.421 Rousseau imports the Protestant feeling 
of existential loneliness in his social theory. He is skeptical of human morality in 
general and distrustful of the Enlightenment’s project of reason in particular—to 
the dissatisfaction of many.422 It makes him a romanticist avant la lettre, a radical 
individualist.423 The ideal of cosmopolitanism is a farce to him. In reality, private 
people entering public spheres turn into actors and look for an audience that will 
acknowledge their reputation and nourish their self-esteem424: “The savage lives 
within himself; the sociable man, always outside of himself, knows how to live 
only in the opinion of others, and it is so to speak from their judgment alone that he 
draws the sentiment of his own existence.”425
 Rousseau’s reservations were not without reason; during the later 
Enlightenment existential sentimentality became increasingly interpreted as “civil.” 
The moral public/private distinction started to dominate the existential public/
private distinction, and it socialized the inner conflict into a conflict between the 
private and public interests of the subject.
7.4 The moral public/private distinction: Man and society
The third modern public/private distinction is called a “moral” one because it 
describes civil processes of will formation, in which private preferences are publicly 
discussed and criticized with a view to human morality. The moral public/private 
distinction runs through the civil realm, which is the “private” aspect of the political 
public/private distinction. Habermas thus calls the developing modern public sphere 
a forum of private people, not because its historical citizens were selfish beings, but 
because their status was apolitical, not officially linked to state authority.426 They 
were members of civil society discussing a wide variety of topics independently of 
the execution of political power.
 Democratic discourse radically changed the function of the public sphere: 
135
what had been an automatic legitimation vehicle of public authority in which power 
was represented became instead an articulation channel of civil interests. The public 
sphere emerged in the wake of an emancipating civil society, and was separated 
from traditional authority. Habermas: “The decisive element was not so much the 
political equality of the members but their exclusiveness in relation to the political 
realm of absolutism as such: social equality was possible at first only as an equality 
outside the state.”427 The public sphere in the civil realm was perhaps especially 
a philosophical idea, based on the ambition to scrutinize authority in general by 
means of reason.
 The emancipatory implications of the public sphere can hardly be overstated. 
Its emergence must have had a theatrical impact on people. As a place and as an 
idea it attracted gatherings of people—in a way strangers to each other—who 
needed to invent themselves, since hereditary status was out of fashion and no 
longer enough for civil praise.428 People engaged themselves in private practices 
(bookshop, hospital, church) and discussed their experiences and interests in front 
of the public. They were endowed with particular talents that were trademarks in 
the market place. Although many of these talents were economical, public spheres 
appeared in cultural realms, as well.429 The bourgeois was supposed to become a 
man—or woman430—of artistic taste, someone with the curiosity to train himself or 
herself to be a respectable participant in public discussions. Modern morality was 
based on a communicative subject.
 “Public sphere” referred to what were in fact many public spheres in many 
different realms. What connected these realms was the idea of human universality, 
which gave people the motivation to reach an understanding about a certain topic, 
were it in manners, health, science or art. The public sphere was the arena of human 
reason, and it caused a dual psychological projection, the rationalization both of 
authority in general and of the competence of the public itself that claimed legitimacy. 
Intersubjectivity was the great promise of the public sphere. Habermas describes it 
again very well: “[Culture] was claimed as the ready topic of a discussion through 
which an audience-oriented (publiksbezogen) subjectivity communicated with 
itself.”431 Modern subjectivity—in contrast to Reformist subjectivity—was based 
on a public process of self-understanding.
 The philosophical idea behind the public sphere is “public reason,” which 
has been most prominently set out by Kant. Indeed, to Kant the public use of 
reason is a forum activity: “[B]y the public use of one’s own reason I mean that use 
which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading 
public.”432 The public use of reason is essentially communication between subjects 
using their reason, for which the condition of publicity is crucial: “The public use 
of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring enlightenment among 
men. The private use of reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly 
restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment.”433 The very 













n freedom to be able to employ reason commits the subject to actually employ it, 
however. According to Kant, the virtue of toleration has not been invented for the 
mere protection of the right to express oneself, but to ensure that people really 
communicate.434 Toleration should serve those people who dare to step into publicity 
and want to lose the private immaturity (Unmündigkeit) that dominates their social 
roles, be it as patient, cleric, or state official. In the private sphere, people think 
for themselves, they seek to satisfy their interests and to follow tradition. Private 
communication is restricted; it always presupposes dependency on some external 
authority according to whose norms things ought to be done (be it religious belief or 
natural necessity). Public communication, however, runs on the internal authority 
of human reason itself. Theoretically, the public use of reason implies imagining the 
world as efficiently organized;435 practically, it leads to imagining oneself to be free 
agent.436 Both presumptions cannot be proven, however; they are based simply on a 
belief in reason.437
 From all public vantage points, the public sphere in the political realm is seen 
as pivotal. Kant is its intellectual ghostwriter. His main objective is to base politics 
on public reason, which, Habermas writes, “allowed him to turn politics into a 
question of morality.”438 According to Kant, modern freedom can be understood 
only in relation to the membership of the political community (civitas). Man is 
inherently civil, and this condition should be understood in two ways, empirically 
(private) and morally (public). First, man is free to improve himself by creating and 
structuring his material surroundings. This private process of pursuing happiness has 
its limits, though, for it may “infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar 
end,” and must therefore “be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a 
workable general law….”439 Hence, says Kant, the second aspect of civility lies in 
transcending the material world. In order to constitute a civil society that is marked 
by private wills that are directed to earthly matters (work, reproduction, health, etc.) 
a public will must evolve as well. The public will should be both formalized and 
abstracted from the empirical world. Since no civitas will ever emerge from a mere 
collection of private wills, its constitution rests on the capacity of people to publicly 
use their faculties of reason. Public reason has a double effect, then: it defines both 
the individual and society. Kant defines the connecting principle as follows: “All 
actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not 
compatible with their being made public. This principle should be regarded not 
only as ethical (i.e., pertaining to the theory of virtue) but also as juridical (i.e. 
affecting the rights of man).”440 The public use of reason is directly related to the 
person’s ethos, which Kant defines as “the moral strength of a human being’s will in 
fulfilling his duty.”441 Virtue is the moral source of public right: it generates the will 
to follow maxims that can be made public, thereby providing the moral foundations 
of the political community.
 We can say, recapitulating, that with his rationalist injunction “dare to know” 
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(sapere aude) Kant challenged not only Luther’s inner dictum “by faith alone” 
(sola fide) but also Rousseau’s interpretation of existential sentimentality. With 
Kant, the modern experience of subjectivity creates a duty to use reason, which 
compensates for the difficult Protestant paradox of the privatization of conscience 
and the predestination of fate. The modern individual is endowed with a potential 
public identity prior to all his private roles: he or she is member of the human 
society. All subjects are equal by merit of their membership of the association 
of humankind. The prominence of this humanism442—which, ironically, resides 
in subjectivity—illustrates the process of religious secularization: the existential 
sphere loses its independent function as a spiritual shelter, a place of sentimental 
solitude, and turns into a breeding ground for human rationality. This secularization 
process is embodied by deliberation and will formation with the object of attaining 
civil harmony. The stage where this takes place is the public sphere.443
7.5 Rousseau and Kant: Two different approaches to modern politics
In this section I analyze the relations between, on the one hand, the existential and 
the moral public/private distinction and, on the other, the moral and the political 
public/private distinction. I will do so by comparing the positions of Rousseau and 
Kant. 
7.5.1 The relation between the existential and the moral public/private 
distinction
I have explained Rousseau’s analysis of modernity as a conflict between nature 
and reason, between irrationality and rationality. Rousseau believes man is right 
in the middle of it: in awe of God’s perplexing world, yet uncomfortable in civil 
society as well. An inherent conflict exists between the profoundness of existential 
sentimentality and the edgy eagerness of reason. This conflict, according to 
Rousseau, may be emotionally appeased but cannot be rationally reconciled.
 Kant thinks otherwise, believing that reasonability may be—or should be—
expected from the subject, who sublimates his inner conflict by transforming his 
natural sentiments into a sentiment of reason.444 Modernity offers but one option, to 
step into publicity and communicate with fellow human beings about what it means 
to be born with reason. The public use of reason follows from the idea of treating 
humanity as an end in itself, respecting the other as a reasonable person, and thus 
seeing one’s own will in correspondence with that of the public. As Habermas 
describes it aptly: “Subjectivity, as the innermost core of the private, was always 
oriented to an audience (Publikum).”445 The moral mirror image of the subject, 
in other words, is human society. Kant’s metaphorical description of the ideal 
typical use of public reason—by a scholar before a reading public—is anticipatory, 
epitomizing the hope of emancipation, which is that the subject as a scholar, gifted 
with reason and capable of giving and receiving criticism, will educate himself 













n and become truly autonomous. This struggle between selfish and social reasons is 
a universal struggle that takes place in civil society, the moral playground of the 
political community.446 By introducing the concept of the public use of reason, Kant 
puts moral publicness in the forefront. And, importantly, in respect to the other two 
notions of publicness, it has a double function: the confrontation of one’s private 
preferences in the public sphere rationalizes existential sentimentality, while it 
also provides for the constitution of public law. Existential sentimentality is pulled 
towards the dialectic tension between the private and public use of reason, while 
political will formation founds itself on the ideal of moral publicness. 
 Rousseau, meanwhile, is keen to retain the idea of existential sentimentality 
as it originated in the Reformation, although he gives it a civil twist. Existential 
publicness, the subjective relation to the world, inevitably brings a confrontation 
with civility.447 For this reason, Rousseau stresses the invaluable relationship 
between the subject and the transcendental natural order—the subject’s connection 
with existence and subjective freedom. The sensation of being in contact with 
the world’s splendor and greatness brings a certain life energy that invigorates 
the subject. Rousseau is eager to protect this personal realm, since it tends to be 
somewhat alienated by its confrontation with the society of man. 
 Kant opposes Rousseau’s skeptical account of civility, for he believes in the 
growth of human morality. Kant understands civil anxiety from the start as a very 
different struggle, not between nature and reason but as a tension between two 
types of reason: self-directed and other-directed. He civilizes Rousseau’s radical 
individualism by turning the notion of existential sentimentality into a rational desire. 
Kant wants to harmonize it with the public use of reason. It is hard to see what role 
the existential public/private distinction plays in Kant’s political philosophy, since 
his definition of “private” is merely contrasted to the use of public reason and not 
translated as a state of existential sentimentality in relation to the outer world. The 
sentimentality that the Kantian subject experiences is a rational sentiment. Where 
the Rousseauvian subject’s step into civility is dominated by an innate ambiguity 
and doubt about the relation between feelings and reason, the Kantian subject’s 
step is rationally motivated and inherently public. It involves an inner battle 
between Verstand und Vernunft. As Onora O’Neill puts it: “Intellectual freedom 
is from the start not merely freedom to engage in inward or solitary reflection. 
Kant’s conception of the private never becomes truly subjective that is, it never 
is a conception of the merely individual or personal.”448 Kant’s subject is always 
dealing with his practical conscience, leaving no room for inner naiveté, immaturity 
or unease with civil society.449 Kant is unaware of civil anxiety, seeing only the 
subject’s moral challenge to think ahead.450 As God is creator of the universe, man 
in Kant’s conception is creator of the world; he should be proud of his existence 
and take initiative.451 Existential sentimentality, to Kant, consists both in gratitude 
for one’s existence and in the transformation of that appreciation into responsibility 
139
by contributing to civility and culture. In contrast, Rousseau rejects the integrative 
meaning of reason. Mindful of the semantic shortcomings of reason,452 he makes a 
sharp distinction between private and public morality, in which the former, because 
of its deep link with existential sentimentality, will always be partly inexplicable.
7.5.2 The relation between the moral and the political public/private 
distinction
The difference between Rousseau’s and Kant’s approaches to the relation between 
the existential and the moral public/private distinctions emerges out of their different 
approaches to the moral and the political distinctions. Rousseau is skeptical not 
only about the possibility of civil harmony but also about the sufficiency of the 
moral dialectic to constitute the political constitution.453 This skepticism leads him 
to radically distinguish between the general will and civil will formation, between 
the civil (or moral) and the political commitment. Just as the shift from the personal 
to the civil is artificial, so is the shift from the civil to the political. Rousseau is 
keen to stress that although the public as a sovereign is always right, the public 
as a people is not. The chances that political society can be managed on the basis 
of civil will formation are slim.454 Due to the great instability of a civil morality 
(volontée de tous), the idea of a general will is vital to uphold the idea of the political 
body.455 The belief in the political body must hold citizens together in the face of the 
“universal desire for reputation, honours and promotion which devours us all.”456 
Rousseau’s disbelief in the possibility of reconciling the subject with civil morality 
or of the attainment of civil harmony is the reason for his radical formulation of a 
concept of the general will.
 The political commitment of the subject has therefore a symbolic rather than 
a rational quality.457 It is the metaphysical counterpart of the civil commitment. 
The general will is the epitome of politics because it signifies the idea of popular 
sovereignty, yet, as a practical device, it is not particularly helpful and needs to be 
supplemented. Of the political consequences—the actions of public authority—it 
says only that public authority will need to preserve the spirit of the general will. The 
human combination of sovereignty and moral deficiency leaves an important role 
to be filled by public authority, especially governmental, judiciary, and legislative 
assemblies. What are the responsibilities of these public authorities and how do 
they relate? Who is going to make sure that the laws given do in fact correspond to 
the general will?458 As said,459 Rousseau explicitly distinguishes the question of the 
social contract (or general will) from the question about its practical representation. 
Despite the sovereignty of the public, civil peace in the spirit of the social contract 
depends on institutions established by executive and legislative bodies.460 
 Rousseau emphasizes the Aristotelean (and also early-modern) question of 
political jurisdiction.461 To govern is difficult and influenced by many circumstances 
that need to be taken care of as not to become potential hazards for civil peace.462 Not 













n without reason, Rousseau spends a great deal of The Social Contract on explaining 
what political virtues are necessary in order to practically represent the general 
will. Rousseau argues that civil practices of will formation are the central source 
of political wisdom and the very focus of ruling, but that they do not have a moral 
equivalence with the social contract. Citizens in public spheres should not be seen 
as legislators; this is not their proper task. Maurice Cranston writes: “And just as the 
Tutor is the dominant figure of Émile so does the Lawgiver become the dominant 
figure of the Social Contract. Indeed, the Lawgiver repeats in the state the role 
that the Tutor performs for the individual.”463 Democracy cannot survive without a 
notion of authority independent of civil freedom. Respecting popular sovereignty 
can sometimes lead to strong administrative interventions.
 Kant takes up where Rousseau leaves off. He connects the civil with the 
political commitment. Kant borrows from Rousseau the idea of the general will 
as the logical consequence of the idea of popular sovereignty, but he moralizes it 
by tying the political commitment to the public use of reason. The public process 
of will formation is, for Kant, the moral fundament of the political constitution. 
Still, although Kant is convinced that a connection must be made between the 
general will and the public use of reason, the connection cannot be grounded in 
a teleological understanding of the natural order. Kant takes seriously Rousseau’s 
lesson about the danger of making reason instrumental to the natural wishes of man, 
for that would only bring disruption of the civil order.464 Looking for a political 
order within reason itself, Kant comes up with the concept of the subject as a self-
legislating (autonomous) being. The dissatisfaction inherent in the private use of 
reason becomes the motivation for reason’s public use. This motivation is essentially 
political, due to its universal working: it constitutes the civitas.465 The way the 
subject evaluates a maxim in relation to his will is the archetype of how political 
principles are to be constructed. Kant states that a maxim which “I cannot publicly 
acknowledge without thereby inevitably arousing the resistance of every one to my 
plans, can only stirred up this necessary and general (hence a priori foreseeable) 
opposition against me because it is itself unjust and thus constitutes a threat to 
everyone.”466 The public use of reason is the moral source of public law: “Whatever 
a people cannot impose upon itself cannot be imposed upon it by the legislator.”467 
The transcendental formula of public right is the guiding principle in the public 
sphere. To Kant, as Habermas puts it, “civil law as a whole was public.”468
Habermas deems Kant the real democrat, seeing his political philosophy as the 
logical—and necessary—step in the development of the moral priority of public 
deliberation.469 Habermas’s verdict on Rousseau, on the other hand, is harsh: 
by refusing to truthfully developing the democratic logic of the social contract 
and indulging his suspicion about people’s political capacity, Habermas writes, 
Rousseau eliminates de facto the public sphere in the political realm,470 cutting 
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public will formation off from politics. I would suggest, however, that instead of an 
anti-democrat, Rousseau is a realist.471 Rousseau retains aspects of the early-modern 
idea of public authority. In contrast to Kant, he preserves the strict distinction 
between public authority and sovereignty, arguing for the maintenance of public 
order by wise politicians who take notice of historically established civil practices 
and laws.472 Although public authority is based on popular sovereignty, the practical 
formation of a political society cannot be based on a purely rational discussion. 
Such a process is multi-layered, and it occurs in civil practices that grow, evolve, 
and perish.473 Without a doubt, Rousseau is a democrat,474 but one who appreciates 
the practical importance of a legislation that is based on the habits, traditions, and 
mores of the people and which is taken care of by capable political representatives. 
Cranston writes: “The point Rousseau dwells on is that superiority in public office 
must correspond to superiority of capability and rectitude, or ‘virtue.’ Such a system 
he can call ‘aristocratic’ in the true classical sense of that word: government by 
the best.”475 Rousseau’s faith in the rational-critical capacity of the people is too 
slim to fully allow public deliberation to provide for the democratic legitimation 
of public authority. Just as important is the connection between political rule and 
social conventions and practices.
7.6 Conclusion
The differences between Kant and Rousseau seem at first surprising, since Kant was 
a great admirer of Rousseau and took Rousseau’s concept of the general will as the 
basis of his moral and political philosophy. Yet this is already where the differences 
begin. Kant has taken an important aspect of Rousseau’s political philosophy for 
a central element of his moral philosophy. Kant makes the political commitment 
voluntarist through the categorical imperative. The political commitment ultimately 
rests in a belief in the reasonable subject. Rousseau, however, stresses that the use 
of reason is artificial; it only starts to make sense if related to real things.476
 Rousseau’s political philosophy has three important consequences for the 
general thesis of this book. First, moral knowledge is particular and concrete.477 
Rousseau is a Deist and believes—like Aristotle—that goodness is achieved within 
the context of individual action itself. The individual should not lose contact with 
nature, the divine origin of goodness. The individual is best prepared to do well for 
self and others through a relation with the natural context. Rousseau’s conception 
of the existential public/private distinction is reminiscent of the epistemic problem: 
reality has a separate existence in relation to the human mind and cannot be 
directly communicated. And although moral knowledge is influenced by existential 
sentimentality, the two cannot be integrated. Put differently, because political theory 
is a third-order construction, it therefore ought to encompass the different orders of 
constructions, including the zero-order realm. Political theory needs to take into 
account the subject’s relation with the world.













n  Rousseau’s second contribution to this book’s thesis is his call for a critical 
stand against civil morality, since the socialization and codification of the good is 
unavoidably an inferior reproduction of the original.478 More particularly for our 
purposes, Rousseau offers skepticism towards rationalist conceptions of morality, 
suggesting that no natural harmony exists between personal and civil interests. 
Rousseau fears that by giving the moral dynamics of reason too great prominence, the 
subject will lose touch with existence and thus with a sense of freedom independent 
of convention and civility. Civil justice is a poor facsimile of justice; it should not 
be confused with the existential relationship between the world and the individual. 
Its codification, accordingly, will need to be sensitive to human individuality.479
 Thirdly, following from both Rousseau’s account of existential sentimentality 
and his distrust in civil morality, the public use of reason is not strong enough to 
bind a political community. The state of civil anxiety must lead to a strict distinction 
between the subject’s civil and political commitments. The domination of the 
moral dynamics of reason will undermine the political commitment by making 
the legitimacy of public authority dependent on will formation. In this respect, the 
concept of the general will follows from the modern idea of subjectivity and gives a 
strong symbolic quality to the political commitment, which can be seen as the mirror 
image of existential sentimentality; the very freedom of the subject results in an 
understanding of the absoluteness of the social pact. Indeed, it is a kind of religion: 
“There is thus a profession of faith which is purely civil and of which it is the 
sovereign’s function to determine the articles, not strictly as religious dogmas, but as 
expressions of social conscience, without which it is impossible to be either a good 
citizen or a loyal subject.”480 Rousseau, all in all, is concerned with safeguarding the 
subject’s existential sentimentality within an emerging civil society that was vibrant 
and wary of bourgeois explorations and expectations. Thus he advocates the need to 
develop a strong political society. The task of modern existence is to cope with civil 
anxiety, while believing still in the democratic supremacy of the polity.
 In Chapter 1, I explained the dominant and questionable workings of the 
publicity imperative. According to many scholars, the moral underpinning of politics 
is the public deliberation of private preferences with the intention of transforming 
them. The publicity imperative is the civil tit-for-tat of the concept of popular 
sovereignty: to be a citizen entails a duty to think and deliberate about the general 
good for society. That is the burden of modern freedom, it is widely held. With 
his concept of the public use of reason, Kant has given the classic defense of the 
publicity imperative. The moral public/private distinction dominates his political 
philosophy. On the one hand, the moral subject is a political subject; his public use 
of reason establishes the social contract. On the other hand, alongside transforming 
private into public interests, the public use of reason implies also a motivation on 
the part of the subject to disengage from existential sentimentality. The public use 
of reason, in other words, cuts both ways: it both rationalizes the subject (away 
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from the personal) and politicizes the subject (towards the political). It tells the 
subject not just to speak up, but to do so in a critical fashion, as a scholar for a 
reading public. Precisely this simple yet utterly ambitious idea has led to a great 
emphasis on political will formation as the medicine for a decent society. 
(Notes)
 382 See also section 1.2.
 383 See also section 3.6 for a critique on Habermas.
 384 For an interesting analysis on conceptions of public and private, see Benn and Gaus, 
“Public and Private.” It is for future study to integrate their findings with the three modern 
conceptions of publicness, analyzed below.
 385 Section 3.4.
 386 As Luther put it: “If [temporal government] did not exist, no man could survive 
because of the rest: they would devour one another as the senseless beasts do among 
themselves.” Cited in: W.D.J. Cargill Thómpson ([1966], 1990) “Martin Luther and the 
‘Two Kingdoms,’” p. 43.
 387 The process of state growth was accelerated by mercantilism and facilitated by 
the emerging empirical sciences, with Francis Bacon as an important frontrunner. See 
Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 34-35.
 388 M. Foucault (1991) “Governmentality.”
 389 Foucault refers to the Italian jurists G. Botero and G.A. Palazzo. The latter argued 
that “state rationality is a method that provides us with understanding how to create peace 
and order in the republic.” Ibidem, pp. 71-72. My translation. Cf. E. Cassirer ([1946], 
1974) The Myth of the State, p. 153: “The Prince is neither a moral nor an immoral book: it 
is simply a technical book. In a technical book we do not seek for rules of ethical conduct, 
of good and evil. It is enough if we are told what is useful or useless.”
 390 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 9.
 391 Q. Skinner ([1978], 2000) The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The 
Age of Reformation, p. 257. (Henceforth: Age of Reformation). Versailles is the pivotal 
example of absolutism, a combination of royal glorification of power with an extensive 
administrative body (the city of Versailles was a city mostly of governmental buildings).
 392 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 12. To be sure, Habermas does not call it 
“administrative publicness,” only stresses the growing importance of the administrative 
state.
 393 Ibid., p. 7. Cf. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 650.
 394 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 18. The depersonalization and 
rationalization of state authority, as Weber put it (([1921], 1978) Economy and Society: 
An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, p. 959), can also be explained economically, since 
mercantilist logic demanded strict administrative and military measures for the opening 
and expanding of foreign markets. Moreover, as the court was losing its natural allies 













n (especially church and nobility) it needed the loyalty of the carriers of early capitalism to 
retain power.
 395 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 11. Cf. ibid., p. 19: “Civil society came 
into existence as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority.” Ibid. Habermas rightly 
refers to Arendt, who defines society as “the form in which the fact of mutual dependence 
for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance, and where the activities 
connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public.” Arendt, Human 
Condition, p. 46. See also: M. Foucault (1992) De wil tot weten. De geschiedenis van de 
seksualiteit, p. 29.
 396 See E.H. Kossmann (1958) “Bodin, Althusius en Parker, of: over de moderniteit van 
de Nederlandse opstand” and E.H. Kossmann (1980) “Volkssoevereiniteit aan het begin 
van het Nederlandse Ancien Régime.” Henceforth: “Volkssoevereiniteit.” Cf. Sabine, 
History of Political Theory, p. 418.
 397 Skinner, Age of Reformation, p. 338. 
 398 During the Enlightenment the organization of society was often seen according to 
the model of a societas, being the basis of political democracy. See e.g. E.H. Kossmann 
(1981) “Aan het volk van Nederland,” pp. 250-251.
 399 J. Locke ([1690], 2002) “Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning 
the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government,” Chapter 2, italics JL. For a 
thoughtful commentary: G.A. den Hartogh ([1988], 1994) “Inleiding.”
 400 R. Kubben (2005) Eenheid in drievoud: Een vertoog over macht, scheiding en 
fragmentatie in het openbaar bestuur, p. 19.
 401 Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 529, italics GD.
 402 Habermas, in this respect, shows how Locke did not see opinion as being suitable 
for legislation. “Law of opinion was by no means meant as law of public opinion; for 
“opinion” neither arose in public discussion—it became binding instead ‘by a secret and 
tacit consent’—nor was it applied in some way to the laws of the state, because it was 
actually grounded in the ‘consent of private men who have not authority enough to make 
law.’” Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 91. Cf. Sabine, History of Political Theory, 
pp. 534-535.
 403 Den Hartogh, “Inleiding,” pp. 49-50. See also Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 
534: “The power of the people over government, however, is still not quite as complete in 
Locke as it came to be in later and more democratic theories. Though he called the power 
of the legislature fiduciary and a delegation from majority that acts for the community, 
he retained the older view that the grant of the community divests the people the power 
so long as the government is faithful to its duties.” It can be argued then that Skinner 
erroneously calls Locke the first author who developed a truly democratic legitimation of 
state authority. Skinner, Age of Reformation, p. 338. To be sure, even if Skinner was right, 
it should be stressed that Althusius’s more democratic political theory was earlier than 
Locke’s. See for a convincing defense of Althusius as the Locke avant la lettre: Kossmann, 
“Volkssoevereiniteit.”
145
 404 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, §45, p. 90, italics IK.
 405 Section 3.4. 
 406 “There is only one law which by its nature requires unanimous assent. This is the 
social pact: for the civil association is the most voluntary act in the world; every man 
having been born free and master of himself, no one else may under any pretext whatever 
subject him without his consent.” Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 152. See also: Rousseau, 
Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 4, p. 75: “[T]he equality of rights and the notion of justice 
which [the general will] produces derive from the predilection which each man has for 
himself and hence from human nature as such.” See also Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 
§46, p. 91.
 407 Apeldoorn, Inleiding, p. 89
 408 M. Cranston (1991) The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1754-1762, p. 303.
 409 Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 55. Cf. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, §46, p. 91.
 410 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, §46, p. 92.
 411 Cf. Foucault’s four different dimensions of the subject (or self) concerning what he 
calls the “techniques of the self.” The first dimension is that of the “ethical subject,” which 
is quite comparable to the ethical public/private distinction. See Foucault, “Genealogy of 
Ethics.”
 412 See also section 1.2.
 413 Cf. Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods, p. 112. 
 414 Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 104.
 415 Luther, “Freedom of a Christian Man,” p. 5.
 416 Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 80. Cf. Taylor, Sources, pp. 215-216, 228.
 417 “The source of unity and wholeness which Augustine found only in God is now 
to be discovered within the self.” Taylor, Sources, p. 362. Cf. I. Kant ([1785], 1956) 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 98. Henceforth: Groundwork.
 418 Taylor, Sources, p. 358; see also Huppes-Cluysenaer, Wetenschapsleer voor juristen, 
p. 222. Certainly, Kant’s key distinction between nature (object of physics) and freedom 
(object of ethics) is in line with Rousseau’s view. See Kant, Groundwork, pp. 67 ff.
 419 See the opening sentence of his Émile: “Everything is good as it leaves the hands of 
the author of things, everything degenerates in the hands of man.” J.-J. Rousseau ([1762], 
1957) Émile, or On Education. Henceforth: Émile.
 420 Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 80.
 421 As Rousseau portrays it: “But when, in my desire to discover my own place within 
my species, I consider its different ranks and the men who fill them, where am I now? 
What sight meets my eyes! Where is now the order I perceived? Nature showed me a scene 
of harmony and proportion; the human race shows me nothing but confusion and disorder. 
The elements agree together; men are in a state of chaos.” Rousseau, Émile, book IV. Cf. 
“Civil man, … being always active, sweating and restless, torments himself endlessly in 
search of ever more laborious occupations; he works himself to death….” J.-J. Rousseau 
([1755], 1987) Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, p. 
136. Henceforth: Discourse on Inequality.













n  422 In a reaction to the Discourse on Inequality Voltaire wrote to him: “I have received, 
Monsieur, your new book against the human race, and I thank you.” See M. Cranston 
([1984], 1987) “Introduction,” pp. 45 ff.
 423 Cf. Cranston, Noble Savage, pp. 302 ff. As Arendt writes: “The rebellious reaction 
against society during which Rousseau and the Romanticists discovered intimacy was 
directed first of all against the levelling demands of the social, against what we would 
call today the conformism inherent in every society.” Arendt, Human Condition, p. 39. 
Rousseau’s struggle also reminds of Socrates’s dilemma: whether to give way to one’s 
conscience or to follow outside norms.
 424 See R. Sennett ([1974], 1992) The Fall of Public Man, pp. 115-121.
 425 Cited in: Van den Hoven, Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, p. 169. 
 426 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 27 ff. See also: C. Taylor (1995) “Liberal 
Politics and the Public Sphere,” p. 266. To be sure, a reference to Habermas’s Structural 
Transformation in this article by Taylor would have been appropriate—to say the least.
 427 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 35.
 428 For an evocative description see Sennett, Fall of Public Man, Chapter 3. Habermas 
refers to Goethe who defined the essence of the aristocrat as “what he represented.” The 
bourgeois, however, could not rely on any representation beforehand: he was socially 
indefinite, and could only (to a certain extent, obviously) create himself. “Hence, Goethe 
advised not to ask [the bourgeois] ‘What art thou?’ but only: ‘What hast thou? What 
discernment, knowledge, talent, wealth?’ This is a statement which Nietzsche’s later 
aristocratic pretensions adopted: a man proved himself not by what he could do, but by 
who he was.” Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 13. Cf. Walzer’s note: “And when 
every man and woman becomes, as it were, a smallholder in the sphere of birth and blood, 
an important victory is indeed won.” Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 16.
 429 Or, as Habermas nicely calls them, public spheres in the world of letters Habermas, 
Structural Transformation, pp. 51-56.
 430 Think of salons being led by women like Madame De Geoffrin, Madame d’Épinay 
and Madame Necker, not particularly bourgeois, yet spirited with enlightenment.
 431 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 29.
 432 Kant, “Enlightenment,” p. 55. italics IM.
 433 Cited in: Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 106.
 434 Onora O’Neill remarks the illiberal tendency of this position: “[H]is principle 
appears to afford no protection for uses of reason which are not public, and these for many 
liberals are uses that particularly need protection.” O. O’Neill (1986) “The Public Use of 
Reason,” p. 526.
 435 Kant, “Orientation in Thinking,” pp. 241-242.
 436 “For in such a being we conceive a reason which is practical—that is, which 
exercises causality in regard to its objects. ... Reason must look upon itself as the author of 
its own principles independently of alien influences. Therefore as practical reason, or as the 
will of a rational being, it must be regarded as by itself as free.” Kant, Groundwork, p. 116.
147
 437 Kant, “Orientation in Thinking,” p. 245.
 438 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 111. According to O’Neill for Kant 
“practical uses of reason are more fundamental than theoretical uses of reason.” O’Neill, 
“The Public Use of Reason,” p. 524.
 439 I. Kant ([1792], 1970, 1999) “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in 
Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,’” p. 74. Henceforth: Kant, “Theory and 
Practice,” p. 74. 
 440 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” p. 126. See also Kant “Theory and Practice,” p. 73.
 441 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, § 6:405.
 442 Taylor calls it the feeling of “dignity.” Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” p. 44. See 
for Kant’s description of the feeling: Groundwork, p. 102.
 443 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 55. Cf. Rawls: “A citizen engages in public 
reason, then, when he or she deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely 
regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses 
political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected 
reasonably to endorse.” Rawls, “Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” p. 140.
 444 Kant stresses that it is “a natural vocation of man to communicate with his fellows, 
especially in matters affecting mankind as a whole.” Cited in: Habermas, Structural 
Transformation, p. 107.
 445 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 48-49. Cf. Taylor, Sources, p. 83.
 446 Cf. Hegel, who was well aware of the vital importance of the proper organization of 
civil society in liberal democracies, which he understood as the functional organization of 
civil societies in spheres or units (Kreise).
 447 As Charles Taylor puts it: “The original impulse of nature is right, but the effect of 
a depraved culture is that we lose contact with it.” Taylor, Sources, p. 357. To be sure, it 
would be more apt to say that the impulse of nature is right, and the effect of culture in 
general is to lose contact with it. Taylor rightly perceives Rousseau’s skepticism of human 
reason’s moral breadth as a radicalization of the process of individualization. Rousseau 
elects subjectivity as the best road to goodness. “We might speak of an individualized 
identity, one that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself. This notion arises along 
with an ideal, that of being true to myself and my own particular way of being.” Taylor, 
“Politics of Recognition,” p. 28.
 448 O’Neill, “The Public Use of Reason,” pp. 529-530.
 449 Cf. Taylor’s consent with this statement: “The monological ideal … forgets how 
our understanding of the good things in life can be transformed by our enjoying them in 
common with people we love; how some goods become accessible to us only through 
common enjoyment.” Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” p. 33. Cf. O’Neill: “[Reason] is 
not [something] we can plan to leave; and were we to try to do so, we would be left in 
solitary and thoughtless silence.” O’Neill, “The Public Use of Reason,” p. 539. Taylor, 
“Politics of Recognition,” p. 34.
 450 An explanation, perhaps, of why in contemporary political philosophical Anglo-













n Saxon literature Kant is much more often appreciated compared to Rousseau.
 451 “Give me matter,” Kant says, “and I will build a world from it, that is, give me 
matter and I will show you how a world developed from it.” Cited in: Arendt, Human 
Condition, pp. 295-296. Arendt calls this the depiction of the homo faber.
 452 “If children understood reason they would not need education, but by talking to 
them from their earliest age in a language they do not understand you accustom them to 
be satisfied with words, to question all that is said to them, to think themselves as wise as 
their teachers; you train them to be argumentative and rebellious; and whatever you think 
you gain from motives of reason, you really gain from greediness, fear, or vanity with 
which you are obliged to reinforce your reasoning.” Rousseau, Émile, Book II. 
 453 See for an opposite view: P. Riley (2001) “Rousseau’s General Will.”
 454 “Individuals see the good and reject it; the public desires the good but does not see 
it.” Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 6, p. 83. In this regard, Rousseau’s plea for a 
civil religion might be understood.
 455 Cf. Cranston, Noble Savage, p. 310: “For Rousseau there is a radical dichotomy 
between true law and actual law.” As will become clear later in the Chapter, next to the 
idea of the general will, Rousseau deemed it important to compensate the danger of private 
interests in politics by arguing for a group of wise politicians.
 456 Cited in: Cranston, “Introduction [to the Social Contract],” p. 44.
 457 Cf. section 4.4.3.
 458 Legislative issues must be taken care of by an extraordinary agent, says Rousseau, 
“not only because of his genius, but equally because of his office, which is neither that of 
the government nor that of the sovereign.” Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 7, p. 85.
 459 Section 3.4.
 460 “What, then, is the government? An intermediary body established between subjects 
and the sovereign for their mutual communication, a body charged with the execution of 
the laws and the maintenance of freedom, both civil and political.” Ibid., p. 102.
 461 Section 6.4.4.
 462 Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 6, p. 80.
 463 Cranston, “Introduction [to the Social Contract],” p. 43.
 464 Cf. R.L. Velkley (1993) “The Crisis of the End of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy and 
the Remarks of 1764-1765,” p. 85.
 465 “[T]he dialectic that lies concealed within [the subject’s] own breast no less than in 
that of his antagonist.” Kant cited in: O’Neill, “The Public Use of Reason,” p. 538. See 
also Kant, Groundwork, p. 129.
 466 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” p. 126, italics IK.
 467 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” p. 85, italics IK.
 468 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 271-272, nt. 71; see also ibid., p. 108.
 469 Cf. Cranston, Noble Savage, p. 308.
 470 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 97-98.
 471 Maurice Cranston calls Rousseau a “republican” rather than a “democrat.”
149
 472 Cf. for a similar argument: Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation.”
 473 See Cranston (1968) “Introduction [to Rousseau’s Social Contract],” p. 38.
 474 “Thus, although the government may regulate its interior discipline as it pleases, it 
can never speak to the people except in the name of the sovereign, that is, in the name of 
the people itself – something that must never be forgotten.” Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 
114
 475 Cranston, Noble Savage, p. 309.
 476 “If children understood reason they would not need education, but by talking to 
them from their earliest age in a language they do not understand you accustom them to 
be satisfied with words, to question all that is said to them, to think themselves as wise as 
their teachers; you train them to be argumentative and rebellious; and whatever you think 
you gain from motives of reason, you really gain from greediness, fear, or vanity with 
which you are obliged to reinforce your reasoning.” Rousseau, Émile, Book II.
 477 “Moral dimensions have no precise standard of measurement; even if we could 
agree about signs, how should we agree on their value?” Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 
130.
 478 Rousseau’s approach in this respect has indeed similarities with Aristotle’s. 
 479 Rousseau’s adage is: “Live your own life and you will be no longer wretched. Keep 
to your appointed place in the order of nature and nothing can tear you from it.”
 480 Rousseau, Social Contract, Book IV, Ch. 8, p. 186.
















The Rise of Politics as Will Formation: The 
Instrumentalization of Public Reason
8.1 Introduction
I have explained the rise of modern politics by focusing on a triple relation between 
the subject and what lies “outside:” the world (in an existential relation), authority 
(in a political relation), and finally, humankind (in a moral relation). I have argued 
that—through the work of Kant—the moral public/private distinction has come to 
overshadow the other two notions of publicness: the public use of reason has been 
depicted both as the ground of human existence and as the very source of legitimate 
public authority. In this final chapter, by introducing the political thoughts of Marx, 
Mill, and Dewey (sections 8.3-8.5), I explain how the domination of the moral 
public/private distinction has obscured both existential and political publicness. 
Put differently, the political subject is misleadingly characterized by his moral 
publicness: his ability to publicly transform his private inclinations becomes the 
source of state legitimacy. This has led to what I call the public sphere’s double 
bind: besides being a moral educator the public sphere is seen as the provider of 
political legitimacy.
8.2 Kant: The reconciliation of public reason
According to Kant, there is no difference in principle between morality and law. 
The way the subject evaluates a maxim is the archetype of how principles of public 
right are to be evaluated. Kant is a liberal individualist: he draws a straight line 
from the moral subject to the political domain. The realization of civil harmony lies 
in the capacity of the subject to look beyond his or her empirical wishes for private 
happiness, while following his belief in the reason of law. Still, despite Kant’s 
optimistic, historicist perspective, he is aware of the formidable gap that still exists 
between the civil and the political—but he refers the incongruence to the fallible 
subject, whose ambitions often overpower the love for reason. 
 Habermas takes up the Kantian gap between civil morality and public law. He 
points out that Kant’s conception of the public use of reason is formalist and empty 
and contends that it cannot really deal with the phenomena. A belief in the long-
term effect of the public use of reason only makes sense, Habermas thinks, within 
a specific material context in which individuals can actually use their reason—a 
proper income, education, and health. The civil status of using reason thus needs to 
come under the scrutiny of public reasoning itself. Habermas: 
[I]n so far as the natural basis of the juridical condition as such was 

















n problematic, the establishment of such a condition—which to this point 
has been treated as a precondition for a moral politics—was itself to be 
made the content and task of politics. A new function would thereby also 
accrue to the public sphere which was to keep politics in harmony with the 
laws of morality—a function which it would ultimately be impossible to 
accommodate within the Kantian system.481
Kant, however, vigorously opposes the materialization of reason on the grounds that 
it goes against the idea of reason itself. He argues that the sensation of freedom that 
accompanies the subject’s self-image as a reasonable being ought to be sufficient in 
any circumstances. To reason empirically or technically, based on the vagaries of 
circumstance, cannot dictate morals; if it did, it would suggest that human freedom 
was conditional and based on private, contingent preferences.
Hence everything that is empirical is, as a contribution to the principle of 
morality, not only wholly unsuitable for the purpose, but is even highly 
injurious to the purity of morals; for in morals the proper worth of an 
absolutely good will, a worth elevated above all price, lies precisely in 
this—that the principle of action is free from all influence by contingent 
ground.482 
Accordingly, the conflict between private and public reason itself should not be 
transposed to the political level and made an object of public law, lest it make 
law and morals merely instrumental to happiness. Although the civil conflict is the 
moral foundation of the social contract, public authority, as the representative of 
the general will, cannot intervene into this process. The moral conflict must remain 
civil; public right must remain formal. The intervention of public authority in civil 
welfare will lead not only to unwanted paternalism but to the materialization of 
public law. Kant wishes to exclude the dialectic between the good and the right 
from the political arena.483 Law cannot be misused for private goals, for otherwise 
the constitution “suspends the entire freedom of subjects, who thenceforth have no 
rights whatsoever.”484 
 According to Kant the social contract holds that within the political order, 
people will deal individually with the conflict between experience and reason while 
also accepting the rule of law for the sake of maintaining the political order. Kant 
believes that the subject will accept the gap between the righteous generality of 
public law and the difficult particularity of civil existence.485 Despite our everyday 
confrontation with the crude contingency of the natural world, God’s gift of reason 
should put us in touch with a free world that the force of nature cannot take away. 
This belief, Kant predicts, will also be the motivation to further develop our skills. 
Despite the brutality of nature, we should thank God for the worldly challenge He 
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has given us.486 In the end, the reasonableness and truth of public law cannot be 
empirically forced nor collectively administrated—only subjectively revealed.487 
Although based in reason, existential sentimentality still has a crucial task to fulfill 
in Kant’s theory: to maintain the subjects’ faith in public right.
8.3 Marx: The politicization of public reason
Karl Marx rejects Kant’s conclusion. Although he upholds Kant’s metaphysical 
distinction between natural necessity and rational freedom, progress for Marx 
means overcoming the distinction by converting reason into action.488 Marx’s 
stress on realizing the promise of reason brings about two important changes in the 
modernist public/private distinctions: first, formal reason (Vernunft) should follow 
empirical reason (Verstand); second, public authority should intervene into the civil 
order to increase morality.
 To Marx, the realization of man’s status as a universal subject can begin 
only when he is in control of the natural order. His confrontation with his natural 
limitations should not become an excuse for moral subjectivity; quite the contrary, 
it should motivate him to take nature’s challenge on and try to objectify and adapt 
the natural surrounding to his needs. Marx calls for technology to free man’s natural 
dependence: the ideal of freedom will become reality only after the phenomena 
themselves have been dealt with by reason.489 “Freedom … can only consist in 
the socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange 
with Nature, bringing it under common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the 
blind forces of Nature.”490 Although Kant and Marx operate in the same ontological 
framework, desiring to overcome the antagonism between man and nature in 
the light of man’s destiny as a “species-being,” they have different ideas about 
realizing this goal.491 Kant believes that ultimate well-being lies in both the moral 
transformation and the political reconciliation of the nature/reason antagonism, 
while Marx explores its political transformation.492
 In contrast to Kant’s belief in the harmonic qualities of public reason at a civil 
level, Marx sees public reason as an ideological construction of private interests, 
and he sees civil society as the institutionalized aggregation of these interests.493 The 
liberal relation between formal equality in the public sphere and actual freedom in 
the private sphere works only for the culturally well-educated commodity owner. In 
reality, the vast majority of people do not fit this socioeconomic category. Observing 
this great discrepancy between civil reality and public right, Marx concludes that, 
for the majority, the idea of subjective freedom defined by publicly using one’s 
reason is mere ideology:
Far from the rights of man conceiving of man as a species-being, species-life 
itself, society appears as a framework exterior to individuals, a limitation 
of their original self-sufficiency. The only bond that holds them together is 

















n natural necessity, need, and the private interest, the conservation of their 
property and egoistic person.494 
In order to take seriously the Enlightenment ideal of moral self-realization, it would 
be necessary to deal with civil injustice itself.495 
 To be sure, Marx’s response to Kant is in line with Kant’s framework of 
politics as will formation—although Marx’s is a radical interpretation. Marx 
materializes and politicizes the Kantian clash between self-interest and altruism. The 
moral distinction between the public and the private use of reason transforms into 
a political dialectic between private and public interests. Marx desires to politicize 
the civil order in order to technically control natural phenomena and realize the 
idea of public reason.496 Marx returns to the social contract and dismisses its formal, 
Kantian—or more general, liberal—interpretation, which, he says, has neutralized 
the distinction between society and state. By literally abstracting from all of civil 
society’s material and cultural aspects, Kant has given civil society an apolitical 
status.497 The political public/private distinction provides for a general and formal 
system of justice, on the basis of an empty moral understanding of man, Marx 
argues. Kant has ideologically linked public law to the idea of the public sphere, 
which in turn he understands as “the community sphere, the general concern of the 
people, in principle independent from these particular elements of civil life.”498 
 Marx argues that the liberal formula that the justification of the social 
contract should be based on the use of public reason can only be proven by an 
empirical analysis of the civil community. Such an analysis would reveal both 
whose general concern is actually at stake and how this concern is represented 
by public authority. According to Marx, though, it is clear that both the public 
articulation of the general interest and its political representation are determined by 
group interest. Marx therefore seeks to close the gap in the political public/private 
distinction, which requires a politicization of moral action.499 The remodeling of the 
political community would be necessary in order to take seriously Kant’s idea of 
the universal subject; such a revision would require the oppressed classes to seize 
political power.500 If the proletariat wins the “battle of democracy,” as Marx and 
Engels call it, class interest will cease to be the motor of political power, and politics 
will be neutralized again. In Marx’s philosophy, “the state” is a temporary concept, 
and if its civil contradictions are eliminated through collective action, the logical 
result is its “withering away.” As Habermas writes, the communist integration of 
the civil and the political would shatter the unjust foundations of the state and bring 
to light a purely civil sphere: “In this sphere, the informal and personal interaction 
of human beings with one another would have been emancipated for the first time 
from the constraints of social labor (ever a ‘realm of necessity’) and become really 
‘private.’”501 Communism means true civil harmony, the ultimate realization of the 
Kantian subject through a political intervention.
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 Marx’s critique of liberalism never resulted in the communist dream (not 
counting its many tyrannical twentieth-century bastards), but the main points of 
his theory came to play a crucial role in later political discussions. Although the 
political organization of civil society happened within the confines of the state—
without destroying it after all502—Kant’s and Rousseau’s readings of the political 
public/private distinction did find themselves reinterpreted. The politicization of 
society that Marx argued for did become a reality, although in a different fashion.503 
While it was assumed by liberalism that loyalty to the social contract would hold fast 
(facilitated by a system of social and political rights), the political administration 
of society and the moral organization of the polity became new priorities. Both 
processes became part of the social realization of the social contract—the upshot of 
the moral idea of mankind as a community. Both processes further intensified and 
instrumentalized the moral public/private distinction.
8.4 Mill: The civilization of public reason
Like Marx, John Stuart Mill understands the use of public reason empirically, but 
unlike Marx, he accepts the social contract. Mill entertains a moral instrumentalism 
that should civilize politics. He argues that Kant’s transcendental conception of 
the categorical imperative is empty and has thus no practical use. The mere idea 
of the public use of reason cannot create a real balance between private and public 
preferences or interests, a problem Mill deems part and parcel of modern society. 
In the era of revolutions, Mill argues, the idea of public reason might have justified 
the moral foundations of the political community, but as a way to assess a bundle 
of private interests in the light of arriving at a public interest, it is useless. Hence, 
Mill writes, “[t]o give any meaning to Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must 
be, that we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might 
adopt with the benefit to their collective interest.”504 The only sensible interpretation 
of the general will would be that it is in the interest of each person to actually 
follow the rule because it will benefit him. Having merely a subjective belief in the 
rightness of a rule, maxim, or law is insufficient; its value needs to be determined 
by empirically testing its consequences.505
 With Mill, the liberal idea of liberty as we know it, first appears: to be free 
to live life as one wishes within the civil order. Mill shares Benjamin Constant’s 
enthusiasm for a modern liberty that emphasizes the individual, but Mill gives it a 
social character, insisting that we as subjects are free to pursuing our good and to 
deliberate and explain our concept of it—but only “[s]o long as we do not attempt to 
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”506 To put it differently, 
Mill is the first to explicitly formulate the modern condition of pluralism—with a 
firm belief, to be sure, that people in the end do want to put their altruism first. The 
individual is free to seek happiness in his own way, yet he needs to understand that 
his actions will be judged according to their consequences. If the consequences are 

















n harmful, then the state (representing the collective good) has a right to prevent the 
individual from further actions. This implies that the individual should be socially 
educated so that he will learn how to act responsibly by anticipating such public 
sanctions.507
  Mill’s concept of public reason foreshadows pragmatist politics and extends 
the Kantian primacy of the moral public/private distinction. It is an intensification of 
the idea of politics as will formation. Mill disregards the notions both of existential 
sentimentality and of the political commitment, by tying them to the moral discourse 
about balancing private and public preferences. 
 For Mill, metaphysics is over. In contrast to Kant and Marx, Mill rejects 
the dualism between reason and nature.508 Both Kant and Marx believed that a 
fulfillment of man’s fate comes in the struggle between nature and reason, to Mill, 
however, the opposition between the “Liberty of the Will” and “Philosophical 
Necessity” is dead wrong: man’s striving should be fully focused on controlling his 
resources (within a framework of right). Man’s struggle is not about coping with 
the idea of freedom in the midst of the forces of nature, but using these forces in 
order to get the right results. Likewise, Mill is not interested in the philosophical ins 
and outs of constituting the political community. The political horizon has changed 
drastically with the advent of liberal democracies, so there is no need to worry about 
the metaphysical intricacies of establishing and preserving the body politic based 
on the principle of popular sovereignty.509 The principle of democratic sovereignty, 
firmly established and solidified with “the recognition of certain immunities” 
(rights) and “the establishment of constitutional checks,” bounds the governing 
power.510 Although Mill concurs with Marx that, in reality, the idea of the general 
will is merely the public articulation of private interests by fluctuating majorities, 
Mill believes the accomplishment of the collective good can be reached within the 
liberal political constitution.
 We may recall that Rousseau related the importance of the political pact to 
the notion of existential sentimentality. It pointed to the inherent limit of human 
reason and thus to the moral success of the dynamics between private and public 
reason as well. Due to the impossibility of constituting the social contract through a 
process of moral will formation, the political pact was to rest on the assumption of 
its very inevitability, which necessitated the alienation of the subject. To Rousseau, 
the modern idea of human existence determined the democratic form of political 
existence. According to Mill, however, the prime political matter is achieving 
the greater good through public morality while still protecting individual liberty. 
The political issue is essentially a moral question of will formation. This is why, 
in On Liberty, he calls his topic “Civil, Social Liberty.”511 Mill seeks to strike a 
balance between private and public interests in the midst of growing governmental 
power, widespread public organization of private interests, and the unfolding of 
public opinion. Mill downplays the importance of the political commitment and 
157
prioritizes the moral one. As a result, he turns to the moral organization of the 
political community.
 Mill’s conception of social liberty redefines not only the political but also 
the existential public/private distinction. Civil anxiety arises not from an existential 
clash between rationality and non-rationality but from a tension between individual 
creativity and social conformity. According to Rousseau, existential publicness 
entailed the subject’s sentimental relation with his worldly existence, projected in 
society. Mill reintroduces the idea of civil anxiety, but in quite a different way from 
Rousseau. Because Mill believes in a wide variety of human creative modes as an 
expression of freedom, he argues for an individual realm free from interference. 
Unlike Rousseau’s (and Kant’s) conception of individuality as a relation with 
existence, Mill’s is a civil individuality, depicted as a private way of life and a 
source of creativity in the midst of growing social conformity. To Rousseau, 
freedom first and foremost was existential and non-rational, an essential condition 
of modernity as seen from a pre-civilized point of view. Mill’s central question is 
how the individual can be given the privacy to realize himself as a creative and 
social being. Mill expects the consequence of individual liberty to be diversity 
of opinion, a situation that should increase the chance of moral progress. He is a 
convincing moralist, in the end, and thinks liberty is instrumental to morals.512 In 
Considerations on Representative Government Mill speaks unrestrained:
It is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men’s ordinary 
life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. 
Their work is a routine; not a labor of love, but of self-interest in the most 
elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; … in most cases, the 
individual has no access to any person of cultivation much superior to his 
own. Giving him something to do for the public supplies, in a measure, 
all these deficiencies. If circumstances allow the amount of public duty 
assigned him to be considerable, it makes him an educated man.513 
It is the publicity imperative that Mill formulates: man should be liberated from the 
drag of his private existence by improving his use of reason. He must get in contact 
with the public cause, with human culture, and taste the fruits of his Liberty.
8.5 Dewey: The instrumentalization of reason
Compared to John Dewey’s understanding of the “problem of the public,” Mill’s 
moral concerns were only preludes to a further instrumentalization of the public 
use of reason. Dewey radicalizes Mill’s reformulation of the moral private/public 
distinction by founding politics on the deliberative process of defining public interest. 
Like Mill, Dewey shows no political interest either in existential sentimentality or 
in the political commitment. Although Mill and Dewey both have a liberal aversion 

















n to paternalism, they are convinced that it is politically necessary to morally educate 
the public—but without metaphysics. Dewey shows a similar fear about the private 
use of reason; he is as cynical about the asocial subject as was the later Mill.514 As 
the lower social strata started to emancipate themselves—just as the third estate had 
done a century before—education became a crucial means to train public virtue. 
 But in contrast to Dewey, Mill feared that the public use of reason could 
very easily turn against individuals.515 So, although he agreed on the importance 
of improving the “morality of public discussion,”516 he was even more committed 
to securing plurality and creativity.517 The existence of individual creativity was 
essential in order to update and refresh the process of public discussion, since the 
possibility of conformism always loomed. Dewey’s perspective is different from 
Mill’s, then, because Dewey is more focused on a characterization or definition for 
the concept of publicness. He makes the basic distinction “between private and public 
actions, that is, actions that have direct consequences, only affecting those who do 
the transaction, on the one hand, and indirect consequence, that is extending beyond 
the transacting people, on the other.”518 While Mill was especially concerned with 
protecting individual creativity in the midst of growing public conformity, Dewey 
finds such caution only confusing, since there is no civil conflict to begin with. 
There is only obscurity and prejudice in human thought, a problem that publicity 
can solve. 
 Dewey is much less concerned than Mill with preserving a place for the 
individual in a growing social environment, simply because Dewey’s epistemology 
of will formation is intrinsically social. He locates the use of reason within a process 
of discussion and interaction, arguing that returning “to a condition of independence 
based on isolation” is impossible.519 Solving the problem of the public requires 
a progressive deliberative strategy, which is to recognize the reality of social 
interdependencies: “The only solution [is] the perfecting of the means and ways of 
communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of 
interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action.”520 
To find a balance between private and public interests is a collective problem. The 
public needs to become conscious of being a public.521
 So, according to Dewey, there is no inherent opposition between the 
individual and the public, because individual actions have social consequences 
and, conversely, social occurrences influence individuals. Individual actions are 
not necessarily opposed to the public good, and well-intentioned social actions 
can have harmful effects.522 Like Mill, Dewey’s standpoint is anti-essentialist; as a 
true pragmatist, he rejects a dualist stance to the world. He proclaims—not without 
some arrogance523—that his approach is an alternative both to the individualism 
of the liberal utilitarians and to the collectivism of neo-Hegelian idealists. Both 
philosophies are parochial and old-fashioned, caught up in deep metaphysical 
descriptions of social categories.524 Terms such as society, individual, or state are 
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all empty, it depends how they are operationalized and made object for public 
discussion: “In the concrete, there are societies, associations, groups of an immense 
number of kinds, having different ties and instituting different interests.”525 We 
see here the great influence of Dewey on the philosophy of social constructivism: 
meaning can only be established by practical application made public.
 The public/private distinction, in this respect, is no more than a conceptual 
tool to think about how to deal appropriately with the social construction of 
the world. Following Marx, Dewey interprets the public/private concept as a 
distinction between the technical, or empirical, and moral uses of reason, between 
constructing reality and publicly deliberating norms that legitimize that construct. 
The social sciences are to a great degree like the natural sciences, Dewey argues, 
since both disciplines deal with facts (behavioral facts, in the case of the social 
sciences). The problem, however, is the interpretation of such “social facts.”526 
Dewey holds that they should be judged according to their consequences, because 
individuals’ thoughts and actions are social, namely, “the consequence of their 
behaviour upon that of others and that of others upon themselves.”527 Complicating 
the issue, however, is that people value these consequential facts differently. The 
social construction of meaning is still private, according to Dewey, because it is 
influenced by unsophisticated interests and desires. Dewey says that people are 
often “not wholly informed by reasoned purpose and deliberate choice—far from 
it—but they are more or less amenable to them.” That is why political philosophy 
needs to deal not just with the social facts, but with finding a normative consensus 
concerning their interpretation, which is “the question of de jure: the question of by 
what right, the question of legitimacy.”528
 How is such a normative consensus about the public interest to be 
understood? How can government legitimately intervene to establish public 
interest? Since Dewey rejects any a priori categorization—on the grounds of the 
social construction of reality and of value pluralism—he concentrates instead on 
the process of public deliberation. His criterion for understanding consensus and 
judging it is that the “perception of the consequences of a joint activity and of the 
distinctive share of each element in producing it [creates] a common interest….”529 
Obviously, this perceiving of consequences is more easily said than done—which 
is why the process of deliberation requires some very capable members of the 
public, who feel both an awareness of the social artificiality of their perception 
and a responsibility to participate in the creation of a common interest. Getting 
the social construction of reality right is a big responsibility. As the saying goes, 
democracy is not for fearful people. Dewey laments, though, the problem of the 
public: its great inertia in the face of so much possibility. “What has happened to 
the Public in the century and a half since the theory of political democracy was 
urged with such assurance and hope?”530 The public is easily manipulated, “still 
largely inchoate and unorganized.”531 It is lagging behind technological progress 

















n and needs to grow up quickly. The moral advance of society is disproportionate 
to its scientific progress. Just as it should take on the power to control and change 
the material environment, the public should morally empower itself in order to 
become a body of strong citizens that checks its government. The sheer magnitude 
of unintended and indirect consequences that arise with the coming of “the Great 
Society” makes it necessary for will-formation processes to become coordinated 
and public. It is important, therefore, to strive for publicity, so that people can come 
to understand the consequences of their actions and deeds: “There can be no public 
without full publicity in respect to all consequences which concern it. Whatever 
obstructs and restricts publicity, limits and distorts public opinion and checks and 
distorts thinking on social affairs.”532 Democratic will formation must be public in 
both senses of the word: it must be open, and it must be owned by the populace. 
That is what democracy is about: a moral energy that should permeate the whole of 
society and organize the political community. “[Democracy] must affect all modes 
of association, the family, the school, industry, religion.”533 According to Dewey, 
democracy is a program of collective self-help: people need to open themselves up 
do it through discussion and sharing.
 To Dewey, the problem of the public cuts both ways. Alongside being 
poorly educated and incapable of articulating itself well, the public has difficulties 
with representing itself politically. And since the state should not be seen as an 
impersonal, metaphysical entity in the first place, but as an organization made up 
by actual persons, the public should become conscious of its political power to hold 
officers of the state accountable. The political task of the public is both to articulate 
its interests by choosing the right candidates and to judge whether those elected to 
public office do in fact take good care of the public’s interests. 
Dewey does not believe that what is good for the public is present in every 
subject, as Kant and Rousseau did (in their own ways). Dewey argues that, according 
to those authors, the social contract was an agreement between “single human 
beings and a collective impersonal will.”534 According to Dewey, such an idea of 
unconditional political commitment of the subject is not only completely abstract 
but potentially oppressive. It is not a legitimate justification for governmental 
action, which should be based instead on the “authority of recognized consequences 
to control behavior….”535 The authority of state action is legitimate only when it 
is based on publicly acknowledged goals, to which elected officials must remain 
loyal.536 In the end, the state is only the result of a well-organized public, just as “the 
public is a political state” itself.537 
The political interpretation of the moral dynamic between the private 
and public use of reason increases the role of the government, which is permitted 
to legitimately intervene in the social habitats of the people. The way Dewey 
perceives governmental intervention is telling: what is considered “public” first 
should be identified, and then the authority of the state should be legitimated in 
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relation to the way it deals with these identified public interests. Therefore, “the 
line between private and public is to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope 
of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether 
by inhibition or by promotion.”538 Put differently, the state comes into action as 
the representative of any part of the public that is “distinctive enough to require 
recognition and a name” and that is indirectly and seriously affected—for good or 
bad—by the actions of others.539 The public sphere is the platform where parts of 
the public apply for state recognition.
8.6 Conclusion
On the issue of popular sovereignty, scholars such as Althusius, Locke, Rousseau, 
and Kant all emphasize the great delicacy of maintaining the balance between 
the centrifugal force of popular will formation and the centripetal force of state 
authority. Although they offer varying definitions, these scholars agree that the 
public is supreme and gives the state its authority. The crucial issue, however, is not 
so much how to defend the idea of popular sovereignty as such—which, morally, is 
rather indestructible—but how this idea is politically organized. This is the question 
of politics as jurisdiction versus politics as will formation. 
 As I have argued in the former chapter, Rousseau most influentially analyzed 
the tension between civil freedom and public authority. Historically, his political 
theory can be placed right at the junction of both political paradigms. In the end, 
Rousseau thinks that only respecting a strict distinction between civil freedom and 
public authority can preserve the idea of popular sovereignty. With the introduction 
of political voluntarism, however, the role of the public itself in governmental rule 
became an issue. Public authority was based on the process of public will formation. 
While Rousseau formulated a notion of the general will, he refused to suggest that 
it be either the consequence of will formation or the instrument of governmental 
authority.540  The general will represented the political commitment and was not to 
be transformed into a process of will formation providing for state legitimacy. The 
legal connection between civil society and the general will was established by the 
legislator not by the citizen himself. Guided by the spirit of the general will, the 
lawgiver represented the people in accordance with the “simplicity of nature” and 
“the needs that society creates.”541  To Rousseau, the executive—government—was 
an administrative intermediary, responsible for the execution of decrees in conformity 
with public law. The legislator was the pivotal political agent amid popular will 
and state authority. Kant was as aware as Rousseau of the danger of harmonizing 
state authority with the people’s will. He therefore formalized public law, believing 
that it would bring peace within the citizen (reasonable reconciliation). Due to the 
formality of the political commitment, the moral conflict could not be brought 
to the political level itself, for public law would be undermined from two sides, 
by both state interventionism and private will formation. Kant, however, unlike 

















n Rousseau, did tie public law to the idea of moral self-legislation and the public use 
of reason. This move provided the theoretical groundwork to “activate” public law 
for scholarly generations to come, by making the moral conflict between private and 
public reason politically instrumental. And that is what happened. With the coming 
of the Great Society, the moral conflict was translated as a political dynamic between 
the impact of economy and technology, on the one hand, and moral deliberation by 
the public, on the other.542 Just as the individual needed reason to control his or her 
private inclinations, the democratic state depended on public discussion to control 
and temper economic and technological development. Dewey: “[P]ositive freedom 
is not a state but an act which involves methods and instrumentalities for control of 
conditions.”543 
 It is possible to illustrate the political instrumentalization of public reason 
by examining the position of the public sphere. The forum/market distinction has 
become the compass of will formation, with the public sphere being the place where 
a capable public decides about its welfare. On the one hand, the formulation of 
public interest occurs in the public sphere, stimulated by a moral discourse, on 
the other, governmental intervention puts unseen pressure on the public sphere. 
Public deliberation is moral and political. The result is what I call the double 
bind of the public sphere: public discussion is expected to politically articulate 
popular sovereignty, while at the same time popular sovereignty is challenged 
by governmental intervention. A political understanding of the public sphere 
accords with the deliberative model of democracy, which supports a discursive and 
instrumental model of democratic will formation. The model is discursive because 
the political process is based on public deliberation; it is instrumental because the 
political purpose of public deliberation is concentrated on the realization of social 
justice and democratic legitimacy. Yet this way of understanding the democratic 
meaning of the public sphere does not hold. The public sphere is not a deliberative 
problem solver of political issues. Attempting to increase cultural integration, 
educate a capable public, control economic development, etc., by invoking public 
deliberation brings confusion to different aspects of democratic publicness. The 
public sphere has become smothered in incongruous aspirations and has imploded 
into a communicative vacuum: there is a lot of political talk, without actually 
empowering the self-reflective and self-organizing qualities of civil society itself. 
A first step to bring back the public sphere to the people is by distinguishing again 
between existential, moral and political publicness.
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n between liberal individualism and “social collectivism,” a familiar middle road 
characterization by deliberative democracy. See the Introduction, above.
 525 Dewey, Public, p. 69.
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  543  Dewey, Public, p. 168.
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CONCLUSION
Someone romantic is said to be sensitive to life’s unexpected turns. He knows that 
there is more than meets the eye. In our age it is not very hip to be romantic, though; 
better is a sense of assertiveness, the readiness to give an opinion, to self-assuredly 
work one’s way into the future, and to give priority to a dynamic lifestyle.
 Similarly, relating politics to romanticism is just not done. It would seem to 
hark back to the dark years of idealist politics in which the individual was sacrificed 
for the Greater Good. The tenor today is that politics is a serious business, in need 
of people who get things done. Politics cannot be in denial of life; it needs to step 
up to the plate, take on the challenges of an open society, and stay away from 
daydreaming.
 Actually, I think it makes sense to aspire to be a political romantic. Since 
many things in life are difficult to predict, explain, and manage, politics without 
some magic and myth belittles reality. Politics encompasses a lot, but there is much 
that it cannot contend with. The language of politics speaks about real people 
and real things, yet is vastly abstract. Putting experiences in an understandable 
language, let alone sharing these descriptions with others, is already an art in itself. 
The virtue of understanding and communicating ideas and experiences is not so 
much a matter of rational argumentation, but more of symbolic illustration and 
narrative amplification. Reaching a modus vivendi, in this regard, is not a shameful 
compromise but an affirmation of the limitation of human rationality, the pluralism 
of human culture. There can be no true realism without some romanticism.
 Politics as jurisdiction can be said to be the conceptual implication of the 
fundamental difficulty of political unification. It is a concept about how to legally 
structure the human aspiration to share. Politics as jurisdiction is the result of the 
intricacies of human cooperation and will formation, understood from the vantage 
point of a dualistic notion of democracy: it is both “civil” and “political” for the 
people themselves to constitute the polity. 
 Civil democracy is the art of the institutionalization of will formation 
processes. It denotes the organization and institutionalization of the complexity of 
human cooperation. This implies, first of all, keeping a balance between individual 
freedom and collective unity, through an understanding of the different types of 
knowledge that are the object of sharing. Secondly, it requires appreciating the 
values of human pluriformity and institutional plurality. 
 Political democracy is the state’s authoritative organization of society in 
the name of society itself, and it follows the same balancing strategy between 
individual freedom and collective unity as civil democracy. The art of politics is 
to use authoritative means to structure civil processes of will formation in a way 














n respecting both its aspects equally—the desirability of civil self-sufficiency 
and the need for political authority.
 In this thesis, I have criticized the idea of politics as will formation 
because it assimilates both aspects of democracy. Politics is usually seen as 
a system that deals with the formation of citizens’ preferences and interests. 
Political theory, in this respect, has been narrowed down to the study of 
how to cope with the problem of preferential pluralism and diversity by 
focusing on the people’s will—their capacity to use their reason publicly 
as a counterweight against the influence of private preferences, opinions, 
or beliefs. Liberalism, in particular the Kantian idea of morality and 
Constant’s modernist interpretation of the classics, has been very influential 
in painting this picture. From the concept of the agora as the space of public 
will formation, where politics is made or broken, the concept of politics as 
will formation was born: the quest to publicly distill preferences in order to 
circumscribe “the political” in relation to a society of private individuals.
 I have further argued that the deliberative strategy to open up liberal 
politics through a kind of rational cleansing of republicanism has proven 
unsuccessful—not so much because it still results in paternalistic politics, as 
a liberal would say, or because the deliberative approach leaves out important 
types of preferences (such as the personal or aesthetic), as a republican (or 
communitarian) would say, but because the deliberative approach is only 
a redefinition of a will formation approach to politics. Political legitimacy 
is still defined, according to deliberative democracy, as the result of a 
will-formation process in which the quality of preferences is the center of 
democratic legitimacy.
 I have tried to show the inadequacy of this mode of political thinking. 
Politics understood as a process of forming the people’s will not only reduces 
politics to a public (moral) discussion but gives public discussions themselves 
a political character as well. Political theory needs to widen its point of view 
by taken into account both levels of the polity, the level of will formation 
and the level of jurisdiction. The result is a different take on the idea of 
democracy.
 Politics as jurisdiction is the development of the idea of popular 
sovereignty, and is understood as the practical organization of civil self-
sufficiency in an environment of political authority. The question that 
politics as jurisdiction asks is how to balance civil autonomy and political 
authority. Political theory, in this respect, is a controlling science, or what 
I have epistemologically called a third-order construction: it studies the 
authoritative organization of democratically institutionalized knowledge. A 
political regime can be rightfully constituted and organized only if it is clear 
what knowledge is shareable, how, and to what degree. However, knowledge 
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of will-formation processes does not constitute the polity but, instead, enables 
ruling it and also puts into perspective the justification of the public authority’s 
intervention in the institutional fabric of society. From a democratic standpoint, the 
political commitment of giving up authority to the state can be upheld only if the 
state preserves civil liberty well despite its own powers to intervene. 
 Democratic politics rests on the idea that a community freely hands over its 
private practices of will formation in allowing itself instead to be represented and 
protected by public authority. This model implies a disconnection between the civil 
and the political, because, in attaching their will-formation capabilities to political 
decision-making, the people jeopardize their civil autonomy. Because of this danger, 
public authority has a great responsibility to respect civil autonomy by representing 
the general will in practice. The model of civil democracy is essential to politics 
as jurisdiction, in this respect, as civil democracy understands the degrees of self-
sufficiency embedded in practices (or institutions) of will formation. Political 
authority does not correspond with civil autonomy. The relation between society 
and state is in tension by definition. Strong state retribution may sometimes emerge, 
in order to uphold the civil order, but so may civil anarchy, in order to unshackle the 
state’s fetters.
 I have argued that three notions of publicness are essential to adequately 
conceive of the subject’s relation to the democratic state. In building a political 
theory, we need to take into account the triple relation between the subject and 
what is outside the subject: the world (existence), society (humanity), and the state 
(authority). Although in reality every citizen is born within some sort of political 
union, his political identity, his condition of being under some authority, is artificial. 
Coming to terms with the idea of politically living together implies, therefore, 
giving equal notice to moral and existential publicness. Individuals cope with the 
world in their own ways. Their next step, so to speak, as self-interested human 
beings, is to relate with others who also have feelings, preferences, and opinions 
of their own. Although this moral notion of publicness is social, it is apolitical. It 
might lead to a desire to institute a society of people, but it cannot constitute it. 
An overlapping consensus of norms and values does not lead to political unity. 
We bond with others, yet the idea of living in a political society is fundamentally 
different, because it involves the acceptance of jurisdiction by a public authority, 
which can sometimes be unreasonable. The imagination of political democracy is 
ultimately the imagination of how, politically, to live with equal strangers under the 
protection of a public authority. This difficulty needs to be put into perspective by 
simultaneously bringing all three notions of publicness into the public debate about 
politics: the individual as a private, public, and political being. Balancing the polity 
requires taking all three identities seriously.














n This can only be a sketch, for in the end, the ambition of this book has been to 
make conceivable, from various philosophical perspectives, a different approach to 
political theory and politics. Working out the many details and intricacies of politics 
as jurisdiction is for the future. I finish here by outlining the approach that politics 
as jurisdiction provides towards a religious school.
 What would be the deliberativist’s take on a religious school? Any 
theoretical approach has to account for how such a school can be a legitimate part 
of a democratic state. The deliberative answer lies in finding out the compatibility 
between the religious reasons the school endorses and the moral reasons that are, 
or rather ought to be, the foundation of a democratic state. Rawls says that it is 
not enough that religious people accept a democratic government on the basis of 
merely strategic or prudential reasons. Likewise, Gutmann and Thompson claim 
that religious reasons can be accepted in a political discussion only if they are 
accessible to all. Such reason should be “recognizably moral in form and mutually 
acceptable in content.”544 Rawls adds that the idea of public reason “is a view about 
the kind of reasons on which citizens are to rest their political cases in making 
political justifications to one another….”545 Hence, the possibility of religious prayer 
at public schools—an example given by Rawls himself—can be morally acceptable 
only if the religious message embedded within the prayers can be seen or expressed 
in terms of a political (or moral) reason.
 To understand this deliberativist answer, recall the social-constructivist 
perspective attached to it. The deliberativist would argue that “reality” at the 
religious school is socially constructed, because religious values influence the 
private thoughts and actions of the students. He would call it politically imperative, 
consequently, to discuss publicly whether the practical influences of religious values 
in the school can be justified in a democratic society. The forum perspective comes 
in: “We” as a society need to discuss whether “we” want young children to grow up 
in a religious environment that shapes their preferences. In the end, religion is only 
acceptable if it is not obstructive to basic political values.546
 Politics as jurisdiction’s take on the issue of religion and education is different. 
In fact, the approach is precisely the other way around: the moral question about 
the rightness of religious prayer in a public school is seen as a civil matter, while 
the political question is only prudential or strategic. Allowing for religious prayer 
is not a matter of discussing whether the values expressed by the prayer can be said 
to be moral (and hence politically right), but whether religious prayer at schools is 
detrimental to the stability and unity of the polity. 
 It can be said that politics as jurisdiction is prudential for epistemological 
reasons.547 Judging the scope of political commonality means distinguishing types of 
knowledge and communication. In order to answer the question of how, politically, 
to deal with religion in education, it is pivotal to reconstruct the “communicative 
steps” taken before arriving at the question of political sharing. Speaking of 
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religious prayer as a “socially constructed reality,” and of the importance of publicly 
discussing prayer’s morality in order to establish its political validity, is easier said 
than done. A lot remains obscured, especially the inherent discrepancy between 
rationally describing religious practices (as social constructions) and the contextual 
situation of intuitive and informal interactions between teachers, children, school 
managers, etc. Without specifically distinguishing between different epistemological 
“realities,” an automatic call for public deliberation to check the moral status of 
religious prayer does grave injustice to the situation of religious schools and their 
civil status in general. Given the distinctions between the orders of construction 
(non-rational, informal, rational), public discussions about religious school practices 
should be assayed with much care.
 For that reason political jurisdiction cannot do without a theory of democratic 
will formation, that is, how individuals construct knowledge, form culture, 
institutionalize certain values etc., etc. Civil democracy in this respect—the missing 
“fourth model” of democratic will formation I distinguished from Jon Elster’s 
schema—is the idea of society as a complex of relatively self-sufficient practices 
of will formation (such as schools), in which people acquire intrinsic knowledge 
about certain life functionalities (such as education). We may assume that in these 
practices, people try to realize a certain quality of action, although, naturally, in 
reality many things will go wrong. Knowledge of this normative framework of civil 
democracy is essential to the other aspect of politics as jurisdiction: the juridical or 
authoritative regulation of civil institutions and practices. Political decisions need 
in the end to be authoritative, and it is precisely for that reason that a good grasp of 
the institutionalization of civil practices of will formation is so important. Again, 
practically giving away sovereignty to state authority is legitimate only if state 
authority is executed in line with respect for civil self-sufficiency. Why else would 
the demos put its faith in public authority?
 The purpose of a religious school is to educate the children in line with 
its idea of education. This is a democratic freedom, and attached to it are civil 
responsibilities, which can be the object of public discussion, to be sure. For instance, 
it may be expected that the school takes into account the way the children cope with 
the school practice. Epistemologically speaking, much functioning of the school 
happens at a first-order—informal—level of communication, interaction in which 
non-rational knowledge is mixed with rational knowledge. The school is a practice in 
which subjects interact within an actual and changing context, while having implicit 
understandings of the habits and rules seen from the working ground. Often these 
processes work well—or at least seem to. Potential conflicts are usually resolved 
informally, or stay below the surface. Such informal interaction and communication 
is essential for practices to function. Making things explicit all the time would 
only result in irritation, friction, or even stagnation. First-order constructions would 














n constructions, and an increase of conflict is likely. Indeed, often elements from first-
order constructions are very difficult to discuss, due to their contextual and intuitive 
quality. Conversely, however, continuous pressure to reconstruct second-order 
constructions by appeal to insights of first-order interaction and communication 
would undermine the stabilizing function of second-order constructions. It is thus 
important to preserve qualities of both first and second-order constructions, because 
participants in a practice need both orders of construction: the freedom to interact 
informally, and a clear set of rules as mechanisms for benchmarking and indicating 
first order constructions. In sum, these epistemological insights support the values 
of both institutional plurality and human uniformity. A social institution is often 
much better equipped to deal with the formation of preferences and capabilities of 
individuals in a weak than in a strong political context of unification.
 Now, say a meeting is called between the teaching staff and school board 
at such a school. How could a discussion within the school be characterized? I 
would call it a public discussion in a private environment. Daily interactions and 
experiences in the school are discussed and related to how things are regulated. 
The intention of the teaching staff is to bring out the best conception of the school 
practice, which may result in the suggestion to adjust certain rules. The school board, 
however, would be inclined to bring first-order practices more in line with school 
rules. This governing body feels a responsibility to keep the system of rules intact, 
not only because it wants to realize certain goals stated there (such as graduating the 
children, teaching them religious values, keeping up discipline), but also because it 
is focused on preserving its authority as such. At the same time, however, the board 
needs to respect and understand the discussion about the relation between first-
order practices and school rules. The quality of education, after all, is embedded 
in the first-order practices of the school. Such a public discussion is an important 
asset in the school’s institutionalization process. It can be said that the school board, 
teaching staff, and students seek a common appreciation and understanding of the 
quality of the school practice and of how it should be organized. By rationalizing the 
contextual knowledge of first-order practices, perhaps in relation to second-order 
rules, a body of knowledge is constructed that gives the school a certain identity 
and direction. Such collective knowledge lies mostly beyond the empirical, and 
has a more metaphysical or symbolic status: based on intrinsic knowledge of the 
school practice, it gives a sense of school direction and identity to all members. The 
public discussion within the school about things like student-teacher relations or 
the balance between theory and practice in classes has a regulatory function, yet in 
a loose or conceptual sense. The discussion is interpreted differently by individual 
school members, while the nature of the insights forbids a purely behaviorist 
execution by way of an induced rule. 
 The religious school’s internal discussion becomes more public if the school, 
for instance, sets up a project with a secular school in the neighborhood. Say that the 
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purpose of this joint venture is to let school pupils exchange thoughts about certain 
life questions (birth, death, health, sickness) and to relate them to certain concrete 
issues (play, sports, books, TV shows). Perhaps, as a result of this project, both 
schools will make modifications in their programs and lessons due to reciprocal 
insights. What would be the status of that result? I would call such an exchange 
public between two private practices in the civil sphere.
 The next phase in civil communication could be called a public discussion at 
a civil level—the “classical” public-sphere discussion. Someone on the school board 
could be invited to a discussion that is open to the public with other educational 
representatives, for instance, about the relation between religion and education. A 
diversity of institutional knowledge about the religious school itself would meet 
comparable institutionalized knowledge of other schools, but perhaps also of other 
agencies in the educational field, like civil servants, parents, religious leaders, or 
economic developers for that matter. The public discussion in this civil setting has 
a new object, therefore—to relate all the different bodies of knowledge concerning 
the issue at hand with the issue of how to organize education in society.
 The important difference between a public discussion between two private 
practices in the civil sphere, and a public discussion in the civil sphere as such, 
is that the latter discussion needs to abstract from the specific contexts of the 
schools and other institutions in question. Although the body of public-sphere 
knowledge refers as much to the schools themselves (and other agencies) as to 
society in general, the main purpose of the knowledge generated is to have a general 
understanding of the social value of education (in relation to religion). Of course, 
the particular interests of the parties involved will be voiced in the discussion, yet 
they cannot be brought into the discussion as mere interests, but as ways of doing, 
as the practices of a certain culture. A public-sphere discussion can be said to be a 
narrative in which the parties explain their traditions and conventions in relation to 
a greater civil value. The result is a plural picture of educational narratives, to be 
sure. The specific value of a public-sphere discussion is that, despite the plurality of 
educational narratives (based on different institutional experiences), an educational 
commonality develops, and it develops precisely because the discussion is not a 
competition between interests as such. It may be expected that the participants of 
the discussion ought to respect this plurality, since that is what living in democracy 
is about. Yet the creation of a common mind concerning education is important 
as well, for virtuous reasons such as as solidarity, empathy, understanding, and 
tolerance.
 Indeed, this sort of public discussion is where deliberative democracy invests 
much value, and, to be sure, that is a good thing—leaving aside the crucial issues 
of both the discussion’s political status and its epistemological status. To begin with 
the latter caveat, it is important not to confuse the epistemological status of public-














n of publicness—within the religious school, between the two schools, and between 
the religious school and other stakeholders—does not run parallel to an increase 
in their moral status. A discussion within the religious school itself concerning the 
role of religion in education is not morally inferior to a public-sphere discussion 
about that same topic, as if a lesser quality of knowledge were reached in the 
former discussion. Without substantial knowledge about human action in a certain 
institutional setting, no general discussion is possible in the first place. On the other 
hand, such knowledge is valuable only if it is related to public-sphere discussions 
that create a social body of knowledge about institutional plurality. Public-sphere 
stakeholders must find a common vocabulary to discuss institutional plurality, one that 
is analogous to the symbolic knowledge that institutes a religious school. Although 
the point of view is different, there is no principal difference between private and 
public justice. The discussions are epistemologically different, not worse or better. 
In contrast to the depiction of deliberative democrats, then, deliberative democracy 
holds that public-sphere discussions should not be seen as moral competitions right 
from the start—although they may end there. The market/forum distinction between 
“private conceptions of the good” versus “public conceptions of justice” gives the 
discussion a misconceived purpose and the discursive (public) component of the 
discussion a misplaced superior status. Understanding the civil status of education 
requires gaining private knowledge, in one way or another, about the contextual 
ins and outs of educational institutions. The liberal distinction between private and 
public preferences, which is still fundamental in the deliberativist’s vocabulary, 
instrumentalizes private preferences by transforming their contextuality and 
materiality into public reasons. Only after this process of laundering can private 
preferences, according to deliberative democracy, attain a moral status and become 
part of political rule-making. The result is a distortion of both public and political 
reasoning.
 Public discussions in the civil sphere are politically important because they 
classify insights about institutional realities concerning all sorts of processes of 
will formation. From the perspective of the political public/private distinction, such 
discussions remain private, however. This is the jurisdictional approach’s second 
difference from deliberative democracy. Public-sphere discussions are directed 
to the way society itself wants to define and organize education by classifying 
institutional realities—relating concrete insights of the practice to general ideas 
about a practice in a civil context—and vice versa, relating general ideas to practical 
insights. Although the art of giving jurisdiction to society is dependent on such dual 
knowledge, political discussions in public spheres about education and religion are 
different. The object of these discussions is the role of public authority—the way it 
governs, that is, facilitates and intervenes in the institutional structures of educational 
practices. This inquiry is not only a public discussion about how citizens experience 
governmental action in their civil lives, but also a very specialized discussion 
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regarding the intricate question of legally structuring the institutional web. Here the 
political commitment of the citizen meets the very responsibility of state officials 
to explain jurisdiction. This overlap implies that both (representatives of) civil 
practices and the state need to discuss how to legally structure the institutional 
framework of society so that practices can develop themselves the way they would 
like.548
 However, the state, meaning not just the government, has an independent 
authority to put all the different dynamics of civil society—those between individuals 
and institutions as well as those between institutions themselves—into law. It needs 
to pacify power relations within civil society without destroying the institutional 
environment through which civil practices organize life. The political commitment 
of the citizen is directed, then, to the acceptance of state authority, whose trust 
is based on the understanding that political authority is not the continuation of 
the moral discussion concerning the institutional organization of civil practices. 
Instead, the citizen is a subject of the law and must understand that law is necessary 
to uphold the political unity of society. Regarding the civil system of education, 
the idea of political unity represented by law entails the political unification of 
the educational system not in a moral way, but in a political way. The political 
discussion concerning education is not about how children ought to be educated 
but how to provide the legal conditions for an institutional framework that allows 
schools to educate children. This implies the preservation of political unity—the 
provision of national examinations, a basic curriculum, etc.—but not the political 
integration of moral prescriptions—singing the national anthem, teaching lessons 
on public behavior (for instance, about smoking, sex, use of the Internet)—for that 
would politicize the educational system. The moral education of children is a civil 
activity, and, keeping in mind the epistemology of acquiring and sharing knowledge, 
an intricate interplay of ethical and moral interactions.
 The double-bind position of the public sphere symbolizes the precarious 
relation between state and society. Discussions in the public sphere are caught 
between the definition of general knowledge concerning particular civil domains, 
and the value of these insights for political jurisdiction. To balance the explicit 
authority of the state to give jurisdiction implies respecting public-sphere 
discussions, because that is where the ideal of civil self-sufficiency is formulated. 
The state is certainly a speaking partner in these discussions, yet it must limit itself 
to the meaning and the limits of its jurisdiction.
In April of 2008, a Dutch parliamentary investigation committee examined three 
major 1990s reform operations in the secondary school system. The main conclusion 
of the “Dijsselbloem committee”’ was that a series of government administrations 
unfortunately mixed up political with civil goals. On the one hand, schools were 














n for instance, by the introduction of a uniform curriculum for the first three years 
of secondary school (called “basisvorming”). Ideas about didactics and education 
were made part of a political mission. Moreover, due to purposes of democratic 
legitimation, the execution of these different reforms was done by a state-sponsored 
semipolitical stratum of educational experts and professional process managers. 
The idea was that this layer could be the democratic bridge between the political 
and the civil sphere.
 The Dijsselbloem committee concluded that the political execution 
of civil norms as a form of jurisdiction was precisely the problem, for it mixed 
responsibilities. The responsibility for good education was given to a layer of 
semi-political professionals who were mandated by the government to execute 
the reform. The result was a discussion between schools and these professionals 
about the practical matters of education. Particularly, a discussion arose concerning 
the method of education. Basically, a moral conception of how children were best 
taught to form their preferences, wills, and opinions was the motor behind these 
political operations. The responsibility of government to give jurisdiction to the 
educational field—allowing it, on the one hand, to legally structure the power 
relation between educational agents and, on the other, to prescribe simple collective 
goals for education and a way to test these goals—was neglected. The commission 
stressed that the civil aspect, the matter of how children are to be educated, is a 
responsibility of schools themselves. In this respect, parents are free to choose the 
school system they prefer for their child.
Ironically, the fear of a democratic deficit in education—namely, of an 
increase in the number of unsuccessful students—turned into a real democratic 
deficit. The mandate given to the semi-political bureaucratic stratum—to bridge 
politics and civil society by means of an ongoing deliberation between the 
bureaucratic stratum (as a representative of government) and the schools—interfered 
with the qualities of both civil agencies and the state: to increase the quality of will 
formation on the one hand and of jurisdiction on the other.
(Notes)
 544 Gutmann and Thomson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 57.
 545 Rawls, “Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” p. 165.
 546 Ibid., p. 166.
 547 This epistemological perspective is wider than the one taken by Gaus when he 
states that a robust epistemological theory of justification is necessary for a political 
conception of justice. See Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, pp. 4 ff. I think Gaus is right 
to put epistemology at the center of political theory, but it should be seen from a wider, 
Aristotelean, perspective, I think. Epistemology is important in political theory because 
knowledge of political ruling implies knowledge of human functioning. This implies a 
notion of the possibility of sharing different types of knowledge.
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 548 Alongside the political discussion in the public realm, there are the public 
discussions within governmental agencies themselves concerning the role of public 
authority in relation to civil practices of will formation. These discussions could be 
called private discussions in the political realm. Obviously, this is another place where 
considerable study needs to be done in order to understand how the different governmental 
agencies relate to each other concerning the task of giving jurisdiction to different parts 
of society. Discussions in parliament, finally, have a special character, and might be called 
public discussions in the political realm. Legislators have a special status because they 
operate at the brink of society and state. On the one hand, as the people’s representatives, 
they are part of public-sphere discussions in the civil realm, and on the other, they 
have a special responsibility to connect these discussions to the task of jurisdiction. 
Parliamentarians need to be strong people, in other words, capable of explaining the 

















Sinds de jaren negentig vinden veel politieke denkers dat deliberatieve democratie 
de tegenstelling tussen het liberalisme en het republikanisme met succes heeft aan-
gevallen.549 De deliberatieve wending (deliberative turn550) in de politieke theorie 
wordt gezien als een doorbraak in een oude impasse, namelijk tussen het primaat 
van legaliteit, verdedigd door het liberalisme, en het primaat van volkssoeverei-
niteit, benadrukt door het republikanisme.551 Deliberatieven streven naar een inte-
gratie van liberale en republikeinse elementen door hun beider goede elementen te 
behouden (liberale rechtvaardigheid en republikeins burgerschap) en hun zwakke 
elementen (liberaal paternalisme en republikeins perfectionisme) te verwerpen. Zij 
zien democratische politiek als het streven naar rechtvaardigheid, maar wel in een 
redelijke, onpartijdige discussie.552 
 Deliberatieven gaan uit van democratie als zelfwetgeving, ze zien het poli-
tieke systeem als een associatie die wordt bestuurd door haar leden, het volk.553 Poli-
tieke besluiten dienen democratisch gelegitmeerd te worden, hetgeen betekent dat 
zij voorafgegaan dienen te zijn door zoveel mogelijk publieke discussie.554 Delibe-
ratieve democraten zijn doorgaans kritisch over de huidige staat van het publieke 
debat. Private belangen en de waan van de dag domineren veel discussies, terwijl 
politiek juist over reflectie en emancipatie van burgerlijke oordeelsvorming zou 
moeten gaan. Het ideaal is een politieke gemeenschap van burgers die in staat zijn 
hun private belangen en meningen in een publiek verband te brengen.555
 Centraal in het normatieve ideaal van deliberatieve democratie staat het 
onderscheid tussen politiek en marktconform handelen: de eerste vindt plaats na 
publieke discussie en opinievorming, de laatste met het oog op een efficiënte aggre-
gatie van private belangen.556 Publieke discussie is evenwel de kern van demo-
cratie en wanneer mensen het niet eens zijn met elkaar en er niet uit komen, dan 
rest er maar een ding: om de tafel zitten en met elkaar praten. Zoals Paul Scheffer 
het stelt: “Zonder een wij gaat het helemaal niet, zonder een kritische betrokken-
heid vergruist de samenleving.”557 De boodschap is duidelijk: we leven in een open 
samenleving en zijn gesteld op diversiteit en een verscheidenheid aan levenstijlen, 
maar dit ideaal kan niet zonder collectieve zelfreflectie. Omdat er geen “wij” meer 
bestaat,558 moet de uitdaging van een pluralistische cultuur gecompenseerd worden 
door kritische en publiekelijk zelfonderzoek een vooraanstaande plek in de samen-
leving te geven.559
 Op het eerste gezicht is de deliberatieve intuïtie een vanzelfsprekende, 
immers, wat is er tegen discussie in een democratie? Een ieder die zijn hart heeft 
verpand aan de algemene zaak kan moeilijk de waarde van publiek debat ontken-
nen. Waarom zou je de stelling betwisten, dat democratie niet zonder actief burger-















n Sterker nog, als democratische burgers mogen we van elkaar verlangen dat we onze 
politieke meningen toetsen aan publieke maatstaven. Politiek egoïsme is een demo-
cratische doodzonde.
 Toch wringt er iets. Moet de kloof tussen politiek en burger geslecht wor-
den en staat of valt democratische legitimiteit met actief burgerschap? Is publieke 
discussie de essentie van democratie? Als ik zelf nadenk over wat ik waardeer aan 
een democratie, is dat dan mijn betrokkenheid bij het publieke debat of juist dat ik 
dat zelf kan bepalen. Wil ik zoveel mogelijk politieke invloed uitoefenen of geef ik 
mijn mandaat liever aan politici die mijn soevereiniteit adequaat representeren en 
zorgen dat ik in vrijheid mijn private leven kan leiden door verantwoord om te gaan 
met hun macht?
 Het komt de lezer wellicht wat geforceerd of kunstmatig over om de keuze 
op deze wijze voor te stellen—maar toch is het nodig naar mijn idee. De suggestie 
kleur te bekennen refereert aan een netelige dubbele kwestie in onze tijd: de politi-
sering van het publieke debat en de popularisering van politiek. Dagelijkse politiek 
lijkt steeds meer op een media spektakel, terwijl publieke discussies automatisch 
een politieke connotatie dreigen mee te krijgen. Het politieke debat is een moreel 
meningencircuit, terwijl publieke zaken al snel met overheidsactie worden verbon-
den. Mijns inziens zijn beide fenomenen het gevolg van de deliberatieve benade-
ring die erop gestoeld is het “democratische tekort” aan te pakken.
 Het democratische tekort impliceert enerzijds, dat burgers minder goed in 
staat zijn (of steeds onwilliger worden) hun ideeën kritisch onder ogen te zien, 
en anderzijds dat politici teveel in een ivoren toren leven en moeite hebben zich 
te identificeren met het publiek. Deliberatieve democraten menen dat een hoog-
staander publieke debat beide kwalen kan indammen. Burgers zullen hun oordeels-
vermogen vergroten door te discussiëren en politici zullen meer verantwoording 
moeten afleggen.
 Ik meen dat de tijd gekomen is vraagtekens te plaatsen bij het vertrouwen 
in publieke discussie als remedie voor democratische legitimiteit. Ik stel voor om 
niet te streven naar een verdere integratie van publieke discussie en politiek, maar 
om een scherpere scheiding te trekken tussen beide. Aan de ene kant is het belang-
rijk meer vertrouwen te krijgen in de manier waarop burgers functioneren in hun 
maatschappelijke omgeving en hoe dat bijdraagt aan een democratische manier van 
leven. Aan de andere kant moet het politieke aspect van democratie benadrukt wor-
den, namelijk hoe de publieke macht op een gezaghebbende manier de maatschap-
pij bestuurt.
 Politiek handelen is een expertise, en hoewel er van uit gegaan kan worden 
dat wat onderwerp van een publieke discussie wordt, belangrijk is, is de politieke 
vertaalslag daarvan niet eenvoudig. Hoewel ik grote waarde hecht aan mijn gezond-
heid en daar ook genoeg over te zeggen heb, wil ik uiteindelijk de arts kunnen 
vertrouwen te bepalen wat juist is. Ik doe mijn best mijn gezondheid te bewaren, 
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maar uiteindelijk heb ik geen zicht op het grotere geheel. Daarom: ik draag graag 
mijn steentje bij aan het publieke debat over wat belangrijk is in de samenleving, 
maar ik weet dat het politieke perspectief complex is en niet altijd vanzelf duidelijk 
wordt in een publieke discussie. Politiek denken heeft een wijd perspectief en gaat 
over het vormgeven van een samenleving. Politiek organiseert op een wettelijke 
wijze de institutionele omgeving van maatschappelijke praktijken waarin indivi-
duen het leven vormgeven. Wordt er publiekelijk gediscussieerd over de boeken-
prijs, over de Islam, over het fileprobleem of over de kwaliteit van het onderwijs, 
dan gaat de politieke discussie erover hoe de overheid de wettelijke voorwaarden 
schept dat burgers zelf de kwaliteit van een maatschappelijke praktijk verbeteren. 
Voor politieke vertegenwoordigers (in brede zin) geldt hetzelfde: zij doen mee aan 
het publieke debat en hebben ongetwijfeld een mening klaar over een onderwerp, 
uiteindelijk dwingt de politieke functie die zij bekleden hen het morele gezichts-
punt los te laten en na te denken over de politieke inrichting van de samenleving. 
Politieke discussies zijn niet eenvoudigweg publieke discussies over wat goed is, 
en morele discussies zijn niet automatisch politieke discussies over dingen die door 
de staat geregeld moeten worden.
Dit boek onderzoekt de deliberatieve intuïtie en bekijkt haar historische wortels. 
Het is een legitieme vraag of de rechtvaardiging van het politieke systeem zo direct 
verbonden moet zijn met het publiekelijk bediscussiëren van opinies en preferen-
ties. Mijn stelling is dat de deliberatieve opvatting van politiek niet geboren is in de 
jaren zeventig, en doorontwikkeld in de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw, maar 
symptoom is van een langere ontwikkeling in de politieke theorie. Deliberatieve 
democratie is onderdeel van een politiek paradigma dat ik politiek als wilsvorming 
noem. Volgens dit paradigma draait politiek om de kwestie hoe er om moet worden 
gegaan met opinies en preferenties van mensen (hun “wil”).560 De conceptie van 
politiek als wilsvorming is ontstaan in de Verlichting en gebaseerd op een commu-
nicatieve dynamiek tussen private (strategisch) en publieke (redelijke) preferenties. 
In het tijdperk van de Verlichting kwam de idee van subjectieve autonomie opzet-
ten; de “wij-vraag” werd geïntroduceerd in de politiek, namelijk hoe de samenle-
ving door het volk zelf kon worden bestuurd. Belangrijke denkers in die tijd meen-
den dat het antwoord lag in de bereidheid en capaciteit van de individuele burger 
om zijn of haar motieven te toetsen aan het algemene belang van de maatschappij. 
Het was de verwachting dat vanuit het publieke gebruik van de rede van de burger 
een politieke collectiviteit zou voortkomen.561 De centrale vraag, volgens politiek 
als wilsvorming, is hoe de wil van de burger politieke legitiem kan worden.
 Ik stel een alternatieve conceptie van politiek voor en noem haar politiek 
als jurisdictie. Deze opvatting van politiek is niet gebaseerd op het publiek/privé-
onderscheid tussen egoïstische en altruïstische preferenties, maar tussen politieke 















n legt geen direct verband tussen legitimiteit van politieke autoriteit en maatschap-
pelijke processen van wilsvorming (waaronder verstaan kan worden meningsvor-
ming, kennisverwerving, waarheidsvinding, deliberatie, etc.), maar maakt juist een 
principieel onderscheid tussen hen. Politiek als jurisdictie houdt zich bezig met het 
zoeken naar de juiste balans tussen enerzijds het belang van een autonome maat-
schappij en anderzijds de noodzaak van een publieke interventiemacht. Politiek is 
niet het resultaat van, maar de voorwaarde voor processen van wilsvorming; haar 
legitimiteit ligt niet in de kwaliteit van preferenties maar in de kwaliteit van het 
representatieve kader van de publieke autoriteit, waarmee processen van wilsvor-
ming in een politieke eenheid worden geplaatst.
 Politiek als jurisdictie doet de lezer wellicht denken aan het bekende onder-
scheid tussen private concepties van het goede en publieke concepties van recht-
vaardigheid, maar niets is minder waar. Het onderscheid tussen staat en maatschap-
pij, tussen civiele autonomie en publieke autoriteit, is niet gebaseerd op waarden en 
meningen en loopt niet parallel aan het onderscheid tussen morele en niet-morele 
preferenties. Het ideaal van politiek als jurisdictie is niet de publieke rede waarop 
een constitutie gebaseerd dient te zijn, maar een complexer idee van politieke een-
heid. De politieke kwestie is niet hoe een onderscheid te maken tussen publieke, 
redelijke, en private, onredelijke, waarden, maar hoe een balans te vinden tussen de 
uitvoerende macht van de publieke autoriteit aan de ene kant en het begrip van de 
maatschappelijke processen van wilsvorming, aan de andere kant. De politiek dient 
verstand te hebben van ziekenhuizen en wat daar gebeurt, maar alleen om een der-
gelijke institutie een zodanig wettelijke identiteit te verlenen dat het zelf optimaal 
kan functioneren. Politiek moet macht en verantwoordelijkheden van belangheb-
benden in die medische wereld in recht vertalen, zodat het medische werk zo goed 
mogelijk verloopt. Politieke kennis is juist zo lastig omdat het zowel vraagt om 
een concreet inzicht in wat mensen beweegt, een politiek gevoel, als een abstract 
verstand om te bepalen hoe de maatschappij bestuurd moet worden, een juridische 
geest.
De opzet van het boek is als volgt. In deel 1 analyseer ik de onvolkomenheden van 
politiek als wilsvorming en de voorkeur voor politiek als jurisdictie vanuit verschil-
lende perspectieven: historisch, analytisch en epistemologisch. In deel 2 continueer 
ik mijn argument maar doe dat door een—noodzakelijkerwijs—beknopte politiek-
theoretische geschiedenis van het publiek/privé-onderscheid. Het is mijn bedoeling 
om de verschillende wortels van beide politieke paradigma’s bloot te leggen en 
uiteindelijk verschillende concepten en ideeën te introduceren die als bouwstenen 
van politiek als jurisdictie kunnen dienen. Ik heb bewust gekozen voor dit brede 
perspectief om de historische inbedding van politiek als jurisdictie te laten zien. Dat 
betekent dat nog veel onderzoek naar de actuele betekenis van politiek als jurisdic-
tie gedaan moet worden, als ook naar haar afzonderlijke theoretische elementen. Dit 
is voor de toekomst.
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 In hoofdstuk 1 onderzoek ik het morele idee achter politiek als wilsvorming: 
de publicity imperative. Hieronder versta ik de verwachting dat mensen hun parti-
culiere opvattingen dienen te verbeteren door ze kritisch en publiekelijk te bespre-
ken. Ik stel dat deze imperatief tot het opzoeken van publiciteit een goed perspectief 
op politieke problemen hindert. Ik illustreer dat aan de hand van drie kwesties: het 
debat over de democratische belofte van het Internet, Richard Rorty’s ironische kri-
tiek op het liberalisme, en tenslotte de relatie tussen vrijheid van religie en vrijheid 
van meningsuiting. Ik beweer dat in al deze debatten het politieke probleem als een 
probleem van wilsvorming wordt gezien. Mijn conclusie is dat politiek, opgevat als 
morele strijd tussen private en publieke preferenties, een te beperkte opvatting is. 
Een meer gelaagde opvatting van polititiek is wenselijk, hetgeen een frisse studie 
naar de conceptuele kwaliteiten van het publiek/privé-onderscheid noodzakelijk 
maakt.
 Hoofdstuk 2 is een pleidooi voor de merites van het publiek/privé-onder-
scheid in de politieke theorie. Het onderscheid kan dienen om bepaalde ideeën in 
de politieke theorie te illustreren—zoals de publicity imperative. Anders gezegd, 
politiek theoretiseren wordt onvermijdelijk beïnvloed door bepaalde metafysische 
impressies van de wereld, die vervolgens gëexpliciteerd kunnen worden aan de 
hand van het publiek/privé-onderscheid. Het onderscheid vormt dus een concep-
tuele brug tussen intuïtie en theorie. Ik onderzoek het verband tussen metafysica 
en theorie, en de rol van het publiek/privé-onderscheid hierin, in een bespreking 
van Raymond Geuss’ Public Goods, Private Goods (2001). Tegengesteld aan zijn 
eigen verwerping van metafysica beweer ik dat Geuss’ boek heel mooi laat zien hoe 
een politieke benadering beïnvloed is door metafysica; het werk biedt de lezer een 
kijkje achter de schermen van een politieke filosoof en laat zien hoe zijn wereldbe-
schouwing zijn theorie doordringt.
 Hoofdstuk 3 is een analytische kritiek op politiek als wilsvorming en een 
introductie van politiek als jurisdictie. Aan de basis van politiek als jurisdictie ligt 
het eerder genoemde publiek/privé-onderscheid tussen “maatschappij” en “staat”. 
Om deze bewering te onderbouwen analyseer ik Jon Elster’s klassieke verdediging 
van deliberatieve democratie. Elster beschouwt politieke theorie aan de hand van 
twee karakteristieken: ten eerste het politieke proces, dat gedefinieerd kan worden 
als privaat of publiek, en ten tweede het doel van politieke theorie, dat gedefinieerd 
kan worden als instrumenteel of intrinsiek. Het resultaat van deze analyse leidt tot 
drie modellen van politieke theorie (of democratie): liberaal, deliberatief en repu-
blikeins. Alleen de laatste twee zijn uiteindelijk het onderzoeken waard volgens 
Elster, omdat zij het politieke proces als publiek kenschetsen. Het liberale model 
ziet politiek als privaat. Elster pleit voor een forum approach van politiek, omdat 
de essentie van politiek ligt in de publieke discussie of deliberatie van preferenties. 
Ik stel de vraag waarom Elster niet het vierde model noemt, namelijk, politieke 















n genegeerd, of over het hoofd heeft gezien, door zijn benadering van politiek, name-
lijk als wilsvorming. Mijn suggestie een alternatieve benadering van politiek, als 
jurisdictie, serieus te nemen maakt het vierde model van wilsvorming wél plausi-
bel. Ik noem het “civiele democratie” om het private karakter hiervan te benadruk-
ken. Politiek als jurisdictie in dit opzicht is het publieke aspect van democratie en 
houdt zich bezig met het vinden van een balans tussen de publieke interventiemacht 
van de staat en de bescherming en facilitering van de institutionele autonomie van 
civiele processen van wilsvorming. Politiek als jurisdictie is het praktische gevolg 
van de idee van volkssoevereiniteit: om vrij te zijn, geeft de burger zijn soeverei-
niteit aan een publieke autoriteit, die met dat mandaat burgerlijke vrijheid dient te 
waarborgen. Hiermee gaat een publieke vervreemding gepaard die onvermijdelijk 
is, aangezien civiele wilsvorming en politieke jurisdictie niet tot elkaar te herleiden 
zijn. De publieke discussie over politieke legitimiteit (of de democratische legitimi-
teit van de staat) gaat over hoe de staat om moet gaan met de institutionele vrijheid 
van civiele praktijken van wilsvorming.
 Hoofdstuk 4, het laatste hoofdstuk van het eerste deel van het boek, is een 
epistemologische analyse van politieke theorie. Ik neem drie stellingen over politie-
ke theorie die geregeld terugkomen in de literatuur onder de loep. Deze stellingen 
hebben een pragmatische grondslag gemeen. Volgens de eerste stelling is politieke 
theorie praktisch en niet metafysisch, omdat zij probleemoplossend dient te zijn. 
Volgens de tweede stelling is politieke theorie sociaal-constructivistisch, omdat zij, 
zoals alle theorie, de werkelijkheid construeert. De laatste stelling benadrukt dat 
politieke theorie intersubjectief is, omdat haar conclusies gerechtvaardigd dienen te 
worden ten opzichte van degene voor wie ze bedoeld zijn: het publiek. Ik bekritiseer 
deze stellingen in het licht van wat ik beschouw als een cruciale epistemologische 
kwestie, het “kenprobleem”. Het kenprobleem is het essentiële verschil tussen de 
ervaring en de beschrijving van de werkelijkheid, en leidt tot een classificatie van 
drie orders van sociale constructie: niet-talig (nulde orde), informeel (eerste orde) 
en rationeel (tweede orde). Het pragmatisme maakt geen principieel onderscheid 
tussen de ordes van constructie, en heeft daarmee een grote invloed op de moderne 
politieke theorie uitgeoefend. Pragmatische epistemologie draait om informele ken-
nis, kennis die tijdelijk gebruikt wordt om zo goed mogelijk in een bepaalde situ-
atie te functioneren: rationele kennis geeft in dit opzicht slechts een technische 
richting aan informele betekenisgeving, terwijl niet-rationele kennis volgens het 
pragmatisme betekenisloos is zolang deze niet vertaald is. In hoofdstuk 3 stelde 
ik dat deliberatieve democratie een inadequate democratietheorie oplevert omdat 
het politiek als een publiek process van rationele wilsvorming ziet. In hoofdstuk 4 
laat ik zien dat hierachter een pragmatische epistemologie schuilgaat. Deliberatieve 
democratie begrijpt menselijke wilsvorming als een sociale constructie en ziet poli-
tieke theorie in dit opzicht als een normatieve theorie die menselijke wilsvorming 
in een kader van publieke en redelijke deliberatie plaatst. Ik claim echter dat, naast 
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informele kennisverwerving, de andere aspecten—rationeel en non-rationeel—van 
kennisverwerving even belangrijk zijn voor een politieke theorie. Daarom pleit ik 
voor politieke theorie als een derde orde constructie: ze reconstrueert tweede orde 
rationalisaties (instituties, regels, protocols) van eerste en nulde orde kennis, met 
het doel deze processen een wettelijk kader te geven. Politieke theorie kan dus 
niet slechts probleemoplossend zijn (praktisch), maar is ook metafysisch, omdat 
ze niet-talige kennis een plek moet geven. Politieke theorie, tenslotte, kan wel als 
“intersubjectief’ geduid worden, maar niet op een redelijk, maar op een symbolisch 
niveau—als representatie van bepaalde tweede orde rationaliteiten.
 In hoofdstukken 5 en 6 ontwikkel ik het idee van civiele democratie als model 
van democratische wilsvorming. Ik doe dat door Griekse concepties van publiek en 
privé te bestuderen. Mijn indirecte ambitie is een opvatting van de Griekse—eigen-
lijk Atheense—politieke traditie te geven die uitgebalanceerder is dan, wat ik noem, 
de modernistische versie, die sterk door het liberalisme is beïnvloed is. Ik beweerde 
in hoofdstuk 1 dat een liberale conceptie van democratie de moderne ontwikkeling 
van politiek geweld aandoet, omdat deze ontwikkeling gedomineerd wordt door het 
imperatief publiciteit op te zoeken. Aan de andere kant van moderne vrijheid ligt een 
scepsis jegens private preferenties. Ik stel dat de Griekse politieke theorie als libe-
raler dan de moderne traditie kan worden gekarakteriseerd, juist omdat de politieke 
scheiding tussen publiek en privé scherper werd getrokken. Wilsvorming en juris-
dictie zijn in de moderne opvatting van politiek nauwer verbonden met elkaar dan in 
de Griekse politieke traditie. Het kan daarom een modernistische dwaling genoemd 
worden om Griekse politieke theorie republikeins of deliberatief te interpreteren.
 In hoofdstuk 6 concentreer ik op Plato’s en Aristoteles’ ideeën van “publiek” 
en “privé”. Plato ziet het publiek/privé-onderscheid als een onderscheid tussen 
politiek en kennis dat hij op twee manieren ontwikkelt: ten eerste als een epistemi-
sche relatie tussen individuele en politieke ethiek, en ten tweede als de persoonlijke 
strijd om rechtvaardigheid binnen het publieke kader van recht. Aristoteles verdiept 
het dubbele Platoonse publiek/privé onderscheid door de vraag te stellen welke 
kennis wij eigenlijk kunnen delen, en vervolgens, hoe wij kennis politiek moe-
ten organiseren. Met betrekking tot epistemisch delen onderscheidt Aristoteles drie 
soorten van rationele kennis (theoretisch, praktisch en technisch) en met betrekking 
tot het politiek organiseren van kennis onderscheidt hij twee concepties van wat 
ik noem “civiele autarkie”: institutionele pluraliteit en menselijke pluriformiteit. 
Volgens Aristoteles is het doel van politiek het vinden van een gemiddelde dat als 
leidraad dient voor menselijk functioneren—dit impliceert een grens aan de zucht 
naar politieke eenwording. Aristoteles benadrukt de tweeledige taak van politiek 
als jurisdictie, namelijk als kennis van de epistemologische status van processen 
van wilsvorming, en anderzijds, als kennis van de taak van politieke organisatie. 
Politieke theorie is een overkoepelende theorie, zegt Aristoteles; het bestudeert de 















n  In hoofdstuk 7 introduceer ik drie moderne concepties van het publiek/privé-
onderscheid. De idee van moderne democratie kan uitgelegd worden aan de hand 
van drie subjectieve noties van openbaarheid. Ten eerste de existentiële, welke 
draait om de relatie tussen het subject en zijn of haar bestaan (de wereld). Ten 
tweede, de morele sensatie, welke draait om de relatie tussen het subject en zijn 
medemens (de maatschappij). Ten derde is er de politieke sensatie van openbaar-
heid en deze bepaalt de relatie tussen het subject en autoriteit (de staat). 
 Een vergelijking tussen Rousseau and Kant brengt twee verschillende bena-
deringen van deze drie noties van openbaarheid in perspectief. Ik laat zien dat Rous-
seau de principiële verschillen tussen de drie aspecten van moderne openbaarheid 
benadrukt, terwijl Kant bezig is hun onderlinge verwantschap te vinden. Morele 
openbaarheid is volgens Kant de verbindende factor tussen existentiële en politieke 
openbaarheid. Het publieke gebruik van de menselijke rede, de kern van morele 
openbaarheid, geeft zin aan het bestaan en is tevens de essentie van democrati-
sche politiek. Kant’s politieke theorie leid tot de klassieke apologie van politiek als 
(morele) wilsvorming. Door zijn rede publiekelijk te gebruiken, zegt Kant, komt 
de mens in contact met zijn soortgenoten, en is hij in staat na te denken over de 
politieke constitutie van de maatschappij. Rousseau’s politieke theorie lijkt wel op 
die van Kant, maar verschilt uiteindelijk wezenlijk. Rousseau vreest dat de morele 
dynamiek van de rede beide andere noties van openbaarheid bedreigt. Menselijke 
vervreemding (existentieel en politiek) is onvermijdelijk. Vanuit politiek opzicht 
moet de legitimiteit van de politieke constitutie, en daarmee van de publieke autori-
teit, niet afhankelijk gemaakt worden van morele wilsvorming. Rousseau verwerpt 
het Kantiaanse primaat van morele openbaarheid en ijvert voor een gelijkwaardige 
positie van de drie moderne noties van openbaarheid.
 In hoofstuk 8 leg ik uit hoe Rousseau’s vrees is bewaarheid. Door een ana-
lyse van de politieke opvattingen van Marx, Mill, en Dewey, laat ik zien hoe de 
dominantie van het morele publiek/privé-onderscheid geleid heeft tot een publieke 
discours waarin existentiële en politieke openbaarheid verdwenen zijn. Het poli-
tieke subject wordt gekarakteriseerd door zijn morele status: zijn capaciteit om zijn 
private preferenties publiekelijk te transformeren is de bron van democratische 
legitimiteit geworden. De integratieve functie van morele wilsvorming heeft geleid 
tot een double bind van de publieke sfeer. De publieke sfeer wordt gezien als een 
deliberatieve ruimte waar zowel moraal als politieke legitimiteit wordt gevormd. 
Het ongelukkige effect is een politisering van publieke discussies en een moralise-
ring van politieke discussies.
 In de conclusie keer ik terug naar de theoretische kernpunten van dit onder-
zoek. Ik illustreer ze door de relatie tussen politiek als jurisdictie en een civiele 
praktijk tot voorbeeld te nemen, namelijk een religieuze school.
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Many political scholars argue that the opposition between liberalism and 
republicanism has been successfully challenged by deliberative democracy. 
Deliberativists aim to rejuvenate the idea of democracy as popular self-government, 
maintaining that political decisions should be (as much as possible) the result 
of public deliberation. In my dissertation I critically examine the deliberative 
intuition. I argue that it is a symptom of a political paradigm, which originated in 
the Enlightenment. I call it politics as will formation. According to this paradigm, 
politics evolves around the issue of how to deal in a democratic way with people’s 
preferences. Politics as will formation is based on a moral private/public distinction 
between strategic and reasonable preferences. I propose an alternative conception, 
which I call politics as jurisdiction. This conception is based on the public/private 
distinction between state authority and civil autonomy. Politics as jurisdiction 
does not relate the legitimacy of the political system to the moral quality of public 
discussion—it strictly distinguishes between them.
 
In Chapter 1, I explore the moral idea behind politics as will formation, called 
the “publicity imperative.” I argue that it hampers an adequate perspective on 
political issues, and I introduce three topics to exemplify this: the debate about the 
democratic potential of the Internet, Richard Rorty’s ironist critique on liberalism, 
and the relation between freedom of religion and freedom of speech. I argue that in 
all these debates the political problem at hand is viewed as an issue of political will 
formation. My conclusion is that a moral perspective is too narrow for an adequate 
political theory. A more complex conception of politics is called for.
 In Chapter 2, I explain how using the public/private distinction may clarify 
some basic ideas that inform political theory—for instance, the publicity imperative. 
It could be generally said that political theory is affected by metaphysical impressions 
of the world, which should be made explicit during analysis. The public/private 
distinction is a conceptual bridge between intuition and theory, in this respect, and I 
develop this thought by reviewing Raymond Geuss’s Public Goods, Private Goods 
(2001).
 In Chapter 3, I analyze Jon Elster’s classic defense of deliberative democracy. 
Elster distinguishes three political theories (liberal, deliberative, republican) in light 
of two sets of characteristics: the political process (private or public) and political 
purpose (instrumental or intrinsic). I ask why Elster did not analyze the fourth 
model, in which the political process is private and the political purpose intrinsic. I 
explain the omission by referring to Elster’s underlying paradigm of politics as will 
formation. Politics as jurisdiction strongly improves the plausibility of the missing 





















n between the political and civil aspect of democracy. Politics understood as 
“jurisdiction” is concerned with finding the balance between the implementation of 
public authority and the preservation of the institutional autonomy of civil practices 
of will formation.
 In Chapter 4 I scrutinize three postulates of political theory that often recur 
in contemporary literature and are heavily influenced by pragmatism. I critically 
analyze them in the light of a key epistemological issue: the “epistemic problem.” 
This leads to a classification of three orders of the social construction of knowledge: 
non-linguistic, tacit and rational. I argue that pragmatist epistemology does not 
strictly distinguish between these orders of construction, a lack that has influenced 
contemporary political theory a great deal. Pragmatism is based on acquiring tacit 
knowledge, from which perspective rational knowledge merely gives technical 
guidance, while non-linguistic knowledge has no meaning until put in words. I 
argue that all orders of construction are, in their own right, imperative for any 
political theory. I finish the chapter by revisiting the three postulates of political 
theory.
 In Chapters 5 and 6, I develop the model of “civil democracy” by examining 
the public and private in Greek political theory. In Chapter 5 I present an account 
of the Greek political tradition that is more balanced than a modernist account, 
which is heavily influenced by liberalism. I argue that Greek political theory can be 
characterized as more liberal than the modern tradition, and that it is a modernist 
misunderstanding to depict Greek political theory so republically.
 In Chapter 6, I concentrate on Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of “public” 
and “private.” Plato elaborates the distinction twofold: as a relation between 
individual and political ethics, on the one hand, and as the pursuit of truth within 
a framework of law, on the other. Aristotle expands this double Platonic private/
public distinction by asking what knowledge we can actually share, and how we can 
manage that knowledge. Both issues need to be tackled by distinguishing between 
three types of rational knowledge (technical, practical and theoretical) and two 
values of civil self sufficiency (institutional plurality and human pluriformity).
 In Chapter 7, I explain the idea of modern democracy as comprising three 
subjective senses of publicness: existential, which concerns the relation between 
the subject and existence; moral, which concerns the subject’s relation with others; 
and thirdly, political, which concerns the relation between the subject and political 
authority. A comparison between Rousseau and Kant brings into perspective their 
different approaches to these distinctions. I argue that Rousseau does the best job 
explaining the differences between the three aspects of modern publicness, while 
Kant is focused on moral publicness, which he sees as the core of modern politics. 
Kant’s theory is the classic apology of politics as will formation, while Rousseau 
rescues politics as jurisdiction by claiming that all three senses of publicness have 
equal democratic stature.
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 In Chapter 8, I explain, by the writings of Marx, Mill, and Dewey, how 
Rousseau’s fears have become real; that is, how the Kantian domination of the 
moral public/private distinction has given birth to a political discourse in which 
both existential and political publicness have disappeared. This has led to what 
I call the double bind of the public sphere: the public sphere is seen as a place 
where both moral preferences are constructed and political legitimacy is created. 
The erroneous effect is a political understanding of public discussions and a moral 
understanding of political discussions.
 In the Conclusion, I return to the main theoretical aspects of the study, and 
put them into perspective by sketching the relation between politics as jurisdiction 
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